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ABSTRACT 
The United States eventually will face an existential catastrophe. An “existential 
catastrophe” would result in cascading effects extending well beyond the physical 
boundaries of the event. When studying the federal response to major disasters, it is 
apparent higher levels of presidential interest provide a positive impact on results. The 
lack of coordination of federal response efforts and the inability of the president to 
impose his will to marshal fully federal resources effectively were major problems 
identified after Hurricanes Katrina and Andrew. The inability of the federal government 
to coordinate the federal response efficiently to a catastrophe appears throughout 60 years 
of modern federal disaster response.  
This thesis argues the most efficient way for the president to supervise the federal 
response to an existential catastrophe is to delegate authority for operational decisions to 
a single federal official that would allow the president and his cabinet to focus on 
strategic decisions. The Federal Emergency Management Agency Administrator, who 
would be supported by an empowered Emergency Support Function Leadership Group, 
with authority to direct all agency capabilities released to them by the president and their 
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A. THE PROBLEM SPACE 
Since the United States (U.S.) declared its independence from Great Britain in 
1776, it has been blessed to have avoided a true catastrophe. Since the British burned 
Washington in 1814, the nation has never again faced the serious threat of invasion. 
When the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons in 1949, the country managed to 
prevail in the Cold War and avoided mutually assured destruction. Even the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, as horrific and shocking as they were, did not threaten the nation’s 
survival.  
Likewise, the United States has so far managed to avoid a major natural 
catastrophe. The New Madrid earthquakes of 1811 and 1812 occurred in a sparsely 
occupied area of the country. The Great Chicago Fire of 1871, the Charleston Earthquake 
of 1886, the San Francisco Earthquake of 1906, and Hurricane Katrina’s impact on New 
Orleans in 2005 did not result in the abandonment of these cities. Nor did the deaths of 
675,000 citizens during the Great Pandemic of 1918–1919 significantly alter the 
trajectory of the United States after its victory in World War I.1 However, history has 
shown that the malevolent effects of nature or man cannot be held in abeyance forever. 
Whether it is the buried city of Pompei, the Bronze Age cataclysmic explosion of the 
Volcano Thera wiping out Mionian culture, the plagues and Black Death of the Middle 
Ages and near history, time is littered with cities and whole civilizations destroyed by 
nature. Likewise, mankind’s penchant for developing ever deadlier ways to kill now 
creates the possibility mankind can wreak the kind of destruction once reserved for the 
gods. While the threat of nuclear war has subsided with the end of the Cold War, the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, whether from North Korea, a coup-wracked Pakistan or 
a future nuclear armed Iran, seems to be increasing. Smuggling just a handful of nuclear 
weapons into the United States could inflict irreversible damage. Similarly, advances in 
science and biological engineering mean that persons with the right knowledge, 
                                                 
1 United States Department of Health and Human Services, “The Great Pandemic, The United States 
in 1917–1919,” Flu.gov (n..d), http://www.flu.gov/pandemic/history/1918/. 
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resources, and intent could unleash viruses that could devastate whole continents, if not 
the world. Even the embrace of technology means that events that caused little 
consternation for this country’s forebears, such as the sun launched Carrington Super 
Flare of 1859, could grind the country to a halt.2 
At some point, the United States will face an existential catastrophe.3 It will 
quickly overwhelm the resources of state and local governments, the private sector, 
volunteers, and individuals. The federal government will need to act effectively and 
decisively to coalesce the nation’s capabilities and coordinate its efforts to ensure the 
broadest use of its resources. The president is uniquely situated, and in fact armed by the 
Constitution and Congress, to ensure the continuity of the nation and its states and 
territories. The federal government will need to be a focal point for situational awareness 
and a fulcrum for action. The president must be a beacon of confidence delivered through 
tangible displays of relief.  
However, the federal government’s record at responding to major disasters, much 
less catastrophes, is mixed at best.4 While it appears most Americans were satisfied with 
the recent federal response to Hurricane Sandy,5 it did not rise to the level of a 
catastrophe, which is the problem space this thesis seeks to explore; how to best organize, 
prepare, and deliver the federal response to an existential catastrophe. 
The current federal response to disasters is based upon a foundation of diffused 
responsibility, which falls upon local government, governors, various federal agencies, 
                                                 
2 Wikipedia, “Solar Storm of 1859” (n.d.), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_storm_of_1859. 
3 “Existential catastrophe” is a new definition proposed for events of this magnitude and is discussed 
in further detail in Chapter I. An “existential catastrophe” would (1) directly affect at least one of the 11 
U.S. mega-regions; (2) result in cascading events beyond a mega-region either unforeseen or 
unmanageable; and (3) create a direct threat to the immediate stability or long-term prospects of the nation. 
4 See generally, Claire B. Rubin, ed., Emergency Management: The American Experience 1900–2010 
(CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 2012). Rising expectations by the American public may also contribute to 
this perception. Moreover, as Rutherford H. Platt notes in Disasters and Democracy, the process of 
federalizing disasters has changed the public’s perspective from compassion to entitlement…). Rutherford 
H. Platt, Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events (Washington, DC: Island Press, 
1999). 
5 Rasmussen Reports, “36% Say Government Did Good Job Responding to Hurricane Sandy,” 
Tuesday, January 8, 2013, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/ 
january_2013/36_say_government_did_good_job_responding_to_hurricane_sandy. 
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the president, and for certain services, the private sector. It is a system premised on the 
idea of “bottom up,” in that local officials will attempt to respond to an incident, and if 
they need assistance, they will seek additional resources from the private sector, state and 
federal government. However, even when the event is damaging enough to result in a 
declaration under the Stafford Act by the president, diffused responsibility still exists. 
This makes sense between the states and federal government, given the powers reserved 
for the States under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, but diffused responsibility 
exists even within the Executive Branch. This shared responsibility in emergency 
response doctrine is referred to as “unity of effort.” Nevertheless, unity of effort may be 
hiding, if not exacerbating the lack of responsibility and supervision necessary to harness 
the full breadth of federal capabilities for an existential catastrophe. 
While the United States has not suffered from an existential catastrophe, it has 
weathered multiple serious disasters in the last few decades, primarily hurricanes and 
flooding with a handful of earthquakes in California. The federal response for the most 
damaging events was often heavily criticized. However, on those occasions during which 
the president took a more aggressive role, the federal response seems to have been more 
efficient and more favorably received.6 As stated in the congressionally chartered 
National Academy of Public Administration report Coping with Catastrophe, “The 
relationship of emergency management to the president, or more broadly the institutional 
presidency, is crucial and has been so throughout history.” A line from a New York 
Times editorial put it bluntly: “The President gets the kind of FEMA he deserves.”“7 For 
instance, once Frank Carlucci was sent to Pennsylvania to oversee federal relief efforts 
for Hurricane Agnes in Pennsylvania at the direct behest of President Nixon, the 
perception of the federal government became a net positive. This event, however, was 
probably the last gasp of the original federal disaster response organization, which for 
                                                 
6 “While there is no definitive answer as to the extent to which the president should be involved in 
emergency management functions, events have shown that when responses to catastrophic disasters involve 
decisions made by, or with the support of, the president, their outcomes tend to be superior to those of 
responses handled solely by administrative channels.” Keith Brea, “The Formative Years: 1950–1978,” in 
Emergency Management: The American Experience 1900–2010, ed. Claire B. Rubin (CRC Press, April 3, 
2012). 
7 Wamsley et al., Coping With Catastrophe, National Academy of Public Administration, February 
1993, 21. 
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around 15 years had been run from the White House. Since President Nixon8 moved the 
coordination of federal disaster response from the White House, a consistent theme of a 
lack of direct presidential attention to disaster response has ensued.9  
If the ability of the president to impose his will on the federal response to a 
disaster is so important, the question becomes whether a way might exist to improve 
presidential interest in a way that maximizes his involvement while recognizing the 
competing claims on his time and attentiveness? Does a way exist to make the president 
present in a disaster response without actually being present all the time? To answer this 
question, this thesis proposes the substitution of unity of command rather than unity of 
effort amongst the federal agencies not engaged in law enforcement activities or the 
Department of Defense (DoD) as a way to maximize presidential involvement in the 
federal response to an existential catastrophe.10 Given the breadth of decisions to be 
made, a choice was made to focus on the operational level of response, which as defined 
later in this thesis, is the highest level of federal government decision-making processes 
dedicated to a particular incident, in this case, an existential catastrophe. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
When conducting a literature review on how to improve the federal response to an 
existential catastrophe, what is astonishing is how the same problems persist from one 
disaster to the next. It is striking to see how many of the lessons and problems identified 
after Hurricane Andrew by official government inquiries, such as those from the National 
                                                 
8 However, President Johnson was more active. “But perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the 
response to Hurricane Betsy was the direct involvement of President Johnson, who took it upon himself to 
monitor the actions of federal agencies and mandated that federal personnel (including the director of OEP) 
remain in the stricken area to oversee relief operations. Thus, President Johnson modeled a new role for the 
president as an active and engaged emergency manager.” Brea, “The Formative Years: 1950–1978,” in 
Emergency Management: The American Experience 1900–2010. 
9 After this thesis was begun, Hurricane Sandy battered the U.S. East Coast. During the response, 
President Obama took a very prominent role, including multiple meetings with the FEMA Administrator at 
FEMA headquarters; however, the research for this thesis was mostly completed before that event and was 
not included, in part because many of its lessons are still being digested. However, in Hurricanes Andrew 
and Katrina, which are discussed in depth later in this thesis, the President did not take a prominent role, at 
least until after the federal response struggled. 
10 As will be discussed later, legally distinct chains of command are in place from the President to law 
enforcement agencies, and the DoD, and it will be argued, the whole of federal government directly 
involved in disaster response, or what was formerly called “consequence management.” 
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Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), the General Accountability Office (GAO)11 
and the federal FEMA Inspector General (IG), were found again in the thorough reports 
of the House and Senate on Hurricane Katrina. However, relevant material on the 
government’s review of federal disaster interagency coordination can be found as far 
back as the 1950s in the annual reports of the Federal Civil Defense Administration. 
Congress also embarked on extensive hearings on the Disaster Relief Acts beginning with 
the first Act in 1950, and most recently with the Stafford Act in 1988, and the Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) in 2006. The Congressional 
hearings in the wake of Hurricane Agnes in 1972, which later led to the Disaster Relief 
Act of 1974, provided crucial evidence of when federal disaster relief efforts can succeed 
when the president provides strong support through a single representative. 
Understanding the evolution of federal interagency coordination in disasters 
would have been impossible without the documents provided to the Federation of 
American Scientists website by William Cumming, a former attorney with FEMA.12 
These documents revealed the origins of the current national disaster response plans, 
Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and the various interagency forums created and 
then abandoned by the White House. They are especially revealing of the lack of 
coordinated federal interagency coordination before Hurricane Andrew and that at the 
time of the hurricane, two competing federal disaster coordination systems were actually 
in place. 
After Hurricane Andrew, federal disaster response literature showed a spike in 
interest in the role of DoD forces, likely because the overwhelming success of the 1991 
Gulf War, juxtaposed against Hurricane Andrew, led to a debate about whether disaster 
response should be taken over by the DoD. While the consensus was that the DoD should 
not take on disaster response, a position held by the DoD itself, DoD doctrine proved an 
invaluable resource when filling in the holes of current federal disaster response doctrine. 
For instance, it proved crucial to carving out the “operational” level of disaster response 
                                                 
11 The GAO was formerly known as the General Accounting Office. 
12 Federal of American Scientists, “Federal Emergency Management Agency, Resources,” Updated 
August 26, 2013, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/fema/. 
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and DoD doctrine promoting mission command provides a good example of how 
resources can be delivered from the operational to tactical level of disaster response. 
The poor federal response to Hurricane Katrina spawned a slew of literature on 
how to improve the federal response to a disaster. The Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) had been issuing periodic reports on federal disaster readiness well before Katrina, 
which formed a good basis to judge subsequent literature on the subject. One unexpected 
source of information was various reports on federal disaster coordination by the Heritage 
Foundation, primarily authored by Dr. James Carafano. While the Heritage Foundation is 
well known for its conservative beliefs, Dr. Carafano’s analysis, including a book on the 
subject, appeared to be evenhanded, and in addition to the documents provided by Mr. 
Cumming, provided another source on the history of federal interagency disaster 
coordination.13 
A review of the literature on the Stafford Act revealed four general categories of 
articles: (1) Overview of the Stafford Act, (2) its support, or lack thereof for Federalism, 
(3) the utilization of military forces in relationship to the Stafford Act, and (4) specific 
grievances against provisions of the Stafford Act, which are usually centered around the 
grant programs to rebuild state facilities. A small subset on the issue of Federalism also 
exists around the discussion of criteria necessary to make a declaration under the Stafford 
Act and the political and economic influences and consequences. What does not appear is 
any sense of the utility of the Stafford Act; does it in fact make a good tool to execute 
federal responsibilities under the law? The lack of utilitarian or consequential discussion 
is unexpected given the greater prominence of the Stafford Act after Hurricane Katrina. 
Outside of CRS, however, its think tank cousins seem to have little interest in the 
Stafford Act. For instance, a review of the website for the RAND Corporation does not 
reveal one single substantive review of the Stafford Act. The only think tank that has 
taken somewhat of an interest was the Heritage Foundation, led primarily again by the 
analysis of Dr. James Carafano, who has consistently analyzed the Act in support of his  
 
                                                 
13 James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to 
Crisis (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008). 
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goal of a limited, federalized national government. While their goal may be to limit the 
responsibilities of the federal government, it does reserve a role for it during catastrophic 
disasters that overwhelm state resources. 
A final crucial resource was locating several interviews and writings of Richard 
Falkenrath. Through his works, the reasoning behind the amalgamation of crisis and 
consequence management can be discovered, along with the misconception that having 
both crisis and consequence management had a detrimental effect on federal disaster 
coordination.14  
C. METHOD OF INQUIRY 
This thesis utilizes a policy analysis to determine which federal official might be 
best suited to exercise unity of command of the federal operational response to an 
existential catastrophe. Six federal officials or positions have been identified to 
implement unity of command. These officials are the Secretary for the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), the Secretary of Defense, the FEMA Administrator, the 
Principal Federal Official (PFO), the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), and agency 
secretaries and leaders chosen from agencies with technical expertise based upon the type 
of event, termed the lead federal agency model. In addition, a seventh choice exists, that 
of choosing the status quo based upon unity of effort.  
Based upon the literature review, four criteria were chosen as they appear to 
reflect the baseline of necessary actions for the adoption of unity of command to provide 
a more efficient federal operational response. These criteria are (1) compliance with 
current law, (2) political acceptance by the president, Congress, federal agencies and the 
states, (3) efficiency in mobilizing, coordinating, and directing the federal response 
through identifying federal response capabilities, organizing federal response capabilities, 
coordinating federal response capabilities, directing federal response capabilities, and 
engaging the Whole Community for response, and (4) public acceptance including the 
Whole Community. Each alternative will be ranked against one another and the lowest 
                                                 
14 Falkenrath’s views are discussed in detail in Chapter II under the subheading, The Distinction 
Between Crisis and Consequence Management. 
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score will indicate the most appropriate choice. As proof of concept, the federal response 
to Hurricane Katrina will be revisited and key decisions will be reimagined but with unity 
of command being exercised for the federal operational response. While Hurricane 
Katrina did not rise to the level of an existential catastrophe, it was chosen since it was 
the largest and most complicated disaster to strike the United States in the last two 
decades. This event probably comes closest to an existential catastrophe than any other 
recent incident. 
D. A THESIS ROADMAP 
When studying the federal response to major disasters, it is apparent higher levels 
of presidential interest in the response provide a positive impact on results.15 However, a 
tendency has occurred to distance the president from disaster response, some of which 
may come from the idea that the president’s options are limited. Unlike the president’s 
control over the military that has a very clear chain of command to combatant 
commanders, responsibility for the federal response is quickly scattered throughout the 
government, especially for preparedness.  
Federal agencies respond to lesser emergencies under their own authorities on a 
continual basis. At some point, the idea appeared that the maximal federal disaster 
response authority embodied in the succession of Disaster Relief Acts could impinge on 
these agencies’ standing authority if used to direct agencies’ response efforts. Instead, 
over time, a framework based upon coordination, and ultimately, unity of effort came into 
place with the adoption of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the 
Incident Command System (ICS). However, these systems were based upon different 
facts and legal frameworks than the federal interagency.  
                                                 
15 See footnote 6. See also “Similar to the troubled national responses to Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew 
in 1989 and 1992 respectively, the federal government failed to recognize the magnitude of the situation 
presented by Hurricane Katrina prior to landfall, adequately project future needs, fully engage the 
President, and respond in a proactive and timely manner.” U.S. House of Representatives, A Failure of 
Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee, February 15, 2006, 131; “A catastrophic event 
requires decisive leadership at all levels—from the affected locality, to the state government, to federal 
agencies, and to the White House.” U.S. Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Special 
Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, S. Rept. 109–322, 2006, 233. 
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NIMS and ICS were formed for agencies that had equal jurisdiction through their 
legal responsibilities to protect either their citizens or property from fire. City firefighters 
might report to their mayor, county fire fighters might to their county board or supervisor, 
state resources might belong to the governor; federal supervisors report to an entirely 
separate government structure.16 None of these entities has the authority to tell the others 
what to do when responding to a wildland fire. In response, NIMS and ICS adopted a 
committee approach in which a forum could be created for these entities to come together 
to exchange information and attempt to make coordinated decisions. Unity of effort was 
the best solution to this problem when faced with multiple jurisdictional entities with 
equal authority. 
The same facts do not apply to the federal interagency response to a disaster when 
the president has declared a major disaster or emergency under the Stafford Act for those 
agencies not engaged in law enforcement activities or the DoD. Unlike the assorted local, 
state and federal agencies engaged in fighting wildfires, all federal civilian agencies 
engaged in disaster relief under these circumstances, fall under the direct coordination 
and directive authority of the president.17 Over time, the power of the president to 
mobilize, coordinate, and direct the federal response under the Disaster Relief Acts has 
weakened as the offices coordinating the federal disaster response moved further away 
from the president.18 This lack of presidential supervision also affects pre-event 
preparedness activities including typing and credentialing of resources, planning, training 
and exercises. This situation may have occurred after President Nixon removed this 
authority from an office within the White House. Its leader had reported directly to him, 
and he spun it out to a new sub-agency created under the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD). At some point, the notion that the president could directly 
control the entire federal civilian response to a disaster seems to have disappeared. 
                                                 
16 The history and foundation of NIMS and ICS are discussed in detail in Chapter II: The adoption of 
the National Incident Management System, the Incident Command System, and the Multiagency 
Coordination System. 
17 See discussion under Chapter II Stafford Act. 
18 See discussion in Chapter II, which recounts the historical devolution of the power to coordinate the 
federal disaster response from the White House primarily to a sub-cabinet agency within HUD and 
eventually reconstituted over time within FEMA. 
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To show unity of command is a viable option for the president, this thesis retraces 
the progression of specific provisions of the Disaster Relief Acts. These statutes, and 
their accompanying regulations, form the statutory basis for the president’s authority to 
mobilize, coordinate and direct the federal operational response to an existential 
catastrophe. It will show this authority is hidden in plain sight behind the meaning of the 
words “direct any federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to utilize its authorities 
and the resources granted to it under federal law,” “coordinate all disaster relief 
assistance (including voluntary assistance) provided by federal agencies, private 
organizations,” and “federal agencies may on the direction of the president, provide 
assistance essential to meeting immediate threats to life and property.” Also discerned is 
that as Congress made this authority more flexible, federal regulations further restricted 
this authority. At some point, the federal interagency mistook what were decisions of 
policy placed into regulations as statutory barriers.19 A review of these statutes and 
regulations shows this is not true. 
Accompanying this review is a brief outline of the current foundation of federal 
interagency disaster coordination. Beyond the historical reasons for the adoption of 
NIMS and ICS by the federal interagency, it examines how the federal government’s 
current National Response Plan (NRP), the National Response Framework (NRF), was 
built upon older plans beginning in the 1980s. It scrutinizes the federal interagency 
coordinating mechanisms that grew alongside these national plans along with key 
executive orders (EOs) and the evolution of ESFs. It looks at the post-9/11 decision to 
remove the distinction between crisis and consequence management, and how this choice 
may have exacerbated issues with federal interagency coordination by trying to weld 
together two concepts that have distinctly different authorities. These difficulties also 
appear in the uneven supervision of the White House for federal interagency disaster 
                                                 
19 See Chapter II for a detailed discussion on how the directive authority of key federal response 
authorities within the Stafford Act diverged between the statutes and their implementing regulations. In 
addition, the federal government, and particularly FEMA, took very restrictive views of their response 
authorities. See pages 17 and 39–42 of FEMA’s Disaster Management Program: A Performance Audit 
After Hurricane Andrew, Office of Inspector General H-01–93 (Washington, DC: FEMA, January 1993). It 
discusses the real world effects of FEMA’s incorrect assertion that law prevented it from prepositioning 
and moving federal assets prior to a disaster declaration for Hurricane Andrew. 
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coordination with a succession of committees and interagency forums that came and went 
during the previous 25 years. Finally, the origins of the positions of the FCO and PFO are 
explored and placed into current context, including the decision after Hurricane Katrina 
by Congress to restrict use of a PFO significantly. The conclusion of this research shows 
unity of command for the federal operational response is a viable option for the president, 
and that the current interagency process to support the president and to coordinate federal 
disaster response can be improved. 
The foregoing shows the need to improve the president’s coordination and 
direction of the federal operational response to an existential catastrophe and that unity of 
command is a practical option. It is upon this basis, using a policy analysis approach, the 
previously stated alternatives to exercise unity of command on behalf of the president are 
examined using criteria developed from a review of the literature and historical research. 
The resulting inquiry shows the FEMA Administrator is probably best suited to take on 
this responsibility from the president. A retrospective look is then taken at the federal 
operational response to Hurricane Katrina, with a fully empowered FEMA Administrator 
re-envisioned when faced with key decisions during that crisis. This review also looks at 
the roles of the federal interagency to support the FEMA Administrator including the role 
of the president and a fully engaged DHS Secretary to provide the necessary strategic 
direction and advice. 
The conclusion of this thesis is the current federal interagency process to 
mobilize, coordinate, and direct the federal operational response to an existential 
catastrophe is inadequate and can be improved by giving the president greater supervision 
over the response. It is especially true if the intent of the president is to be able to provide 
significant federal resources to an existential catastrophe within the first 72 hours of the 
event, which can be accomplished through the president clearly providing the authority to 
mobilize, coordinate, and direct the federal operational response to a single federal 
official, the FEMA Administrator. The Administrator would be supported by a robust 
federal interagency forum staffed by key federal officials with real authority to deploy 
resources within their agencies. This system must also be utilized in the preparation for 
existential catastrophes.  
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Based upon this conclusion, the following recommendations are made. First, the 
Emergency Support Function Leadership Group (ESFLG) needs to be revitalized and 
become the nexus for the federal interagency operational response to disasters. The 
ESFLG would provide a single focal point for the president to release all the resources of 
the federal government not engaged in law enforcement activities or part of the DoD 
based upon his strategic direction. During an existential catastrophe, it would form a 
Unified Area Command Group (UACG) and report through the FEMA Administrator 
directly to the president and the National Security Council (NSC). The ESFLG would be 
charged with prioritizing and distributing federal resources and capabilities, providing 
direction to distributed federal field operations and to summarily resolve any issues 
regarding these responsibilities unless otherwise directed by the president and the NSC. 
Just as important as the ESFLG’s role in disaster response, is its responsibility for 
disaster preparedness. It is vitally important that the same persons who will have 
operational control over federal response capabilities in an existential catastrophe also be 
the same federal officials who identify, organize, and otherwise, prepare them for the 
response. Organized around the congressionally mandated federal response capability 
inventory and the Catastrophic Resource Report, the ESFLG will identify and organize 
potential federal resources and capabilities for disaster response. Once identified, each 
capability would be tied to a pre-scripted mission assignment (PSMA). Mission 
assignments (MA), which by law belong to FEMA, are the tool that can both direct the 
deployment of these federal response capabilities and fund their operations. With the 
identification of federal response capabilities, coupled with PSMAs, the ESFLG can 
develop metrics for their implementation and exercise them to these standards. This 
process of identifying, organizing, and exercising would provide the basis for the steady 
state operation of the ESFLG. 
Parallel to this internal federal effort, the ESFLG would also reach out to state and 
local governments, the private sector, and other members of the Whole Community. This 
outreach would have several objectives to include ensuring federal capabilities do not 
duplicate activities adequately prepared for by the Whole Community, and where 
possible, identify areas in which federal capabilities can support existing initiatives and 
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capabilities of the Whole Community. An example might include drawing upon the 
significant situational awareness capabilities of the federal government to empower a 
more efficient response of the Whole Community. Of course, this tactic might also work 
in the other direction as well where the ESFLG can identify Whole Community 
capabilities that lead to a more efficient federal response. 
For these recommendations to be implemented, multiple stakeholders would need 
to consent to this new paradigm. These stakeholders are reflected in the criteria chosen to 
select the FEMA Administrator as best suited to exercised unity of command on behalf of 
the president. The most important is the president. If he chose to implement this new 
system, he could likely accomplish it through issuing a new EO declaring his intention 
for the ESFLG and the FEMA Administrator to execute his direction and leverage 
existing EOs, such as EO 12148 Federal Emergency Management, EO 12656 
Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, and Presidential Policy 
Directive (PPD)-8 National Preparedness. While ESFLG preparedness activities may 
require federal agencies to shift existing funding or seek additional resources, by tying 
response activities to an existential catastrophe to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), they 
will have an existing source of funding that can be replenished by Congress more 
efficiently than its current agency-by-agency approach for disaster funding. However, at 
a minimum, the implicit support of Congress will be required, which always retains the 
right to restrict the funding of these activities. 
The federal interagency will also need to accept unity of command as exercised 
by the FEMA Administrator with the support of the ESFLG. Even with the support of the 
president and Congress, federal agencies could feel threatened with a loss of authority 
and influence. These concerns may be ameliorated by the fact federal agencies would 
have access for the first time to funds in the DRF to fund disaster response activities 
previously paid for from their own coffers. In addition, federal agencies might also 




It is also important that state governments understand the utility of this new 
system since the basis of federal disaster relief is to support state and local efforts. 
Education will be a key component as governors should be expressly reminded that in no 
way is the unity of effort affected, which will continue to exist between the federal and 
state governments. 
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II. THE PROBLEM WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S 
CURRENT ORGANIZATION IN PREPARING FOR AND 
RESPONDING TO AN EXISTENTIAL CATASTROPHE 
The central concept in successful adaptation and response is a focus on working 
across traditional boundaries (legal, organizational, and cultural) and understanding that 
trust, networks, collaboration, and cooperation are the building blocks, traditionally, the 
primary means to accomplish this is unity of effort. The author uses this term in distinct 
contrast to the military or law enforcement term “unity of command,” in which the action 
of the organization occurs within a legal framework and compliance with orders is not 
discretionary. 
The concept of unity of command has helped the United States create the greatest 
and most effective fighting force in the history of the world. However, practical and legal 
limits to the employment of military forces do exist.  
Accordingly, we must seek to create unity of effort in an atmosphere in 
which there may be no legal authority to direct participants to act. That is 
the demand being placed on public administrators today, and it requires 
the acquisition of new leadership skills to create unity.20  
Admiral Allen may have been thinking about the Whole of Nation effort required 
to respond to an existential catastrophe. This effort includes the boundaries set forth in 
our Constitution and the principle of Federalism. However, what if legal authority and 
past history could make unity of command available to direct at least part of the federal 
effort to respond to a catastrophic disaster? Could the federal government have taken a 
system developed to work across existing legal, organizational, and cultural boundaries 
and had imposed it on itself where these boundaries did not exist? Would this use of unity 
of effort perversely lead to the creation of boundaries where they previously did not exist, 
and thus, negatively affect the federal response to catastrophic disasters? 
                                                 
20 Thad W. Allen, “Confronting Complexity and Creating Unity of Effort: The Leadership Challenge 
for Public Administrators,” Public Administration Review 72, no. 3 (May/June 2012): 320–321. 
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A. THE PROBLEM 
The lack of coordination of federal response efforts and the inability of the 
president to impose his will to marshal fully federal resources effectively were major 
problems identified after Hurricane Katrina. These problems appeared not just during the 
federal response to Hurricane Katrina but also in Hurricane Andrew in 1992.21 The 
inability of the president and the federal government to coordinate the federal response 
efficiently to a disaster appears consistently throughout 60 years of modern federal 
disaster response. For instance, the following exchange occurred during Congressional 
hearings that led to the Disaster Relief Act of 1974.22 
So effective had been Mr. Carlucci’s brief sojourn that at the Wilkes-Barre 
hearings, two themes were frequently expressed: (1) that the FCO must be perceived as a 
personal representative of the president to be effective, and (2) that the word 
“coordinating” must be interpreted as administering and directing. The following 
colloquy occurred between Senator Burdick and Mr. Carlucci:  
Senator Burdick. Most of the witnesses who testified in our Wilkes-Barre 
hearings would not agree with your comment that a “federal czar” is not 
needed for major disasters. Is it not true under Public Law 91-606 now 
that the federal Coordinating Officer named by the President for each 
major disaster has full coordinating power similar to a so-called czar?  
Mr. Carlucci. He does on paper, Mr. Chairman, to be quite honest with 
you. But, as I indicated in my statement, when you have federal czars who 
are essentially civil servants, it is quite obvious that they don’t have direct 
authority from the President and they do not have the power that I 
inherently had in my role in Wilkes-Barre. But they do have coordinating 
responsibility.  
Senator Burdick. And they get that directly from the President.  
                                                 
21 For a list of those failures, see Chapter I Failures of the Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina. For 
Hurricane Andrew, see the GAO, NAPA and FEMA IG reports referenced in footnotes 38–40.  
22 Frank P. Bourgin, A Legislative History of Disaster Relief 1950–1974, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 1983, 44. 
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Mr. Carlucci. They do get that directly from the President. There is a 
difference between getting it directly from the President on paper and 
getting it directly from the President in person.23 
The issues that plagued the federal response to Tropical Storm Agnes in 1972 
have not faded with time. While speaking of a broader issue than just the federal 
response, one recent commentator stated, “The overarching characteristic of emergency 
management in the United States in 2010 is inadequate integration and coordination of 
the wide range of civilian and military, governmental, private sector, and 
nongovernmental organization participants (NGOs) in preparedness and response.”24 
When faced with an existential catastrophe, the president will be required to 
mobilize, coordinate and direct fully the core capabilities of the federal government in 
response.25 As will be shown, short of direct, sustained daily involvement by the 
president, the current federal interagency response coordination system does not 
efficiently support these objectives. The current model of interagency federal leadership 
modeled upon unified command and based upon the concept of unity of effort is too 
loosely managed for the president to fulfill these objectives in the time critical 
environment of a catastrophic disaster. The failure of the current system of federal 
interagency coordination will be shown by specific examples from the response to 
Hurricane Katrina. This thesis will argue improving federal interagency coordination and 
direction, including the implementation of unity of command amongst federal civilian 
agencies, will fundamentally change and improve the federal response to an existential 
catastrophe.  
                                                 
23 History of Disaster Relief Acts 1983, 44. 
24 William C. Banks, “The Legal Landscape for Emergency Management in the United States, New 
America Foundation,” February 25, 2011, http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/the_legal_landscape_ 
for_emergency_management_in_the_united_states.  
25 “The President is the head of the federal government. The Constitution vests executive power in 
him. He is personally charged with taking care that the nation’s laws are faithfully executed. And while he 
has the apparatus of the entire federal government to aid him in discharging his Constitutional functions, he 
is no titular head of government. To the contrary, only he – or those working in the White House on his 
behalf—has the authority to order all federal agencies to take action, to resolve disputes among 
participating federal agencies, and to ensure that the government as a whole functions as it should in a time 
of crisis and catastrophe.” U.S. Senate, Additional Views Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Senator Carl Levin, 
Senator Daniel K. Akaka, Senator Thomas R. Carper, Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, and Senator Mark L. 
Pryor, Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Special Report of the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, S. Rept. 109–322, 2006, 668. 
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B. THE INEVITABLE FUTURE OF AN EXISTENTIAL CATASTROPHE 
AND CHOICE OF CRITERIA TO CRAFT THE FEDERAL 
OPERATIONAL RESPONSE 
In the last two decades, two disasters in the United States stand out, Hurricanes 
Andrew and Katrina, but neither rose to the level of an existential catastrophe. Despite 
the fact that neither hurricane was “the big one,” in each case, the federal response was 
judged a failure. One solution to the failure of the federal government to respond to the 
future existential catastrophe may be to focus on three criteria to improve the federal 
operational response to an existential catastrophe. The three criteria chosen are 
mobilization, coordination, and direction. These criteria were chosen for two basic 
reasons. First, these are the original “action” words used by the Congress when it began 
developing a formalized federal response to disasters and they continue to inform current 
law. Second, their concept and definition cover the essential tasks for preparing for and 
responding to catastrophes.  
How to improve the federal operational response will be shown by taking specific 
examples from Hurricane Katrina, where it failed to meet at least one of the three criteria, 
and then project different outcomes based upon an alternative system of federal 
operational response premised on unity of command. This premise will not provide a 
solution to errors at the federal strategic or incident command levels, nor for the 
responses of the states that, with certain powers preserved under the Constitution, remain 
in a position of unity of effort with the federal response. However, by choosing to focus 
on the operational level, the highest level of decision making focused solely on the 
response to an existential catastrophe, it will provide some definition as to what actions 
must occur at the levels above and below it in the federal government and cover the 
broadest aspects of the federal response.  
C. AN EXISTENTIAL CATASTROPHE 
The nation deals with all manner of disasters and catastrophes every day; be it a 
car crash, an apartment fire, or a flash flood. These events are handled by the first 
responders of local government, or if they increase in size and scope, eventually with the 
support of state government. However, sometimes disasters are of such scope and 
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magnitude that the federal government acts to supplement state and local governments 
when they are overwhelmed. Of these larger events, a few manage to affect large swaths 
of the country and demand a different, more intensely focused response from the federal 
government. Moreover, of these, just a few threaten the stability and trajectory of the 
United States.  
A “catastrophic incident”26 is defined in the Homeland Security Act27 but many 
events might meet this rationale but fail meaningfully to threaten the stability of the 
United States. Several types of truly catastrophic incidents could be reasonably imagined 
that could seriously threaten the ability of the United States to survive in its current form 
or dramatically weaken the nation for a prolonged period of time. These existential 
catastrophes could include the use of multiple nuclear weapons on U.S. soil, pandemic 
flu, a series of major earthquakes, or the collapse of the U.S. power grid that requires near 
complete reconstruction.  
In the 236 years of its existence, the United States has managed to avoid facing an 
existential catastrophe. The New Madrid Earthquakes of 1811 and 1812 happened in a 
sparsely populated part of the country. The San Francisco Earthquake of 1906 was too 
distant from the rest of the country for the effects of its devastation to spread. The 
costliest disaster in U.S. history, the Great Chicago Fire of 1871, did no more than 
temporarily slow the growth of the then fifth largest city in the country.28 Even the 
effects of Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina were largely regional. For instance, the area 
directly affected by Hurricane Katrina only accounted for about 2% of the nation’s gross 
                                                 
26 6 U.S.C. § 311. The term “catastrophic incident” means any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or 
other man-made disaster that results in extraordinary levels of casualties or damage or disruption severely 
affecting the population (including mass evacuations), infrastructure, environment, economy, national 
morale, or government functions in an area. 
27 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107–296 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. §§ 101–
1405). 
28 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Considerations for a Catastrophic 
Declaration: Issues and Analysis, by Bruce R. Lindsay and Francis X. McCarthy, CRS Report R41884 
(Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, July 6, 2011), 10. If the economic 
value of lives were used, however, under that measure, the 1919 Influenza Pandemic would be the costliest 
with an estimated value of over four trillion dollars. 
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domestic product,29 although the latter did have some effect on domestic gasoline 
prices.30 However, numerous, plausible, and in some cases inevitable scenarios could 
result in the country facing its first existential catastrophic event. 
Philip Bobbitt and Andrew Krepinevich both provide a handful of plausible 
scenarios that would dwarf any disaster yet experienced by this country. Bobbitt, in his 
book, Terror and Consent,31 provides examples of three disasters that could severely test 
the nation: a bio-engineered flu that subsumes the country, two earthquakes, the largest 
measuring 7.8 on the Richter Scale in northern California, and the launch of a single 
Russian Intercontinental Ballistic Missile that strikes the United States. Krepinevich’s 
book, 7 Deadly Scenarios,32 creates a feasible case of what might happen if terrorists 
managed to smuggle multiple nuclear weapons into the country and if the nation faced a 
pandemic. As another example, in 2009, the Mid-America Earthquake Center issued a 
report on the effects of what a 7.7 earthquake might look like if it struck the New Madrid 
Fault today.  
Nearly 715,000 buildings are damaged in the eight-state study region. About 
42,000 search and rescue personnel working in 1,500 teams are required to respond to the 
earthquakes. Damage to critical infrastructure (essential facilities, transportation, and 
utility lifelines) is substantial in the 140 impacted counties near the rupture zone, 
including 3,500 damaged bridges and nearly 425,000 breaks and leaks to both local and 
interstate pipelines. Approximately 2.6 million households are without power after the 
earthquake. Nearly 86,000 injuries and fatalities result from damage to infrastructure. 
Nearly 130 hospitals are damaged and most are located in the impacted counties near the 
rupture zone. Extensive damage and substantial travel delays occur in both Memphis, 
Tennessee, and St. Louis, Missouri, thus hampering search and rescue, as well as 
                                                 
29 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Macroeconomic Effects of 
Hurricane Katrina, by Brian W. Cashell and Marc Labonte, CRS Report RS22260 (Washington, DC: 
Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, September 13, 2005), 1. 
30 Ibid., 5. 
31 Philip Bobbit, Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Anchor 
Books, 2009). 
32 Andrew F. Krepinevich, 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century 
(New York: Bantam Books, 2009). 
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evacuation. Moreover, roughly 15 major bridges are unusable. Three days after the 
earthquake, 7.2 million people are still displaced, and 2 million people seek temporary 
shelter. Direct economic losses for the eight states total nearly $300 billion, while indirect 
losses may be at least twice this amount. 
Any of these events would severely threaten the long-term health of the nation 
and could rise to the level of an existential threat. For the purposes of this thesis, these 
types of events inform the definition of what is an “existential catastrophe.” While this 
thesis will not propose a standard for what the actual parameters of such losses could be, 
the closest government standard the nation may have to setting the level of losses that 
may lead to an existential catastrophe may be FEMA’s “Maximum of Maximums” 
(MOM) Initiative.33 
This was a worst-case scenario based on different hazards that challenges 
preparedness and overwhelms the response capabilities of every 
governmental level. The scenario, a no-notice event, contemplated the 
impact of at least 7 million population and 25,000 square miles, and 
involving several states and FEMA regions. It results in 190,000 fatalities 
in its initial hours, with 265,000 citizens requiring emergency medical 
attention. There is severe damage to critical infrastructure and key 
resources, including transportation.34 
D. DEFINITION OF AN EXISTENTIAL CATASTROPHE 
For events of this magnitude, it is proposed that a new term be created to define 
their nature, scale and impact. An “existential catastrophe” results in cascading effects 
that extend well beyond the physical boundaries of the event. It directly affects one of the 
emerging 11 mega-regions within the United States,35 and results in unforeseen or 
unmanageable national consequences. The defining characteristics of an “existential 
                                                 
33 FEMA, “2012 The State of FEMA” (n.d.), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/state_of_fema/state_of_ 
fema.pdf. “During the last two years, we have instituted a forward leaning approach to “Go Big, Go Early, 
Go Fast, Be Smart” by focusing on “Maximum of Maximums” planning. Key benchmarks for FEMA’s 
response and recovery resulting from a catastrophic event are to stabilize the event to meet the needs of 
survivors within 72 hours, restore basic services and community functionality within 60 days, and return 
communities to normalcy within five years.” FEMA, “2012 The State of FEMA,” 11.  
34 Sharon Caudle, “Homeland Security; Advancing the National Strategic Position,” Homeland 
Security Affairs 8, art. 11 (August 2012). 
35 America 2050, “Megaregions” (n.d.), http://www.america2050.org/megaregions.html. 
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catastrophe” would: (1) directly affect at least one of the 11 U.S. mega-regions, (2) result 
in either unforeseen or unmanageable cascading events beyond a mega-region, and (3) 
create a direct threat to the immediate stability or long-term prospects of the nation. A 
secondary characteristic of existential catastrophes is they turn traditional first responders 
into victims and survivors leaving state, federal and other non-local first responders to 
fulfill the roles normally held by traditional first responders. This thesis will seek to 
improve the federal response to an existential catastrophe by providing an alternative to 
the present system of mobilizing, coordinating, and directing the federal operational 
response to these existential catastrophes.  
E. MOBILIZE, COORDINATE AND DIRECT AS MEANS TO PROVIDE 
UNITY OF COMMAND 
To respond to an existential catastrophe, three key elements are proposed to the 
president fully harnessing the powers of the federal government: (1) mobilization, (2) 
coordination, and (3) direction. All three terms can be found in the earliest 
comprehensive federal laws addressing disasters. The three provide a basic framework 
for the basic elements of the federal response. Mobilization is defined as the ability of the 
president to force federal agencies to pivot their attention away from their primary duties 
and towards preparations to support the federal response to an existential catastrophe. 
Coordination is the ability of the president to provide order and efficiently distribute 
resources amongst federal agencies responding under their inherent, supplemental, or 
event triggered authorities, to respond to an existential catastrophe. Direction is the 
president’s ability, using either his Constitutional or congressionally provided authority, 
to order federal agencies to take specific actions, or courses of action, based upon his 
strategic, political, and to the extent exercised by the president, operational judgment. 
While similar to coordination, direction connotes the ability to order federal agencies to 
perform actions that they are either uncertain or unwilling to perform or would do so 
untimely.  
This thesis submits that the most efficient way to improve the president’s ability 
to mobilize coordinate and direct the federal operational response to an existential 
catastrophe is through creating unity of command over the federal operational response to 
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an existential catastrophe. Unity of command for the purposes of this thesis will be 
defined as all federal capabilities not directly engaged in law enforcement activities or 
which are part of the DoD, that operate under a single leader with the requisite authority 
to direct all federal capabilities employed in response to an existential catastrophe.36 The 
concept of unity of command is chosen because it may have been a substantial reason for 
the success of the single largest humanitarian effort in U.S. history, the restoration of 
Western Europe immediately after the end of the WWII.37 
The numbers of persons who needed to be fed, sheltered, and moved home were 
staggering for the U.S. Army in the Spring and Summer of 1945.  
Housing themselves looked like a hopeless job for the Germans… 
Southern Bavaria, which had been a favorite refuge from the bombing, 
had an estimated two and a half million people more than its normal 
population. About half of an estimated seven million refugees who had 
escaped from eastern Germany ahead of the Soviet winter offensive were 
in SHAEF territory. Undamaged towns and cities had a third to a half 
again as many people as normal. In the heavily bombed big cities the 
populations were increasing-in Cologne, for instance, at a rate of 2,000 
people a day during May but the cities could not accommodate all their 
former residents and were beginning to discourage the return of those who 
did not have needed skills or assured places to live…The worst 
consequence of unsettlement and overcrowding, a typhus epidemic, did 
not materialize. Serious outbreaks in the concentration camps-over four 
thousand cases in Dachau alone-led 12th Army Group to send out typhus-
finding teams and dusting teams. By the end of May they had deloused a 
million persons and had used fifteen tons of DDT, and reports of new 
cases had decreased. Tuberculosis and venereal diseases, however, were 
on the rise.38 
                                                 
36 See discussion on page 41 as to why unity of command cannot include law enforcement and 
military activities. However, it will be noted later that should the President delegate the authority to direct 
the federal response under the Stafford Act to the Commanding General of USNORTHCOM, that person 
would be able to exercise unity of command over all but federal law enforcement activities. 
37 Earl F. Ziemke, “The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944–1946,” Center of Military 
History United States Army, Washington, DC, 1990, http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Occ-GY/. 
38 Ibid., 278. 
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This endeavor was just a small part of the total effort. Twenty million Germans 
were homeless or without adequate shelter and many of the recently liberated Europeans 
needed to be sheltered, fed, and returned to their homes.39  
After V-E Day, SHAEF G-5 reckoned the total number of displaced 
persons uncovered in SHAEF-held territory, including those already 
repatriated as well as liberated prisoners of war, to be 5.2 million. All but 
about a million were in the areas of the two US army groups. They were 
being cared for by 102 UNRRA teams, about an equal number of French 
MMLA teams, and, wherever necessary, by the local military government 
detachments. The western Europeans were leaving as fast as transportation 
could be provided. In April the repatriation rate had been 35,000 persons a 
week; in May it jumped to over 200,000 a week. 
“Willing though SHAEF was to have the displaced persons (DP) off its hands, 
some would have to stay a while, particularly the two million Soviet citizens, because 
their government had not indicated when or where it would receive them. For those who 
stayed, SHAEF ordered, “the conditions of living . . . improved to a standard as high as 
resources permit and without consideration of any adverse effect on the living conditions 
of the Germans.” While the German ration fell below 1,000 calories a day, the military 
government held the DP ration everywhere at 2,000 calories or more, even when this 
requirement meant, as it did in the Fifteenth Army area, drawing food from U.S. Army 
stocks. In the cities, the detachments moved thousands of Germans (10,000 in Munich for 
instance) out of their homes to make room for the displaced persons, and sick and 
wounded German soldiers were transferred out of hospitals to provide beds for them.”40 
In addition to the displaced, wayward citizens and former slave laborers, the U.S. 
Army also had to care for and process the millions of German prisoners of war (POWs) 
left in their hands. At end of the war, it is estimated that allied forces had 5 million 
German POWs on their hands, over 3 million in U.S. Army custody, and it is estimated 
that between just May 8 and July 15 of 1945, U.S. forces processed 7.7 million German 
POWs and associated personnel,41 which was not accomplished through feats of 
                                                 
39 Ziemke, “The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944–1946,” 283. 
40 Ibid., 284–285. 
41 Ibid., 291. 
 25
technology. The U.S. Army mobilized, coordinated, and directed all these activities with 
the help of telephones, typewriters, telegraphs, radios, and couriers. No satellite phones, 
internet, computers, e-mail, or cell phones existed at that time. While it did have a pool of 
manpower measured in the millions, a huge set of challenges were also generated in 
addition to the millions of refugees and POWs, U.S. troops also needed to be housed, fed, 
and all the while remain a disciplined force. What the U.S. Army did have was a clear 
chain of command, from the leader of all allied forces, General Dwight Eisenhower, 
down to the individual corporal. Moreover, it worked.  
F. DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Critical to this thesis is the definition of core terms and concepts. Mobilization, 
coordination, and direction have already been defined but several other critical core 
concepts remain. First among these core concepts is “unity of command,” and the related 
but distinct, “unity of effort.” “Unity of effort through unified command” is one of the 
five key principles to federal response doctrine under the NRF. The NRF defines unity of 
effort as “respects the chain of command of each participating organization while 
harnessing seamless coordination across jurisdictions in support of common 
objectives.”42 For comparison, the DoD defines unity of effort as “coordination and 
cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part 
of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action.”43 This 
paper will adopt the former definition as its definition of “unity of effort.” The 
fundamental tenant of this definition is that federal agencies operate under separate 
chains of command while coordinating their actions. In other words, the ability to direct 
is not available across federal agencies under the current system of federal disaster 
response. 
The two primary sources for a definition of “unity of command” in the current 
context normally should be the NRF or NIMS; however, neither provides a satisfactory 
definition. The NRF only mentions “unity of command” once, and only to indicate the 
                                                 
42 National Response Framework, January 2008, 10. 
43 Joint Publication 1 Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States, GL–11. 
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term has a unique legal and cultural meaning within the DoD. NIMS only defines “unity 
of command” at what might be considered the tactical level calling it “an Incident 
Command System principle stating that each individual involved in incident operations 
will be assigned to only one supervisor.”44 The corresponding NIMS process at what 
could be the operational level, as opposed to the tactical level of ICS, is the Multiagency 
Coordination System (MACS). MACS makes no provision for unity of command and 
instead provides a process wholly reliant on concepts related to unity of effort.  
Since current DHS/FEMA doctrine does not provide an adequate definition of 
unity of command, it is possible to resort to the DoD definition since both the NRF and 
the NIMS refer to it. The DoD definition is also relevant as the DoD also must produce 
an organization that can respond to existential threats in a short period of time. 
Accordingly, the DoD definition of “unity of command” found in Joint Publication (JP) 1 
will provide the basis for the definition within this thesis. “Unity of command means all 
forces operate under a single CDR [commander] with the requisite authority to direct all 
forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.”45 This definition must be slightly 
modified given that the federal response includes both military and law enforcement 
activities.46 Accordingly, the definition of “unity of command” for this thesis is “means 
all federal capabilities not directly engaged in law enforcement activities or which are 
part of the Department of Defense, operate under a single leader with the requisite 
authority to direct all federal capabilities employed in response to an existential 
catastrophe.”  
Defining “operational” is a similar conundrum to looking for a definition for 
“unity of command.” Despite numerous references to the word “operational,” NIMS 
provides no definition for the term. The NRF only provides examples of what is not 
operational. However, the FEMA Incident Management Handbook (IMH) does provide a 
definition for “operational control,” which it calls “the transferable authority that may be 
                                                 
44 National Incident Management System (NIMS), December 2008, 149. 
45 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, JP 1, 02 May 2007 Incorporating Change 1, 
20, March 2009, XV. 
46 The unique nature of federal military forces and law enforcement activities will be addressed later. 
 27
exercised by leadership at any level at or below the level of organization … and is the 
authority to perform those functions of command over resources, assigning tasks, 
designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the 
mission will be assigned to the lowest operational level.”47 
The DoD has a useful definition of “operation,” which includes “A series of 
tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme.”48 However, its definition of 
the operational level of war seems better suited for the purposes of this thesis, which it 
describes as “The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, 
conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other 
operational areas.”49 
To understand what “operational” really means, definitions for “strategic” and 
“tactical,” which are commonly used to divide various levels of command and action, are 
also helpful. Similar to “operational,” neither the NRF nor NIMS have a specific 
definition of “tactics.” However, within the context of the NIMS ICS, it  can be inferred 
that tactics are exercised within ICS organizations. The IMH does have a definition for 
“tactics,” which are “the deployment and direction of resources during an incident to 
accomplish established incident objectives.”50  
FEMA’s Incident Action Planning Guide (IAPG)51 is also helpful, especially if it 
is assumed that the “incident” level is the same as the “tactical” level. According to the 
IAPG, “Tactics define specific actions to be performed to achieve a planned outcome. 
Tactics specify who, what, where, and when for implementing strategies to achieve 
incident objectives.”52 They are part of a planning process that seeks to establish incident 
objectives, and then, prioritize assigned resources, attempt to accomplish these objectives 
through assigning work to these resources and selecting the right tactics. However, the 
                                                 
47 FEMA Incident Management Handbook, FEMA B–761, March 2009, Appendix J–14. 
48 Joint Publication 3–0 Joint Operations, GL–14. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., J–17. 
51 FEMA Incident Action Planning Guide, January 2012. 
52 Ibid., 24. 
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IAPG shows how difficult it is to come up with a definition of what is tactical, 
operational or strategic, as it manages to include “strategies,” “operational” and “tactics” 
all at the incident level. 
The definition of strategy is handled similarly. The NRF declares that it falls 
under a National Strategy for Homeland Security but does not define the term. NIMS has 
a definition of “strategy” that is too generic to have much utility, “the general plan or 
direction selected to accomplish incident objectives.”53 The White House National 
Strategy for Homeland Security, issued in 2007, states, “the purpose of our Strategy is to 
guide, organize, and unify our Nation’s homeland security efforts.”54 Resorting again to 
the DoD Joint Publication, JP 3, Joint Operations, it calls strategy “a prudent idea or set 
of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and 
integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.” The 
DoD, like its definition for “operational,” also has a strategic level of war, “The level of 
war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or 
multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then 
develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives.”55 
Choosing from amongst these examples, for the purpose of this thesis, “tactical” 
is the “deployment and direction of resources at the incident consistent with operational 
and strategic objectives and intent,” which includes setting objectives, selecting tactics, 
assigning resources released to the tactical (or incident) commander and work 
assignments.  
“Operational” is the level of decision making where “operational control over 
resources is provided to one or more incidents,” which includes the collection and 
provision of resources as authorized by strategic level decision makers, prioritization of 
resources amongst multiple incidents, and overall prioritization of effort and supervision 
in accordance with national strategic decision making. The authority to take these actions 
                                                 
53 National Incident Management System (NIMS), 147. 
54 National Strategy for Homeland Security, Homeland Security Council, October 2007, 1. 
55 Joint Publication 3–0 Joint Operations, GL–16. 
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would be considered “operational control.” Operational control also includes directional 
authority over all resources provided from the strategic to the operational level. 
Operational control remains with the operational commander, however, the actual choice 
of tactics, assignment of resources, and work to achieve incident objectives should be 
delegated to the tactical (incident) decision-making level. The operational level of 
decision making is the highest level of authority solely focused on the incident at hand. 
“Strategic” is the level of decision making at which the nation’s vision and 
priorities are set and resources are created or assigned. The federal strategic level of 
decision making for disaster response should be thought of as part of a “strategic 
environment” in which unity of effort amongst federal, state, military, law enforcement, 
private sector, voluntary organizations, and citizens is established. In the context of 
responding to an existential catastrophe, the federal government balances its need to 
provide for national security, homeland security, civil liberties, fiscal health and legal and 
regulatory responsibilities while maximizing its response to the existential catastrophe. 
Unlike the operational level of decision making, the strategic level is not focused solely 
on any particular incident, but spans across all federal responsibilities. 
G. MANIFESTATION OF THE PROBLEM 
The current system for the president to mobilize, coordinate, and direct the federal 
response to large-scale disasters has been inadequate when tested by several near-
catastrophic events, most recently Hurricane Katrina. A sampling of examples of these 
failures can be found in both the Senate56 and House57 reports on Hurricane Katrina. It 
follows that the current system would also be inadequate for the president and the federal 
government to respond to an existential catastrophe. For instance, speaking of the unified 
command between federal and state governments, the Senate report remarked, “A 
catastrophe, of course, is exactly when the need for unified command and an effective 
                                                 
56 U.S. Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Special Report of the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 
57 U.S. House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan 
Committee. 
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incident command structure is most acute.”58 However, in the House report, both state 
and federal agencies confirmed federal agencies were “freelancing” during the disaster 
and bypassing the command structure.59 In the Senate report, the FCO for Louisiana 
flatly stated he was not in charge of all federal operations.60 As to who was actually in 
charge of the federal response, no clear answer was available, particularly as it pertained 
to the PFO and FCO positions. For example, again from the Senate report, multiple 
senior officials stated “two people were in charge” in both Louisiana and Mississippi. 
Bruce Baughman, President of the National Emergency Management Association and 
Director of the Alabama Emergency Management Agency, testified, “basically, in 
Louisiana, we had two people in charge. And it wasn’t real clear what the roles and 
responsibilities of each were.”61  
Well before Hurricane Katrina, a similar outcry occurred after the perceived poor 
federal response to Hurricane Andrew. Of particular importance were reports from the 
NAPA,62 the GAO63 and the FEMA IG.64 The NAPA report was particularly 
comprehensive in not just critiquing what went wrong in the response to the hurricane, 
but in what specific actions Congress, the president, and FEMA must take to improve the 
federal response to future disasters. While the NAPA report served as a foundation for 
several changes, including the revocation of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 and 
restating those authorities within the Stafford Act,65 many of its recommendations would 
have to wait to be adopted until after Hurricane Katrina if at all.66 The FEMA IG report 
                                                 
58 U.S. House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan 
Committee, 561. 
59 Ibid., 189. 
60 U.S. Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Special Report of the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 
61 Ibid., 553. 
62 Wamsley et al., Coping With Catastrophe. 
63 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Disaster Management Improving the Nation’s Response to 
Catastrophic Disasters (GAO/RCED-93–186, B-253822), Washington, DC: GPO, July 23, 1993. 
64 Disaster Management Program: A Performance Audit After Hurricane Andrew. 
65 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, 103 Public Law 337. 
66 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Disaster Management Improving the Nation’s Response to 
Catastrophic Disasters, 618. 
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also detailed numerous problems that would be repeated in Hurricane Katrina. One of the 
problems it identified was the lack of a command and control structure for the federal 
response. The primary reasons for this was the unfamiliarity of senior officials with the 
Federal Response Plan (FRP), the failure to plan for and integrate the Presidential Task 
Force and military Joint Task Force, and that there were ““on the books” two ways of 
coordinating federal assistance in catastrophic emergencies: the National System for 
Emergency Coordination [NSEC], established in 1988, and the “Federal Response Plan,” 
established in 1992.”67 
During the period of time between the two hurricanes, various exercises also 
included attempts at testing the coordination of the federal response to disasters. The Top 
Official (TOPOFF) series of national exercises, now called National Level Exercises 
(NLEs), produced a number of reports that provide some evidence that the issues of 
understanding the PFO and FCO roles were already causing problems and decision-
making roles to lead the federal response were not clear.68 The importance of having 
clear leadership and lines of authority in the response to a catastrophic disaster did not go 
unnoticed after Hurricane Katrina. 
All the various critiques of Hurricane Katrina concluded that leadership at 
all levels of government should be improved. In preparing for, responding 
to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster, the legal authorities, 
roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority for the preparation and 
response at all levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively 
communicated, and well understood in order to facilitate rapid and 
effective decision making.69  
All these problems were manifested in the federal operational response to 
Hurricane Katrina. Organized under the criteria of mobilization, coordination and 
direction, specific examples can be found in which failing to provide unity of command 
to the federal operational response directly led to numerous failures. 
                                                 
67 Disaster Management Program: A Performance Audit After Hurricane Andrew, 72. 
68 A Review of the Top Officials 3 Exercise, DHS Office of Inspector General, OIG-06–07, November 
2005. 
69 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Disaster Management Improving the Nation’s Response to 
Catastrophic Disasters, 618. 
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H. FAILURES OF THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 
The failure of adequate mobilization, coordination, and direction led to numerous, 
specific failures by the federal government in its response to Hurricane Katrina. The 
following are a list of specific instances during which the federal government failed to 
execute its responsibility to mobilize, coordinate, and direct. These events occurred at 
every level of response including the strategic, operational, and tactical, and are so noted. 
Some are used later as examples to show if unity of command for the federal operational 
response had been in place, these mistakes may have been mitigated or avoided.70  
1. Mobilization 
(Strategic) The cabinet did not meet until over two days, some 57 hours, after 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana.71 
(Strategic) No evidence or testimony by the DHS Secretary was available that 
demonstrated he reached out to other cabinet secretaries to assess their level of 
preparedness, to determine if they were coordinating efforts with DHS, or to ensure that 
they responded quickly and fully to any requests that might come from DHS or FEMA.72 
(Operational) The Department of Justice and DHS failed to plan for law 
enforcement assistance to a disaster. This failure directly led to FEMA personnel pulling 
out of the Superdome during the height of the crisis.73 
(Operational) The National Communications System (NCS) never developed a 
plan to restore communications to emergency responders, such as the police and fire 
departments, after a catastrophic disaster.74 
                                                 
70 Chapter IV is devoted to describing specific mistakes that might have been avoided if unity of 
command had been in place for the federal operational response to Hurricane Katrina. 
71 U.S. Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Special Report of the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 70. 
72 Ibid., 165, 167. 
73 Ibid., 11, 448–453, 554–555. 
74 U.S. Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Special Report of the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 166. 
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(Operational) DHS senior leadership failed to reach out to Immigration and 
Custom Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), Federal Protective 
Service (FPS) or the Secret Service to assess their planning and preparation—or even to 
determine if they were planning and preparing.75 
(Operational) DHS and FEMA failed to publish the Catastrophic Incident 
Supplement (CIS) to the Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA), which would have provided 
at least a framework for contingency planning during the event.76 Jeff Smith, Louisiana 
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) Deputy Director 
for Emergency Preparedness, believed, “the biggest single failure of the federal response 
was the Department of Homeland Security’s failure to recognize that Katrina was a 
catastrophic event and implement the catastrophic incident annex to the National 
Response Plan…” However, the CIA required the CIS to actually operate. “Unless it can 
be credibly established that a mobilizing federal resource identified in the NRP-CIS is not 
needed at the catastrophic incident venue, that resource deploys.” He was waiting on the 
execution of a plan that never existed.77 
2. Coordination 
(Strategic) The DHS Secretary did not activate the Interagency Incident 
Management Group (IIMG) until nearly 36 hours after landfall.78 
(Operational) The Homeland Security Operational Center (HSOC) failed to 
collect situational awareness from FEMA, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) or 
other federal agencies in a timely manner including the report from FEMA employee, 
Marty Bahamonde, on the evening of landfall that the levees in New Orleans had been 
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breached. It was not until 6:30 A.M. the following morning the White House considered 
the levees breached.79 
(Operational) Lack of clarity between the PFO and FCO roles.80 
(Operational) Lack of coordination between USCG and the DoD search and 
rescue (ESF #9).81 
(Operational) Lack of coordination between American Red Cross and law 
enforcement.82 
(Operational) Joint Task Force-Katrina (JTF-Katrina) stops evacuation of the 
Superdome, which delays it a full day.83 
(Strategic/Operational) Mayor Nagin speaks to the president on Tuesday, August 
30 saying buses are his number one priority but no mission assignment from FEMA 
occurs until around 1:30 P.M. the next day.84 
3. Direction 
(Strategic) DHS Secretary is unsure of the role of the Secretary during a disaster 
or role under the NRP.85 
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(Strategic) DHS Secretary failed to stay in touch with his “battlefield 
commander” or to ensure he understood his role.86 
(Operational) No one understood if the PFO or FCO position was in charge or 
even who was in charge of federal response at operational level.87 
(Operational) The FCO was not leading all federal forces or providing clear 
direction. At least three separate structures led the federal response: the FCO, PFO, and 
JTF-Katrina.88 
(Operational) Failure to direct Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS)/ESF #8 to pick up the bodies of victims.89 
I. THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF MOBILIZING, COORDINATING, AND 
DIRECTING THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 
The current system of federal response to a catastrophe begins with the legal 
responsibility of the president to guide the nation’s response to a catastrophic disaster. 
There is ample, mostly centralized legal authority for emergency response 
[by the federal government]. The national government is instructed in 
Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution to guarantee a “Republican Form 
of Government” to each state (the Guarantee Clause), to protect the states 
against invasion (the Invasion Clause), and to protect them against 
“domestic Violence” (the Protection Clause). Though there is uncertainty 
about which of the political branches controls certain emergency response 
powers, by and large Congress has delegated broad discretion to the  
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executive branch to act in anticipation of and response to emergencies. 
States and their cities do retain the police powers to protect the health, 
safety, and welfare of their citizens, and in some contexts these reserved 
state prerogatives establish limits on the prescriptive authorities of the 
national government.90 
Congress has broadly delegated this authority for the president to act in the 
Stafford Act.91 The FEMA Administrator was also arguably given some direct power to 
lead the federal response to catastrophic disasters with the passage of the PKEMRA in 
2006.92 However, this authority does not authorize the funding that the Stafford Act does 
with its complementary appropriations in the DRF,93 nor does it give specific authority 
how the FEMA Administrator will actually lead the nation’s efforts to respond to a 
catastrophic incident,94 and conduct emergency efforts to save lives and protect 
property.95  
The Homeland Security Act (HSA)96 states the mission of DHS is in part to 
“minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur 
within the United States [and to] carry out all functions of entities transferred to the 
Department, including by acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises 
and emergency planning…”97 The secretary also has vested in them “all functions of all 
officers, employees, and organizational units of the Department…”98 However, 
PKEMRA added a provision to the HSA that specifically maintains FEMA as a distinct 
entity within DHS and does not allow the Secretary to “substantially or significantly 
                                                 
90 Banks, “The Legal Landscape for Emergency Management in the United States, New America 
Foundation,” 7–8.  
91 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 93–288 (as amended 
primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207). 
92 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) of 2006, Public Law 109–295. 
93 For more information on the DRF, see FEMA, “Disaster Relief Fund” (n.d.), http://www.fema.gov/ 
disaster-relief-fund. 
94 6 U.S.C. §§313(b)(2)(A) & 314(a). 
95 6 U.S.C. §§313(b)(C) & 314(a)(3) & 314(a)(9)(C). 
96 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107–296 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. §§ 101–
1405). 
97 6 U.S.C. § 111. 
98 6 U.S.C. § 112. 
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reduce the authorities, responsibilities, or functions of the Agency or the capability of the 
Agency to perform those missions, authorities, responsibilities, except as otherwise 
specifically provided in an Act enacted after the date of enactment of the Post-Katrina 
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006.”99 None of these authorities, however, 
relieves the president of their constitutional and congressionally delegated responsibility 
to mobilize, coordinate, and direct the federal response. 
J. THE STAFFORD ACT 
Putting aside arguments the president could proceed in organizing the federal 
response to a catastrophic disaster solely relying upon his Constitutional powers, the 
primary authority for the federal government to respond to a catastrophic disaster is 
found in the Stafford Act. The purpose of the Stafford Act is to “provide an orderly and 
continuing means of assistance by the federal Government to State and local governments 
in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result 
from such disasters…”100 To execute this purpose, Congress gave all the powers under 
the Stafford Act directly to the president with the power to “…prescribe such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out any of the provisions of this Act, 
and he may exercise any power or authority conferred on him by any section of this Act 
either directly or through such federal agency or agencies as he may designate.”101 The 
only exception, discussed later, is Title VI Emergency Preparedness, the remnants of the 
defunct Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950,102 which is given directly to the FEMA 
Administrator.103  
                                                 
99 6 U.S.C. § 316. 
100 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b). 
101 42 U.S.C. § 5201(a)(1). 
102 The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 as amended (50 U.S.C. App. § 2251 et seq). Public Law 
81–920. It was repealed in its entirety in 1994 by The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1995, Public Law 103–337. 
103 See also 6 U.S.C. § 112(a)(2) where the DHS Secretary is given all the powers of DHS 
components. However, it is unclear whether this includes Title VI of the Stafford Act, especially in light of 
the PKEMRA provision codified at 6 U.S.C. § 316 that limits her power to remove certain powers and 
responsibilities from FEMA. The remnants of the Civil Defense Act are found in Title VI of the Stafford 
Act 42 U.S.C. §§5195–5197g. 6 U.S.C. § 5195b specifically orders that Title VI “shall be carried out by the 
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.” 
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The authority of the Stafford Act for federal response actions can be thought of 
having two distinct characteristics, the first providing specific authority to save lives and 
protect property, and the second as an overall “meta-authority” that can be found in 
Sections 402 and 502 of the Act. This meta-authority allows the president once an 
emergency or major disaster has been declared under the Stafford Act to  
…direct any federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to utilize its 
authorities and the resources granted to it under federal law (including 
personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical, and 
advisory services) in support of State and local assistance response and 
recovery efforts, including precautionary evacuations; coordinate all 
disaster relief assistance (including voluntary assistance) provided by 
federal agencies, private organizations, and State and local governments, 
including precautionary evacuations and recovery…104 
The particular purposes this meta-authority supports can be found throughout the sections 
of the Stafford Act for both major disasters and emergencies.105 The primary powers for 
authorizing federal response activities are respectively the following.  
 Providing assistance essential to meeting immediate threats to life and 
property resulting from a major disaster through 
 Federal resources, generally—utilizing, lending, or donating to 
state and local governments federal equipment, supplies, facilities, 
personnel, and other resources, other than the extension of credit, 
for use or distribution by such governments in accordance with the 
purposes of this Act. 
 Medicine, durable medical equipment, food, and other 
consumables—distributing or rendering through state and local 
governments, the American National Red Cross, the Salvation 
Army, the Mennonite Disaster Service, and other relief and 
disaster assistance organizations, medicine, durable medical 
equipment, food, and other consumable supplies, and other 
services and assistance to disaster victims. 
 Work and services to save lives and protect property—performing 
on public or private lands or waters any work or services essential 
                                                 
104 6 U.S.C. § 5170a(1) see also 6 U.S.C. § 5192(a)(1). 
105 Given the scope of a catastrophic disaster, the assumption is that a major disaster would be 
declared by the President upon request by the governors of the affected states. While scenarios exist that 
may require the use of an emergency declaration if state governments are no longer capable of requesting a 
declaration, that discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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to saving lives and protecting and preserving property or public 
health and safety  
 Contributions—making contributions to state or local governments 
or owners or operators of private nonprofit facilities for the 
purpose of carrying out the provisions of this subsection.106 
 Providing through the use of federal departments, agencies, and 
instrumentalities, the clearing of debris and wreckage resulting from a 
major disaster from publicly and privately owned lands and waters, and 
making grants to any state or local government or owner or operator of a 
private non-profit facility for the purpose of removing debris or wreckage 
resulting from a major disaster from publicly or privately owned lands and 
waters.107 
 Providing through providing temporary housing units, acquired by 
purchase or lease, directly to individuals or households who, because of a 
lack of available housing resources, would be unable to make use of 
financial assistance provided by the President.108 
Subsequent to Hurricane Katrina, the President can now  
Provide accelerated federal assistance and federal support where necessary 
to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate severe damage, which 
may be provided in the absence of a specific request and in which case the 
President 
(A) shall, to the fullest extent practicable, promptly notify and coordinate 
with officials in a State in which such assistance or support is provided, 
and; 
(B) shall not, in notifying and coordinating with a State under 
subparagraph (A), delay or impede the rapid deployment, use, and 
distribution of critical resources to victims of a major disaster.109 
This last provision, added by PKEMRA, allows the president, once he has issued a major 
disaster declaration, to provide emergency assistance even if the state government is 
unable to coordinate with the federal government. It could be thought of as the 
“Superdome Provision,” such that if federal officials can clearly see a need to act, they 
can move forward on their own. 
                                                 
106 42 U.S.C. § 5170b see also 42 U.S.C. § 5192. 
107 42 U.S.C. § 5173 see also 42 U.S.C. § 5192. 
108 42 U.S.C. § 5174(C)(1)(B)(i). 
109 42 U.S.C. § 5170a(5) see also 42 U.S.C. § 5192(a)(8).  
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The Superdome during Hurricane Katrina is an example of what can happen when 
information has failed to arrive through state channels but the federal government is fully 
aware of the problem. “Asked about “thousands of people at the convention center in 
New Orleans no food, zero,” [DHS Secretary] Chertoff responded that “we are getting 
food and water to areas where people are staging.” Then he remarked, “The thing about 
an episode like this is if you talk to someone and you get a rumor or you get someone’s 
anecdotal version of something, I think it’s dangerous to extrapolate it all over the place.” 
When the interviewer, Robert Siegel pressed the issue, pointing out that experienced 
reporters had witnessed the scene in person, Chertoff answered, “Well… actually I have 
not heard a report of thousands of people in the convention center who don’t have food or 
water.” 110 
Taken at face value, Congress has provided the president, upon request of a 
governor, dramatic power to respond to catastrophic disasters. Congress has conferred the 
necessary authority to any federal agency to save lives and protect property, essentially 
providing authority to unlock federal capabilities, and the authority to command these 
agencies through direction and coordination.111 The president can also choose to 
reimburse these federal agencies from the DRF when responding under directions issued 
under the authority of the Stafford Act, and thus, provide both authority and 
appropriations. 
However, the authority granted to the president contains two notable exceptions. 
The first is no direct authority under the Stafford Act to make arrests and enforce the law, 
which can only be done by federal law enforcement agencies responding to a disaster 
                                                 
110 Howitt and Leonard, Managing Crises: Responses to Large-Scale Emergencies, 59. See also 
CNN.com, “The Big Disconnect on New Orleans,” September 2, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/U.S. 
/09/02/katrina.response/. 
111 See footnotes 121–124. 
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exercising their own authorities to make arrests.112 Law enforcement efforts, relying on 
separate authority, are supplemental to the primary purpose of saving lives and protecting 
property, which are accomplished by the president directing a federal agency “to utilize 
its authorities and the resources granted to it under federal law.” However, the Stafford 
Act does allow for a law enforcement agency to “utilize its authorities,” which means 
they can be tasked to provide safety and security as a part of federal response efforts and 
reimbursed for those efforts, but they still must rely on separate authorities to make 
arrests and enforce the law. In other words, federal law enforcement agencies can be 
mobilized and coordinated as part of the larger federal response effort but they cannot be 
directed under the authority of the Stafford Act to make arrests. The second exception is 
that while federal military forces may be provided the authority to engage in life and 
property saving actions, the Stafford Act does not confer operational control of those 
forces. Federal troops follow a separate statutory chain of command.113  
This chapter has provided evidence the federal government has a poor record of 
responding to large disasters, such as Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, and cannot 
currently be expected to have an efficient response to an even larger disaster, an 
“existential catastrophe,” without changes to the way it is organized. It proposes that 
instituting unity of command over the federal response to an existential catastrophe, at the 
operational level, might result in a more efficient federal response.  
The current system of coordinating and directing federal agencies responding to a 
catastrophic disaster has never fully utilized its expansive authority to direct non-federal 
                                                 
112 See the Enumerated Powers to Save Lives and Protect Property found in Sections 403 and 502 of 
the Stafford Act. None of them includes any authority to enforce the law or make arrests. However, Section 
402 and 502(a)(1) both allow the President to direct federal agencies to “utilize their authorities and 
resources granted to it under federal law.” This “meta-authority” allows those agencies to use their existing 
authority to support response efforts but does not create new authority to enforce the law and make arrests. 
Less any doubt lingers about this, the Office of Legal Counsel opined on this issue in 2012 emphatically 
stating the Stafford Act does not contain authority to make arrests. Opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel – 
State and Local Deputation of Federal Law Enforcement Officers During Stafford Act Deployments, OLC 
LEXIS, 2012, 3. 
113 See 10 U.S.C. § 162 and § 164. 
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military capabilities not engaged in law enforcement activities.114 To understand why, it 
is necessary to retrace the history of certain provisions of the Stafford Act and the federal 
regulations that provide that authority and allow for the reimbursement of federal 
agencies from funds appropriated to execute the Stafford Act. Funding is a key 
component to directing federal agencies and provides evidence of how the federal 
government was historically responding to disasters. Without funding, authority to act 
relies on an empty capability. 
After retracing the history of regulations and law under the Disaster Relief Acts 
(DRAs), discussion will turn to the foundation of the current federal interagency response 
to disasters in addition to the Stafford Act. This foundation includes: (1) The NIMS, the 
ICS, and the MACS, (2) federal response plans and frameworks, (3) the consolidation of 
crisis and consequence management, (4) EOs 12148 Federal Emergency Management, 
EO 12656 Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, and Presidential 
Policy Directive (PPD)-8 National Preparedness, (5) federal interagency coordination 
bodies and White House supervision, and (6) the FCO and PFO positions. 
                                                 
114 For example, see the discussion in Chapters II and V on how the federal government has never 
issued the federal response capability inventory, and just last year, the Catastrophic Resource Report. If the 
federal government has never issued these reports, it is difficult, if not impossible, to argue it has 
ascertained the full extent of all its capabilities to respond to an existential catastrophe. 
 43
III. THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL RESPONSE LAW FOR THE 
COORDINATION, DIRECTION AND REIMBURSEMENT OF 
FEDERAL AGENCIES UNDER THE DISASTER RELIEF ACTS 
AND THE FOUNDATION OF FEDERAL INTERAGENCY 
DISASTER COORDINATION115 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide evidence the president has the authority 
to implement unity of command through a single federal official. This ability to provide 
unity of command is limited, however, and does not include federal agencies engaged in 
law enforcement efforts or the DoD, which has its own distinct chain of command, 
though they would both support the efforts of this official. This authority would also 
allow the president to utilize the DRF to reimburse federal agencies for disaster work, 
which could be performed under their existing authority. It would be a key tool for the 
federal official exercising unity of command on behalf the president, and crucial to 
ensuring the cooperation of federal agencies. It would also allow Congress a simpler, and 
possibly, more efficient way to fund federal response costs for an existential catastrophe. 
This chapter also provides evidence FEMA’s regulations, which currently prohibit 
reimbursement from the DRF to federal agencies acting under their own authority but 
coordinated under the Stafford Act, are based on policy, not law. 
Several key observations can be arrived at after a thorough review of the history 
of the DRAs and federal interagency disaster coordination. The first is the president does 
have the ability to provide unity of command amongst all federal civilian agencies 
engaged in responding to an existential catastrophe but excludes the DoD, and federal 
agencies engaged in law enforcement activities, but does includes the ability to reimburse  
 
                                                 
115 In May 2013, DHS, through FEMA, released a new version of the NRF and a draft of its 
supporting Federal Interagency Operational Plan–Response. This thesis does not address the newest version 
of the NRF, but after a summary review, it should not affect its conclusions. However, it should be noted 
the position of PFO no longer appears in the newest version of the NRF, although it does reference the 
DHS Secretary as the principal federal official in relation to their role set forth in HSPD-5. Unless 
otherwise noted, all references to the NRF are to the previous version. 
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any federal agency for work ordered under this authority.116 Second, the adoption of ICS 
and its premise of unified effort amongst federal agencies is not a legal requirement, but a 
matter of policy, and could be replaced with a system built on unity of command. 
Replacing unity of effort with unity of command would be consistent with the singular 
authority of the president rather than a system of multiple equal jurisdictional authorities 
that provides the foundation for ICS. Third, the consolidation of crisis and consequence 
management may have been done under a faulty premise; namely, that it did not allow for 
a clear answer as to who was in charge of the federal response. A return to these 
distinctions may better reflect the reality of disaster response and allow for the proper 
prioritization of efforts and appropriate leadership during a response to a terrorist or 
criminal incident. Currently, the consolidation of these two concepts may serve as an 
impediment to providing unity of command. Fourth, two key EOs, 12148 and 12656, 
contain guidance that could support a system based on unity of command for both 
response and preparedness.  
In addition, the PKEMRA set forth specific parts of a national preparedness 
system, not reflected in PPD-8, that would be of exceptional value to preparing for an 
existential catastrophe; the creation of a federal response capability inventory and 
Catastrophic Resource Report. A stronger federal preparedness posture, utilizing a form 
of unity of command, could be used to push federal agencies to complete these tasks, and 
also fulfill their responsibilities under EO 12656. Fifth, a historical lack of discipline has 
occurred in federal interagency coordination during disasters, as well as the role of the 
White House in supervising federal agency coordination.117  
Currently, no clear conduit for federal operational interagency disputes to be 
elevated to the White House or for cabinet level discussion exists, and if it does, that 
system does not reflect the one implemented to adjudicate policy disputes. In other 
                                                 
116 However, FEMA’s regulations currently prohibit reimbursing federal agencies for performing 
work under their own disaster assistance authorities. This regulation has been interpreted as a complete ban 
on reimbursement. See 44 CFR 206.8. 
117 For instance, see the discussion of the use of the IIMG under identified failures in coordination 
during Hurricane Katrina in Chapter I and under federal interagency coordination groups and White House 
supervision later in Chapter II. 
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words, the federal government “fights” (responds) differently than it “trains” (prepares). 
Last, the role of PFO, as performed by Admiral Thad Allen after Hurricane Katrina, is 
probably defunct,118 but the FCO position is legally and historically suited to exercise 
unity of command on behalf of the president. 
A. THE DISASTER RELIEF ACT OF 1950119 
The modern statutory framework for federal disaster assistance began with the 
Disaster Relief Act (DRA) of 1950.120 On March 2, 1951, President Truman issued EO 
10221,121 which delegated his authority to execute sections of the DRA of 1950 to the 
Housing and Home Finance (HHF) Administrator. Later, on January 16, 1953, the 
president issued EO 10427,122 which revoked EO 10221, and moved the functions given 
to the HHF Administrator to the Federal Civil Defense Administration.  
Section 3 of the DRA of 1950 provided much of the antecedent language that 
eventually became Sections 304, 402, and 403 of the Stafford Act. For instance, from 
Section 3 of the DRA of 1950, came the following statement.  
The authority conferred by this Act, and any funds provided hereunder 
shall be supplementary to, and not in substitution for, nor in limitation of, 
any other authority conferred or funds provided under any other law. Any 
funds received by federal agencies as reimbursement for services or 
supplies furnished under the authority of this section shall be deposited to 
the credit of· the appropriation or appropriations currently available for 
such services or supplies.  
The language of Section 304 of the Stafford Act can be directly traced to this 
provision. Its last sentence, which serves to provide relief from the Miscellaneous 
Receipts Statute appears unchanged in Section 203(c) of the DRA of 1970, and Section 
307 of the DRA of 1974. What is now the first sentence of Section 304 was joined to the 
                                                 
118 See discussion under PFO later in Chapter II. 
119 See Appendix B for the full text. 
120 The Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Public Law 81–975. 
121 EO 10221 Providing for the Administration of Disaster Relief 16 FR 2015, March 6, 1951. 
122 EO 10427 was subsequently amended three times by EO 10737, October 29, 1957, EO 10773, July 
1, 1958, and EO 11051, September 27, 1962 before being revoked by EO 11575 on December 31, 1970 
with the passage of the Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Public Law 91–606. 
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second sentence in the DRA of 1970. The antecedent to the first sentence of Section 304 
is found in Section 7 of the DRA of 1950, which also is the predecessor of Section 306 of 
the Stafford Act. In relevant part it states: 
Any federal agency, in performing any activities under section 3 of this 
Act, is authorized… to incur obligations on behalf of the United States by 
contract or otherwise for the acquisition, rental, or hire of equipment, 
services, materials, and supplies for shipping, drayage, travel and 
communication, and for the supervision and administration of such 
activities. Such obligations, including obligations arising out of the 
temporary employment of additional personnel, may be incurred by any 
agency in such amount as may be made available to it by the President out 
of the funds specified in section 8. The President may, also, out of such 
funds, reimburse any federal agency for any of its expenditures under 
section 3 in connection with a major disaster, such reimbursement to be in 
such amounts as the President may deem appropriate. 
Section 3 of the DRA of 1950, also stated the following. 
In any major disaster, federal agencies are hereby authorized when 
directed by the President to provide assistance by utilizing or lending, with 
or without compensation therefore, to States and local governments their 
equipment, supplies, facilities, personnel, and other resources, other than 
the extension of credit under the authority of any Act.  
This more closely aligns with what is currently Section 403 of the Stafford Act but it still 
maintains provisions common to Section 402. This crossover is not unexpected since 
until the DRA of 1974 created the category of Emergency, Congress established only one 
category of incident, Major Disaster, to trigger federal assistance. 
Section 3(a)-(d) of the DRA of 1950 was moved with minimal changes to Section 
203(a)(1)–(4) of the DRA of 1970 and then moved to Section 306(a)(1)-(4) of the DRA 
of 1974 from whence it was moved to Section Stafford Act Section 403(a)(1)–(3) as parts 
of it were combined. Especially important was the part that would eventually become the 





In any major disaster, federal agencies are hereby authorized when 
directed by the President to provide assistance by utilizing or lending, with 
or without compensation therefor, to States and local governments their 
equipment, supplies, facilities, personnel, and other resources, other than 
the extension of credit under the authority of any Act. 
From Section 5(a) of the DRA of 1950, it also stated the following. 
In the interest of providing maximum mobilization of federal assistance 
under this Act, the President is authorized to coordinate in such manner as 
he may determine the activities of federal agencies in providing disaster 
assistance. The President may direct any federal agency to utilize its 
available personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and other resources, in 
accordance with the authority herein contained.  
This language was carried forward without change through Section 203(f) of the DRA of 
1970 and Section 302(a) of the DRA of 1974. This section closely aligns with Section 
402(2) of the Stafford Act. This is supported by the chart on page 7 of the Report of the 
Committee on Environment and Public Works United States Senate to accompany Senate 
Bill 2380, Report 100-524, September 22, 1988 which shows “federal Assistance” moved 
to Section 402 of the Stafford Act and page 16 of the same where the Committee states 
“The new section 402 is drawn from sections 302(a) and 305(b) of the 1974 Act.” The 
language of the Senate bill is identical to what later appeared in Public Law 100–707. 
Section 5 provided the language that has become Section 402 of the Stafford Act, or what 
can be called its meta-authority.123   
Sections 3 and 5 of the DRA of 1950 would form the crux of the authority for the 
federal government to execute “the intent of Congress to provide an orderly and 
continuing means of assistance by the federal Government to States and local 
governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate suffering and damage 
resulting from major disasters.”124 In addition, in Section 8 of the DRA of 1950, 
Congress appropriated $5,000,000 to carry out the purposes of the Act. 
In sum, the DRA of 1950 provided the antecedent authority that became Sections 
402 (meta-authority to coordinate and direct) and 403 (specific authority to save lives and 
                                                 
123 See previous discussion of “meta-authority.” 
124 Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Public Law 81–875, Section 1. 
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protect property) of the Stafford Act, funds to execute the Act (akin to the present day 
DRF provided by Congress to carry out the Stafford Act) and provided that the funds 
given to execute the DRA of 1950 were “supplementary to, and not in substitution for, 
nor in limitation of, any other authority conferred or funds provided under any other 
law.” Interestingly, this last provision did not prohibit paying other federal agencies for 
work performed under their own authorities; only that these funds were supplementary to 
their existing authority and appropriations. 
B. REGULATIONS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS TO EXECUTE THE 
DISASTER RELIEF ACT OF 1950 
Obviously, some method would have to be implemented by the Administrator of 
the Federal Civil Defense Administration to execute the president’s authority to direct 
federal agencies. While research did not uncover rules or regulations on how the 
Administrator actually exercised this authority, the 1953 Annual Report for the Federal 
Civil Defense Administration stated the following in its chapter on the DRA of 1950. 
Many agencies of the federal Government have statutory authority and 
appropriations which allow them to operate in disaster situations. When 
the problem is of greater magnitude than can be handled by existing 
authority and funds, the President will invoke the provisions of the 
Disaster Relief Act and provide additional federal assistance to 
supplement State and local efforts and existing federal authorities. 
Upon the invocation of this law and declaration of a “major disaster” by 
the President, FCDA has the authority to call on the resources of all 
federal departments and agencies. This assistance must be provided by the 
federal agencies, with or without reimbursement, at the President’s 
discretion.125  
This language is not ambiguous. When called upon by the president, through the Federal 
Civil Defense Administration, federal agencies must follow the president’s orders, with 
or without reimbursement. 
On October 29, 1957, President Eisenhower issued EO 10737, Further Providing 
for the Administration of Disaster Relief.126 As part of the EO, the president added three 
                                                 
125 1953 Annual Report Federal Civil Defense Administration, 19. 
126 Published at 22 FR 8799 on November 1, 1957. 
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additional provisions to Section 1 of EO 10427 giving additional authority to the Federal 
Civil Defense Administration to reimburse federal agencies.127 These provisions 
provided the first evidence that federal agencies were actively being reimbursed for work 
ordered by the head of a federal agency tasked with coordinating and directing the federal 
response to a disaster. Under Section 2 (e)(2), the president:  
Could allocate funds for use in connection with the specific major disaster. 
The funds so allocated to the Administrator may be utilized by him… (ii) 
for reimbursement pursuant to the provisions of section 1 (c) of Executive 
Order No. 10427 of January 16, 1953, as added by this order.128 
On February 24, 1960, the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM), 
which had assumed the duties of the Federal Civil Defense Administration,129 published 
the first regulations on the reimbursement of federal agencies performing major disaster 
relief functions at Title 32 Part 1709 of the Code of federal Regulations.130 It signaled the 
birth of the “mission assignment”.131 In its annual report from that year, the OCDM 
explicitly stated that some of the funds used for disaster relief went to the reimbursement 
of federal agencies.132 
These original regulations of the OCDM would remain unchanged until they 
would be updated to reflect the DRA of 1970. Additional changes would be made upon 
                                                 
127 EO 10737 Further Providing for the Administration of Disaster Relief, Section 3, October 29, 
1957. 
128 Section 1 (c) of EO 10427 refers to the provision in Section 7, the antecedent language to Section 
304 of the Stafford Act, that allows the Federal Civil Defense Administration , through his delegation from 
the President in EO 10427, to reimburse other federal agencies from funds appropriated to Execute the Act 
by Congress in Section 8. Reimbursement of other federal agencies would be cautioned, however, on the 
basis of part of Section 3 of the DRA of 1950 that stated the “authority conferred by this Act, and any funds 
provided hereunder shall be supplementary to, and not in substitution for, nor in limitation of, any other 
authority conferred or funds provided under any other law.” 
129 EO 10773 Delegating and Transferring Certain Actions and Affairs to the Office of Defense and 
Civilian Mobilization, July 1, 1958. 
130 Published at 25 FR 1587, February 24, 1960. 
131 So far, the earliest use of the term “mission assignment” found by the author was for tornados in 
Texas in May 1970. At that time, the DRA of 1950 had not yet been replaced by the DRA of 1970. See 
Congressional Record July 8, 1970 23207. For a further explanation of MAs, see Appendix A. 
132 Annual Report 1960 Executive Office of the President Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, 
58–59. 
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the passage of the DRA of 1974133 but they would remain mostly intact until FEMA, 
which inherited these regulations and transferred them to Title 44 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, would replace them in 1989 after the passage of the Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act Amendments of 1988.134 Even now, much of the language for 
FEMA’s current regulations can be directly traced to the original OCDM regulations.  
What is noteworthy about the original OCDM regulations from 1960 is for the 
first time, federal agencies were advised they would not be reimbursed for “costs incurred 
while performing work under a federal agency’s own authority subsequent to the 
president’s declaration of a major disaster (except as provided in 1709.2).”135 Thus can 
be seen when one of the current impediments to exercising unity of command; the 
inability to reimburse federal agencies when ordered to respond to a disaster, may have 
begun. This regulation, however, would have been consistent with the law at that time 
that any funds provided to execute this law would be “supplementary to and not in 
substitution for” funds provided for under any other authority or law. However, this 
regulation was not a blanket prohibition against reimbursement. Section 1709.2 of these 
regulations otherwise generally allowed for reimbursement of federal agencies, subject to 
certain criteria, which otherwise would have not been reimbursed, stated as follows. 
When determined to be in the best interests of the Federal Government 
reimbursement to other federal agencies for expenditures in the 
performance of disaster relief assistance, made at the direction of the 
Director, OCDM (hereinafter called the Director), pursuant to section 1 (a) 
of EO 10427, as amended, may be approved for the following: 
(a) Overtime, travel, and per diem of regular federal agency personnel 
diverted from their normal duties as a result of a directive from the 
Director. 
(b) Work, services, and materials contracted for by other federal agencies 
for assistance performed on a specific disaster project. 
                                                 
133 Public Law 93–288. 
134 Public Law 100–707. This law renamed the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 The Stafford Act among 
many substantive changes. 
135 32 CFR 1709.3 (1960). 
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(c) Materials, equipment, and supplies (including transportation, repair, 
and maintenance) from regular inventory stocks utilized or consumed by 
other federal agencies. 
(d) Emergency work performed under provisions of section 5(a) of the Act 
at the specific direction of the Director prior to a declaration of a major 
disaster: Provided, That such work shall be otherwise eligible under 
section 3 of the Act upon the declaration of a major disaster: 
And provided further, That reimbursement may not be sought if no funds 
are allocated by the President for disaster assistance, and that such costs 
shall not include funds expended or supplies and materials used by federal 
agencies performing disaster work under their own authority where funds 
therefore may be otherwise available or may be made available. 
(e) Such other costs or expenditures not otherwise provided herein, as the 
Director and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget may approve, based 
upon the written justification submitted to the Director by the agency 
concerned, or as agreed to in writing between the Director and other 
federal agencies, and concurred in by the Director of the Bureau of the 
Budget. 
These OCDM regulations also referred back to two important sections of 
President Eisenhower’s’ EO 10427. Section 1(a) of this EO referred to the Director of 
OCDM’s ability to direct other federal agencies, under the authority delegated to him by 
the president, to execute Section 3 of the DRA of 1950. Section 3 provided a blanket 
authorization to federal agencies, when tasked under this section, to provide assistance 
they otherwise could not, which is the forerunner to the Section 403 specific authority of 
the Stafford Act. Section 3 provided the key to unlock “authority” for federal agencies 
that otherwise have one of the enumerated “capabilities” in Section 3 to assist but not the 
inherent “authority” to utilize these capabilities. Read in conjunction with Section 7 of 
the DRA of 1950, Section 3 allowed these activities to be reimbursed from funds 
appropriated to execute the DRA of 1950. 
Section 5(a) of the DRA of 1950 provided a slightly different purpose. This 
provision of the DRA of 1950 is the direct predecessor of Section 402 of the Stafford Act 
and states, “The President may direct any federal agency to utilize its available personnel, 
equipment, supplies, facilities, and other resources, in accordance with the authority 
herein contained.” This sentence allowed the president to direct federal agencies to utilize 
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their available resources. To be already “available” means these resources could already 
have participated in disaster relief under existing authority. To argue otherwise means 
that these resources were not “available” on their own accord and that Section 5(a) is 
essentially duplicative of Section 3, particularly Section 3(d). Section 5(a) must serve a 
purpose that adds to what already exists under Section 3. It is also instructive to look at 
this section’s progeny, Section 203(f) of the DRA of 1970, and the discussion of what 
this provision means by the Congressional Committee Conference.136 
The President would be further authorized to coordinate the activities of 
federal agencies providing disaster assistance, direct any federal agency to 
utilize its funds, personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and other 
resources …137 
The different purposes of Section 3 and Section 5(a) were reflected in the OCDM 
regulation 32 CFR 1709.2, which is why it has separate sections for each, although 
reimbursement for Section 5(a) activities was limited to pre-declaration activities. It is 
also why 1709.3 has a clause at the end of its paragraph denying reimbursement for 
“costs incurred while performing under a federal agency’s own authority subsequent to 
the president’s declaration,” it reflects the ability of the president to both coordinate and 
direct resources already available to assist, which means the authority to utilize these 
resources existing outside of the DRA of 1970. In line with Congress’s direction in 
Section 3 that “the authority conferred by this Act, and any funds provided hereunder 
shall be supplementary to, and not in substitution for, nor in limitation of, any other 
authority conferred or funds provided under any other law” the OCDM regulations 
prohibit, both in 1709.2(d) and 1709.3(d), reimbursement for costs for work that the 
federal agency already had the authority and appropriation to perform on its own after a 
major disaster declaration.138 
                                                 
136 The DRA of 1970 altered the statute slightly by adding the terms “with or without reimbursement” 
to the statute so it reads as follows: The President may direct any federal agency, with or without 
reimbursement, to utilize its available personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and other resources in 
accordance with the authority, herein contained. 
137 Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Conference Report [To accompany S. 3619], Report No. 91–1752, 
December 15, 1970, 20. 
138 
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In 1709.2(d), it does state that reimbursement may be sought for “Emergency 
work performed under provision of section 5(a) of the Act at the specific direction of the 
Director prior to a declaration of a major disaster; Provided, That such work shall be 
otherwise eligible under section 3 of the Act upon the declaration of a major disaster; And 
further, That reimbursement may not be sought if no funds are allocated by the president 
for disaster assistance, and that such costs shall not include funds expended or supplies 
and materials used by federal agencies performing work under their own authority where 
funds therefore may be otherwise available or may be made available.” While it is not 
clear why the regulations allow for the reimbursement of work done under existing 
authority prior to a declaration, one possibility is that Congress wanted to encourage 
federal agencies to act proactively in response to an event and that these regulations 
reflect this. The point of this exception for reimbursing pre-declaration work is that 
federal agencies could depend on being reimbursed either through funds dedicated to 
execute the scope of work covered under Section 3 of the DRA of 1950 or through their 
own appropriations as supplemented by Congress. This latter suggestion may be what the 
language “funds therefore may be otherwise available or may be made available” 
represents. This caveat serves to preserve the requirement that funds provided under 
Section 3 must be “supplementary to… funds provided under any other law.” 
Until the passage of the DRA of 1970 on December 31, 1970, the sum total of the 
law and regulations meant the following criteria applied to the directives that, by at least 
May, 1970, were called MAs. 
 Federal agencies without the authority to act could be directed by the 
Director of OCDM139 to perform certain work under Section 3 of the 
DRA of 1950, essential measures to save lives and protect property, and 
could be reimbursed at the discretion of the Director of ODCM if funds 
were available. 
 Federal agencies with existing authority to assist after a disaster could 
have their work coordinated by the Director of OCDM, and to further this 
power to coordinate, the Director could direct their work performed under 
                                                 
139 EO 10737 did provide that the Director of OCDM could delegate any duty or function under EO 
10427 to anyone within OCDM, or to the heads of any agency with their approval. As discussed later, 
OCDM would later be replaced by the Office of Emergency Planning later itself changed to the Office of 
Emergency Preparedness. 
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their own authority, but federal agencies could not seek reimbursement 
from funds dedicated to execute the DRA of 1950 except for a limited 
exception for work done prior to a major disaster declaration under 32 
CFR 1709.2(d), which was consistent with the law that required that 
reimbursement for this work may not be in “substitution for, nor in 
limitation of, any other authority conferred or funds provided under any 
other law.” 
 All directives authorizing the performance of work and the expenditure of 
funds must have been in writing and contain a clause that establishes a 
ceiling amount for expenditures so authorized. 
C. THE DISASTER RELIEF ACT OF 1970140 
Subsequent to the DRA of 1950, Congress passed the Disaster Relief Acts of 
1966 and 1969, neither of which affected any provisions relevant to this discussion, 
although the 1969 Act did create the FCO position.141 On December 31, 1970, Congress 
passed the Disaster Relief Act of 1970,142 which repealed the DRA of 1950 and DRA of 
1969 in their entirety and all but one section of the DRA of 1966. The provisions of 
Sections 3, 5(a) and 7 of the DRA of 1950 were all recodified in Section 203 of the DRA 
of 1970. Section 3 became Section 203(a), although the section for reimbursing federal 
agencies was peeled off into its own Section 203(c), Section 5(a) became Section 203(f), 
and Section 7 became Section 203(e).143 
This recodification resulted in two substantive changes. Most importantly, the 
provision of the DRA of 1950 making all assistance under the Act “supplemental and not 
in substitution for” was removed without comment in any of the legislative history. In its 
place was added what now appears as the first sentence of Section 304 of the Stafford 
Act, “Federal agencies may be reimbursed for expenditures under this Act from funds 
appropriated for the purposes of this Act.” Related to this, the reimbursement language 
                                                 
140 See Appendix C for the full text. 
141 Disaster Relief Act of 1966, Public Law 89–769; 80 Stat 1316; The Disaster Relief Act of 1969, 
Public Law 91–79; 83 Stat 125. 
142 Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Public Law 91–606; 84 Stat 1744. 
143 Even though Section 203 of the DRA of 1970 is labeled “Cooperation of Federal Agencies in 
Rendering Emergency Assistance,” Congress had not yet created a second category of event known under 
the Stafford Act as an “emergency,” as of the DRA of 1970, only the designation of “major disaster” 
existed and it used emergency to describe the assistance provided after a major disaster. 
 55
that once appeared in Section 7 of the DRA of 1950 did not carry over to Section 203(e) 
of the DRA of 1970, likely because it was redundant to the new 203(c), which now 
addressed reimbursement for all these sections. 
Second, what had previously been Section 5(a), and now had become Section 
203(f) added that the president (or the person delegated this power) could direct any 
federal agency to perform work under the authority of 203(f) “with or without 
reimbursement.” Coupled with the removal of the language that previously made 
assistance “supplemental and not in substitution for,” it now meant by the plain reading 
of the statute that federal agencies could be reimbursed for work that could have been 
accomplished under their own authority independent of the DRA of 1970, which is 
supported by the legislative history of the Act.  
It may be asked why Congress chose to add language allowing reimbursement 
into Section 203(f) but not 203(a). Work performed by federal agencies under Section 
203(a) was by its nature work it did not have the authority to do on its own (which if it 
had in the first place would be covered under Section 203(f)) so that if in fact it 
performed such work, it logically follows that the authority to perform the work, 
provided by Section 203(a) would be followed by funds to reimburse the work. The 
authority for reimbursement flows from Section 203(c), which by its terms applies not 
just to Section 203(a) but the entire Act. It could be then be asked, if Section 203(c) 
applied to the entire Act, including Section 203(f), why did Congress even need to add 
reimbursement language to Section 203(f)? It can be assumed it was done to reinforce the 
fact Congress wanted to create the flexibility to reimburse federal agencies from funds 
appropriated to execute the DRA of 1970 for work that ostensibly could have been 
performed and paid for under their existing authorities and appropriations. 
The Joint Committee Report is silent as to reimbursement under 203(f) but plainly 




Federal agencies could be reimbursed for services and supplies under 
Section 203(a) from funds appropriated under this Act. Any funds paid to 
federal agencies for services or supplies furnished under the provisions of 
this section would be deposited to the credit of the appropriation or 
appropriations currently available for such services or supplies.144 
More specific reference may be found in the individual reports of the Senate and 
House. Section 203 of the DRA of 1970 was essentially the same as the provisions of the 
Senate bill.145 In the Senate’s report, it simply says for the section as a whole, 
“Reimbursement of a Federal Agency for services or supplies it furnishes is to be 
deposited to the credit of its appropriation for these items.”146 It does not distinguish 
between work performed under Section 203(a) or Section 203(f). As for Section 203 in 
its entirety, it states that while “based largely on a similar provision of Section 3 of Public 
Law 81-875… the powers conferred therein are in this bill clarified, extended and 
expanded.”147 Therefore, if any view must be taken, it is that Section 203 provides more, 
not less flexibility and power to the president. 
The House report is even more favorable. In its report, the House in its discussion 
of the Senate bill states that Section 8 “amends section 7 of Public Law 81-875 so that 
obligations may be incurred by any federal agency in such amount as may be made 
available to it by the president out of funds available under this act.”148 As to Section 9, it 
“authorizes the President to utilize the resources of federal departments or agencies for 
use in disaster relief, with or without reimbursement, as he deems appropriate. Similar 
authority was granted by Sections 3 and 7 of Public Law 81-875…”149 These two 
sections are then discussed again later in their report: 
 
                                                 
144 Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Conference Report No. 91–1752, 19. 
145 Ibid., 20. 
146 Disaster Assistance, Report Together with Individual Views [To accompany S. 3619], Senate 
Report 91–1157, August 31, 1970, 10. 
147 Ibid. 




Section 8… The 1950 act would be further amended to provide that 
obligations may be incurred by an agency in the amount as may be made 
available out of funds specified to carry out this act or section 9 of the 
Disaster Relief Act of 1966 and the Disaster Relief Act of 1969 instead of 
only funds specified under section 8 of the 1950 Act. 
Section 9. This section grants the President authority to use all federal 
departments or agencies to the best advantage under varying conditions to 
exercise the authorities granted him by this act, the act of September 30, 
1950… the Disaster Relief Act of 1966 and the Disaster Relief Act of 
1969. 
D. REGULATIONS UNDER THE DISASTER RELIEF ACT OF 1970 
On January 28, 1971, the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), to whom the 
functions of OCDM had been passed by a previous EO, updated 32 CFR Part 1709 to 
account for the changes in the DRA of 1970.150 The provisions of 1709 were barely 
changed. 44 CFR 1709.2 was expanded to include additional categories of costs that 
would be reimbursed. What had previously been 1709.2(d) had been designated 1709.2(i) 
and now read as follows. 
(i) Work performed at the specific direction of the Director when a major 
disaster is imminent: Provided, That such work would be otherwise 
eligible upon the declaration of a major disaster: And provided further, 
That such costs shall not include funds expended or supplies and materials 
including medical stockpiles delegated under E.O. 10958; August 14, 
1961, used by federal agencies performing disaster work under their own 
authority where funds therefore may be otherwise available or may be 
made available. 
Section 1709.3, Expenditures Not Eligible for Reimbursement, was changed in that it 
eliminated two of its four paragraphs, and (d), which previously read as “Costs incurred 
while performing work under a federal agency’s own authority subsequent to the 
president’s declaration of a major disaster (except as provided in § 1709.2),” which was 
relettered (b), and simply stated “Costs incurred while performing work under a federal 
agency’s own authority.” This change seems to have eliminated some of the discretion to 
pay. What is interesting in these two changes is while the law changed to allow the  
                                                 
150 OEP had been delegated the powers previously delegated the pertinent powers related to the DRA 
of 1970 under EO 11575, which revoked EO 10427. 
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discretionary reimbursement of federal agencies directed to perform work under the DRA 
of 1970, but which could have been done under their existing authority, the regulations 
go in the opposite direction and further restrict reimbursement.  
From this point on, the restriction of using funds dedicated to pay for work 
performed under the Disaster Relief Acts, and later Stafford Act, appears to have been 
based upon a regulation grounded in policy rather than mandated by law. In other words, 
the current practice of not using the DRF to pay for the work of federal agencies 
conducting disaster relief under their own authorities, which could have also been 
ordered under the specific life saving and property preserving authority of the Stafford 
Act, is one of policy. If this were true, it would mean that current law would not need to 
be changed to allow for a federal official, exercising unity of command over the federal 
operational response to an existential catastrophe under the authority of the Stafford Act, 
to reimburse federal agencies for work they could have performed under their inherent 
authority. The current law would allow that person to both direct federal agencies to 
respond to an existential catastrophe and reimburse them for their efforts. 
The regulations governing reimbursement would continue in effect151 until April 
19, 1976 when the federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) issued new 
reimbursement regulations to execute the DRA of 1974.152 
To summarize, the regulations as they existed during this period to execute the 
DRA of 1970: 
 Federal agencies, at the discretion of the President, could be reimbursed 
for work performed as directed under Section 203(a) of the DRA of 1970 
from funds available to execute the DRA of 1970. 
 Federal agencies, whose work was either coordinated or directed under the 
authority of Section 203(f), could not seek reimbursement from funds 
appropriated to execute the DRA of 1970. 
                                                 
151 Although these regulations were transferred on February 22, 1974 to Title 24 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations when HUD, through the FDAA, was delegated the relevant powers to execute the 
DRA of 1970 by EO 11725, but no changes were made to the regulations. 
152 See 41 FR 16476. 
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 All directives authorizing the performance of work and the expenditure of 
funds must be in writing and contain a clause that establishes a ceiling 
amount for expenditures so authorized. 
 The statutory prohibition to prevent the reimbursement of federal agencies 
from funds appropriated to execute the DRA of 1950 for life saving and 
property preserving activities they could already perform under their own 
authority was removed, but federal regulations continued to carry this 
restriction. 
E. THE DISASTER RELIEF ACT OF 1974153 
On May 22, 1974, Congress passed the Disaster Relief Act of 1974.154 The DRA 
of 1974 repealed the DRA of 1970 with the exception of several sections not of 
interest.155 Section 203 of the DRA of 1970 was divided into new and separate sections 
of the DRA of 1974. Section 203(a) became Section 306, Section 203(f) became Section 
302(a), and Section 203(c) became Section 307. Section 306 was nearly the same as 
Section 203(a) except that its final paragraph covering the performance of emergency 
work on public or private lands was reworded.  
42 U.S.C. 5146(a) (4) Performing on public or private lands or waters any 
emergency work or services essential to save lives and to protect and 
preserve property, public health and safety, including but not limited to : 
search and rescue, emergency medical care, emergency mass care, 
emergency shelter, and provisions of food, water, medicine, and other 
essential needs, including movement of supplies or persons; clearance of 
roads and construction of temporary bridges necessary to the performance 
of emergency tasks and essential community services; provision of 
temporary facilities for schools and other essential community services; 
demolition of unsafe structures that endanger the public; warning of 
further risks and hazards; public information and assistance on health and 
safety measures; technical advice to State and local governments on 
disaster management and control; reduction of immediate threats to life, 
property, and public health and safety; and making contributions to State 
or local governments for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this 
paragraph. 
                                                 
153 See Appendix D for the full text. 
154 Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Public Law 93–288; 88 Stat 143. 
155 Ibid at Section 603. 
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Section 302(a) was reworded to make it mandatory that the president “shall 
coordinate, in such manner as he may determine, the activities of all federal agencies 
providing disaster assistance…” The rest of the paragraph expanded the list of resources 
and eliminated the requirement that the direction to utilize these resources be done “in 
accordance with the authority, herein contained.”  
42 U.S.C. 5142(a) In the interest of providing maximum mobilization of 
federal assistance under this Act, the President shall coordinate, in such 
manner as he may determine, the activities of all federal agencies 
providing disaster assistance. The President may direct any federal 
agency, with or without reimbursement, to utilize its available personnel, 
equipment, supplies, facilities, and other resources including managerial 
and technical services in support of State and local disaster assistance 
efforts … 
Section 203(e) became Section 309 of the DRA of 1974, but with its 
reimbursement language removed in the 1970 version, it no longer related to the direction 
and coordination functions of the president. 
Section 203(c) was unchanged when it was moved to its own section. Neither the 
Joint Committee report156 nor the Senate report157 provide any guidance other than to 
restate the words of the statute. However, the fact that the reimbursement provisions, with 
the exception of the provisions “with or without reimbursement” in Section 302(a), were 
now wholly consolidated in its own statute is important. In addition to Sections 302(a) 
and 306, Congress specifically provided statute specific programs to be delivered under 
the DRA of 1974, a process begun under the DRA of 1970.158 If the FDAA wished to 
implement these programs with the assistance of other federal agencies, particularly those 
which would be offered alongside the assistance delivered under 306(a)(4), Section 307, 
allowing for the reimbursement of activities, must apply to the entire DRA of 1974 to 
provide authority to transfer funds between appropriations without violating the Transfer 
                                                 
156 Disaster Relief Act Amendments of 1974, Conference Report [to accompany S. 3062], Report No. 
93–1037, May 13, 1974. 
157 Disaster Relief Act Amendments of 1974, Report of the Committee on Public Works to accompany 
S. 3062, Report No. 93–778, April 9, 1974. 
158 See the following sections under the DRA of 1970: Sec 222 Emergency Communications; Sec 223 
Emergency Transportation; Sec 224 Debris Removal; Sec 226 Temporary Housing Assistance; Sec 238 
Food Coupons and Distribution; Sec 239 Legal Services; Sec 240 Unemployment Insurance. 
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Statute,159 or the Miscellaneous Receipts Statute.160 Section 307 is doubly important for 
the latter proposition, because Section 302(a), while it includes language allowing for the 
transfer of funds between appropriations, does not include an exception to the 
Miscellaneous Receipts Statute. Without applying Section 307 to Section 302(a), any 
federal agency reimbursed under that statute would be forced to place those funds in the 
miscellaneous receipts fund of the General Treasury and not replenish their own funds 
expended for the work.161 More evidence can thus be seen that the law, at this point in 
time, now allowed for the reimbursement of federal agencies when directed to perform 
work under the DRA. However, this divorce between regulation and law would continue 
through the DRA of 1974 and its implementing regulations.  
F. REGULATIONS UNDER THE DISASTER RELIEF ACT OF 1974 
The FDAA issued new regulations for the reimbursement of other agencies on 
August 2, 1976 that replaced those for the DRA of 1970.162 As a clerical issue, the 
regulations for federal disaster assistance had been moved to Title 24 Part 2205 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations to reflect that HUD, through the FDAA, was now the 
primary federal agency coordinating and providing federal disaster assistance.163 The 
regulations for reimbursement of federal agencies were now joined in the same Part 2205, 
and would be the regulations FEMA would inherit and republish when it was created in 
1979. 
Several changes to these updated regulations for reimbursement were made. For 
the first time, the regulations now explicitly stated that federal agencies could be 
reimbursed for work under the language of Section 302(a) in its preamble.  
 
                                                 
159 31 U.S.C. § 1532. 
160 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b). 
161 Ibid. 
162 41 FR 32359. 
163 The authority to implement these regulations was delegated to the Secretary of HUD pursuant to 
EO 11795, 39 FR 28227, July 15, 1974, and was delegated from the Secretary of HUD to the Director of 
the FDAA pursuant to a Delegation of Authority, 39 FR 28227, August 5, 1974. 
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41 FR 32359. On April 19, 1976, the federal Disaster Assistance 
Administration of the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
published proposed regulations in the federal Register (41 FR 16476) to 
establish certain procedures and criteria for reimbursement to other federal 
agencies providing disaster assistance under the Disaster Relief Act of 
1974, (Public Law 93–288, 42 U.S.C. 5121 note) by adding a new Subpart 
H to Part 2205. Section 302(a) of the Act authorizes the President to direct 
any federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to utilize its available 
personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and other resources in support of 
State and local disaster assistance efforts… Subpart H supersedes previous 
regulations on this subject, 24 CFR 2201, adopted pursuant to the Disaster 
Relief Act of 1970 (Public Law 91606, 42 U.S.C. 4401 et seq.). Section 
2205.82(a) of Subpart H sets forth with great specificity certain 
expenditures not eligible for reimbursement. Except as noted, there were 
no other major substantive changes from the previous regulations. 
Previously, the authority that now resided in Section 306, backed by authority for 
reimbursement that now rested in Section 307, was the primary justification for 
reimbursing federal agencies. The FDAA had now turned this on its head without 
providing any further reasoning why it was not relying on the arguably broader authority 
of Section 307. The new regulations were completely silent as to relationship to Sections 
306 and 307, which does not mean these sections were not used to direct and reimburse 
federal agencies for their efforts in providing disaster assistance after a major disaster. 
However, it is interesting that the FDAA chose to specifically invoke the “with or 
without reimbursement” language of Section 302(a) after it could be argued that authority 
had been ignored for the previous six years. 
The other major change came with the regulation on Expenditures Not Eligible 
for Reimbursement being combined with eligible expenditures under a new Section 
2205.82 Eligibility of Certain Expenditures for Reimbursement. In addition to listing 
eligible expenditures, its first line now read “The [FDAA] Administrator or the [FDAA] 
Regional Director may not approve reimbursement of costs incurred while performing 
work under an agency’s own authority.”164 This new language was essentially identical 
to the reimbursement language for the regulations in effect to execute the DRA of 1970 
despite the fact that in its preamble, the regulation specifically cites Section 302(a), 
                                                 
164 24 CFR 2205.82(a) (1976). 
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which allows the president to “direct any federal agency, with or without reimbursement, 
to utilize its available… resources.” One logical explanation is that if federal agencies 
were directed by the FDAA under the authority of Section 302(a) to perform work they 
could have ordinarily done on their own, that authority for that particular work flowed 
not from their standing authority but from Section 302(a). In other words, this work 
would be eligible for reimbursement from funds appropriated to execute the DRA of 
1974. The regulations appearing at 24 CFR 2205 would later be adopted wholesale by 
FEMA on September 28, 1979 after it had assumed responsibility to execute the DRA of 
1974 under EO 12127, 12148 and Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978, and retitled in 44 
CFR Part 205.165  
To summarize, the regulations as they existed during this period to execute the 
DRA of 1974 are as follows. 
 While silent as to Section 306, there was no reason to indicate that federal 
agencies, at the discretion of the President, could not be reimbursed for 
life saving and live preserving work performed as directed under Section 
306 of the DRA of 1974 from funds available to carry out the DRA of 
1974. This presumably flowed from the authority to transfer funds, and to 
deposit them in an agency’s own funds to the exclusion of the 
miscellaneous receipts fund, from Section 307. 
 Federal agencies, whose work was directed under the authority of Section 
302(a), could now seek reimbursement from funds appropriated to execute 
the DRA of 1974. However, it was offset by the language of 2205.82(a) 
declaring, “costs incurred while performing work under an agency’s own 
authority” were not eligible for reimbursement, which could be read as the 
ineligible work would be that disaster assistance not performed at the 
direction of the FDAA, but only coordinated with the FDAA. 
 All directives authorizing the performance of work and the expenditure of 
funds must be in writing and contain a clause that establishes a ceiling 
amount for expenditures so authorized. 
                                                 
165 See 44 FR 56173. 
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G. THE STAFFORD ACT 
On November 23, 1988, Congress passed the Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Amendments of 1988 (DREAA). The DREAA amended the DRA of 1974166 
and renamed it the Stafford Act.167 It made significant changes to the DRA of 1974 
including adding a second designated category of assistance for “emergencies” alongside 
“major disasters.”168 Once again, the statutes were recodified in different sections. 
Section 307 of the DRA of 1974 was moved to Section 304 of the Stafford Act. Section 
302(a) had its first two sentences removed and the rest became what is now Section 
402169, Section 306 of the DRA of 1974 became Section 403 of the Stafford Act. 
In the two reports issued on the DREAA of 1988 by the House and Senate, 
several statements were relevant.170 
New Section 402 is entitled “General federal Assistance.” This section 
provides the President with authority to direct any federal agency to use its 
authorities and the resources granted to it under federal law in support of 
State and local assistance efforts. This assistance may include personnel, 
equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical and advisory 
services. The President may also coordinate all disaster relief assistance 
including voluntary assistance, provide technical and advisory assistance 
to affected State and local governments, and assist State and local 
governments in distribution of medicine, food, and other consumable 
supplies.  
New Section 403 is entitled “Essential Assistance.” This section 
authorizes federal agencies on the direction of the President to provide 
assistance essential to meeting immediate threats to life and property 
resulting from a major disaster by using, lending, or donating to federal, 
State and local governments federal equipment, supplies, facilities,  
 
                                                 
166 Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments of 1988, Public Law 101–70; 102 Stat. 
4689. 
167 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. 
168 See 42 U.S.C. § 5122. 
169 See U.S. Senate, Disaster Relief Amendments of 1988, Report of the Committee on Environment 
and Public Works to Accompany S. 2380, S. Rept 100–524, 1988, 11. 
170 Disaster Relief and Great Lakes Erosion Assistance Report [To accompany H.R. 2707], House of 
Representatives, Report 100–517, March 15, 1988 and Disaster Relief Act Amendments of 1988, Report of 
the Committee on Environment and Public Works United States Senate to accompany S. 2380, Report 100–
524, September 22, 1988. It is noted that the House bill, as amended, became the bill that was passed. 
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personnel and other resources, other than the extension of credit, for use or 
distribution by such governments in accordance with the purposes of the 
Act.171 
New Section 502, “federal Emergency Assistance,” authorizes the 
President to direct any federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to 
use its authorities and the resources granted to it under federal law in 
support of State and local emergency efforts to save lives, protect property 
and public and safety, and lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe. The 
President may also coordinate all disaster relief assistance, provide 
technical and advisory assistance to affected State and local governments, 
provide emergency assistance through federal agencies without cost, 
remove debris in accordance with Section 407, provide temporary housing 
assistance under Section 408, and assist State and local governments in the 
distribution of medicine, food and other consumable supplies.172 
In addition, in the Senate report: 
The new title V is comprised of three sections. Section 501 provides 
emergency declaration procedures. Section 502 gives the President 
authority (1) to direct federal agencies to do work under their own 
authorities, without reimbursement; (2) to coordinate federal agencies and 
voluntary relief organizations providing emergency assistance, (3) to 
coordinate emergency assistance with State and local officials, and (4) to 
provide technical and advisory assistance to State and local 
governments.173 
Following a declaration, under authority of section 502, the President may 
(a) direct any federal agency to provide emergency assistance under its 
own authorities with or without reimbursement from funds appropriated to 
carry out this Act; (b) coordinate federal agency and voluntary relief 
organization assistance and coordinate with State and local officials; (c) 




                                                 
171 See U.S. House of Representatives, Disaster Relief and Great Lakes Erosion Assistance, Report 
100–517, 1988, 7. 
172 Ibid., 12. 
173 U.S. Senate, Disaster Relief Amendments of 1988, Report of the Committee on Environment and 
Public Works to Accompany S. 2380, 9. Obviously, “without reimbursement” was changed in the final bill 
to the current language allowing reimbursement. 
174 Ibid. 
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SECTION 7-CHANGES TO TITLE III 
Section 7 deletes sections 301, 305, 306 and the first two sentences of 
section 302(a), while retaining the authority to have work done by other 
federal agencies with or without reimbursement.175 
In a trend dating back to the DRA of 1970, Congress continued to expand the 
language allowing for the reimbursement of federal agencies while executing the 
successive disaster relief acts. This expansion can be seen with the additional language 
added to Section 402 of the Stafford Act, which now clearly showed what had been 
Section 203(f) of the DRA of 1970, Section 302(a) of the DRA of 1974, and now, 
Section 402 of the Stafford Act did in fact provide authority for federal agencies to be 
“reimbursed with or without reimbursement” for work they were directed to perform 
under the meta-authority of Section 402. Coupled with the second sentence of Section 
304 of the Stafford Act, these reimbursements could be returned to the appropriated funds 
used to fund the work directed under Section 402, even though such work might have 
been performed under authorities independent of the Stafford Act, but subject to 
coordination of the FCO. Reimbursement would only apply to the types of life saving and 
life preserving work found in the Stafford Act, such as that found in Sections 403,407 
and 408 of the Stafford Act. See the following.  
 42 U.S.C. § 5170(a) (2): In any major disaster, the President may 
coordinate all disaster relief assistance (including voluntary assistance) 
provided by federal agencies, private organizations, and state and local 
governments, including precautionary evacuations and recovery 
 42 U.S.C. § 5143(b)(3): Functions of federal coordinating officer—To 
effectuate the purposes of this Act, the federal coordinating officer, within 
the affected area, shall coordinate the administration of relief, including 
activities of the state and local governments, the American National Red 
Cross, the Salvation Army, the Mennonite Disaster Service, and other 
relief or disaster assistance organizations, which agree to operate under his 
advice or direction… 
 44 CFR 206.5(d): Disaster assistance by other federal agencies is subject 
to the coordination of the FCO. Federal agencies shall provide any reports 
or information about disaster assistance rendered under the provisions of 
these regulations or authorities independent of the Stafford Act, that the  
                                                 
175 U.S. Senate, Disaster Relief Amendments of 1988, Report of the Committee on Environment and 
Public Works to Accompany S. 2380, 11. 
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FCO or Regional Administrator considers necessary and requests from the 
agencies,  
 44 CFR 206.42(a)(3): Coordinate the administration of relief, including 
activities of state and local governments, activities of federal agencies, and 
those of the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the Mennonite 
Disaster Service, and other voluntary relief organizations that agree to 
operate under the FCO’s advice and direction. 
This steady expansion of authority could explain why Congress inserted the 
words “its authorities” into Section 402 to clarify this position; that FEMA could utilize 
both the physical assets of other federal agencies, but also marshal their authority. By 
substituting “authority” for the word, “available,” Congress could have indicated its 
intent to allow for reimbursement. 
H. REGULATIONS UNDER THE STAFFORD ACT 
However, Congress’s intent once again was not reciprocated with a change in the 
regulations that allowed for the reimbursement of federal agencies when providing 
disaster assistance once directed under the authority of the Stafford Act. The two relevant 
regulations, which were updated on May 22, 1989 in the wake of the Stafford Act, have 
remained unchanged since that date.176 The one significant change can be found at 44 
CFR 206.8(b) where previously reimbursement would not be approved for “work under 
an agency’s own authority” was changed to “costs incurred while performing work 
pursuant to disaster assistance authorities independent of the Stafford Act.”  
No stated reason appears in either the interim or final rule as to why FEMA 
substituted that language. However, it could be read that it did reduce the authorities that 
would not be reimbursed from all authorities of federal agencies to just their disaster 
assistance authorities. But if the view previously set forth that when FEMA directs a 
federal agency to perform work under that agency’s inherent authority in Section 402 is 
taken, the authority for the work is no longer the directed agency’s own authority but that 
of Section 402, this distinction is rendered irrelevant.  
                                                 
176 54 FR 22162. This was the interim rule. The final rule was issued on January 23, 1990 at 55 FR 
2284. 
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Why the discrepancy then between what Congress provided in the law and what 
FEMA restricts itself to? A clue may appear in some of the statements that accompanied 
the first interim rules issued by FEMA after the Stafford Act was passed. 
Although virtually identical legislation was proposed in several bills 
during the 1980s, the provisions did not become law until passage of the 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. 
100-707. Nevertheless, the legislative history leading to the enactment of 
Pub. L. 100-707 indicates a clear Congressional intent to authorize a 
much more limited range of federal assistance in response to 
“emergencies” than in response to “major disasters.”177 
Title V of the Act indicates a clear Congressional intent that the resources 
and authorities of other federal agencies will be utilized first. Only if such 
authorities and resources are inadequate to meet immediate emergency 
needs will FEMA implement emergency assistance programs under the 
Act. Prior to enactment of Pub. L. 100-707, discussions in both the Senate 
and the House of Representatives indicate the clear intent that Stafford Act 
emergency declarations should not be used to override other federal 
response mechanisms already in place.178 
Likewise, a[t] page 4 in S. Rpt. No. 100-524 (September 7, 1988), which 
accompanied S. 2380, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., the Committee on 
Environment and Public Works of the United States Senate stated: In any 
emergency the President must first invoke other federal authorities 
available to him to meet the crisis. If there are other authorities, the role 
of the federal Emergency Management Agency would be limited to 
providing technical assistance and coordinating the efforts of other 
federal agencies under authorities granted to them under other federal 
acts. Only after a determination that assistance under other federal 
authorities is inadequate to meet the crisis may FEMA directly 
intervene.179 
Much of Congress’s discussion during the legislative history of the DREAA of 
1988 focused on limiting FEMA’s role to appropriate events.180 FEMA may have been 
mistaken by carrying over its focus on the declaration process for a major disaster or 
                                                 
177 54 FR 22162 Subpart B(3). 
178 Ibid at Subpart C(2). 
179 Ibid. 
180 See generally Senate Report 100–524; House Report 100–517, 134 Cong Rec H 938, March 17, 
1988; 134 Cong Rec H 10840, October 21, 1988; 134 Cong Rec S 17137, October 21, 1988; and 124 Cong 
Rec S 172333, October 21, 1988. 
 69
emergency, when it was clearly the Congress’ intent not to duplicate existing federal 
authorities that could handle the event on their own to the coordination and direction of 
federal agencies after a declaration. Once the facts justified a declaration, i.e., the event 
was of such magnitude that it deserved to trigger a declaration under the Stafford Act, 
Congress did not intend to continue to institute a wall between the Stafford Act and non-
Stafford Act authorities. To the contrary, Section 402 clearly serves to coordinate both 
FEMA, exercising its Stafford authority, and federal agencies, exercising their non-
Stafford authorities under the FCO. If this is the case, then FEMA’s current prohibition 
against reimbursing federal agencies for “work pursuant to disaster assistance authorities 
independent of the Stafford Act” is a matter of policy, not a matter of law. In addition, the 
person coordinating federal assistance delivered through the Stafford Act has the 
authority to both coordinate and direct the federal agencies responding to an event that 
results in a declaration under the Act. Also included is the ability to reimburse those 
federal agencies directed, pursuant to the authority found in sections 402 and 502 of the 
Stafford Act, to engage in activities they might have already been authorized to do and 
for which they already had funding, or for which, they may seek additional funding.181  
I. MAXIMIZING THE LATENT FLEXIBILITY OF THE STAFFORD ACT 
TO DIRECT AND REIMBURSE FEDERAL AGENCIES 
The ability to reimburse federal agencies directed to perform work under the 
Stafford Act significantly increases the efficiency of the federal response to an existential 
catastrophe in three ways. First, it provides a “carrot” to federal agencies to respond to 
direction from the person vested with the power to direct federal agencies under the 
Stafford Act. Second, it removes the ambiguity of whether federal agencies, none of 
which it can be safely reasoned, are funded to the extent necessary to respond to an 
existential catastrophe, may not respond because of the fear they may quickly extinguish 
existing funds.182 Third, it increases the fiscal efficiency of the federal response by 
allowing disparate federal programs responding to an existential catastrophe to compete 
                                                 
181 See Appendix E for a graphic depicting the continuity of certain statutes from the DRA of 1950 
through the Stafford Act. 
182 While the DRF is not a limitless fund, it has been consistently funded to necessary levels by 
Congress. 
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for the same dollar based upon their priority.183 In other words, with limited funds 
available, an EPA project would now compete in priority with the cost to evacuate 
citizens or to make emergency repairs to local transportation systems. According to the 
manner in which disaster funds are appropriated currently, each of those actions would 
likely be funded by separate appropriations in an uncoordinated manner not necessarily 
reflective of their priority. This lack of coordination can result in Congress appropriating 
funds for one action that might have been better used funding another part of the 
response. 
This change in funding federal agencies responding to an existential catastrophe 
could also find additional efficiencies to assist in the prioritization of limited capabilities, 
including available funds, if accompanied by a way for the federal government to 
compete mission assignments amongst all primary and supporting Emergency ESFs. 
FEMA currently does not have a process to “bid” out the work amongst federal agencies 
necessary to respond to requests for assistance from states. Instead, FEMA relies almost 
entirely upon the primary agencies for each ESF to execute MAs. The federal 
government does not fully utilize its ESF supporting agencies, and even among primary 
agencies, nearly all their MAs end up to going to those in uniform; the DoD and the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and the USCG.184 The first step to ending this 
evisceration of a real Whole of Government approach would be to execute the 
Congressional mandate to inventory federal response capabilities as required under 6 
U.S.C. § 751. Once these capabilities were identified, each one would be the subject of a 
PSMA that could quickly order them to action.185 
                                                 
183 See the United States Senate Committee on Appropriations Disaster Assistance Supplemental 
legislation for Hurricane Sandy where multiple federal agencies have sought individual reimbursement 
after funds have been expended. While Congress may wish to maintain such control, rather than ceding it to 
the Executive Branch, the current method is unable to provide real time prioritization of funds and could 
result in agencies not performing work that should be done, under fear Congress will not later reimburse it, 
or perform work Congress would not have wanted done but feels compelled later to reimburse. 
184 Author’s review of historical MAs using FEMA records dating back to Hurricane Katrina and 
discussions with FEMA MA staff. This review occurred prior to Hurricane Sandy and does not reflect 
FEMA’s response to that disaster. 
185 See 6 U.S.C. § 753(c) To expedite the provision of assistance under the National Response Plan 
(NRP), the President shall ensure that the Administrator, in coordination with federal agencies with 
responsibilities under the National Response Plan, develops prescripted mission assignments, including 
logistics, communications, mass care, health services, and public safety.  
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The purpose of this history and analysis of the federal Disaster Relief Acts and 
their implementing regulations was to provide evidence that the law, as it currently exists, 
supports unity of command under the Stafford Act. Specifically, it shows the ability to 
mobilize, coordinate, and direct federal agencies under the Stafford Act is not divorced 
from the ability to reimburse them, even for those agencies that could have engaged in 
those activities under their inherent authority. It also attempts to explain how current 
practice and regulations, which would impede unity of command by preventing the 
reimbursement of federal agencies for work they could have performed under their own 
authority, may have come about.  
J. THE ADOPTION OF THE NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM, THE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM, AND THE 
MULTIAGENCY COORDINATION SYSTEM 
The nation’s response to disasters is organized under the NIMS, which includes 
the ICS and MACS. The NIMS was created when President Bush issued Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5 on February 28, 2003, which stated in part:  
The [DHS] Secretary shall develop, submit for review to the Homeland 
Security Council, and administer a National Incident Management System 
(NIMS). This system will provide a consistent nationwide approach for 
federal, State, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently 
together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, 
regardless of cause, size, or complexity. To provide for interoperability 
and compatibility among federal, State, and local capabilities, the NIMS 
will include a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and 
technologies covering the incident command system; multi-agency 
coordination systems; unified command; training; identification and 
management of resources (including systems for classifying types of 
resources); qualifications and certification; and the collection, tracking, 
and reporting of incident information and incident resources. 
NIMS was based on an earlier system, the National Interagency Incident 
Management System (NIIMS), which was developed in the 1970s to respond to the 





was accepted by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group in 1982 and was centered on 
the organizing protocol of the FIRESCOPE Incident Command System.186 FEMA’s 
website carries a more detailed history of ICS.187 
The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, the Governor’s 
Office of Emergency Services; the Los Angeles, Ventura and Santa 
Barbara County Fire Departments; and the Los Angeles City Fire 
Department joined with the U.S. Forest Service to develop the system. 
This system became known as FIRESCOPE (FIrefighting RESources of 
California Organized for Potential Emergencies).188 
The important distinction between NIIMS/NIMS and ICS is that NIMS, and the 
NIIMS before it, are broader in concept and scope than ICS. NIMS “represents a core set 
of doctrines, concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes that enables 
effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management.”189 NIMS has five 
components: preparedness, communications and information, resource management, 
command and management, and ongoing management and maintenance.190 ICS is a 
subset of command and management alongside MACS and public information.191 ICS is 
used to organize on-scene operations for a broad spectrum of emergencies from small to 
complex incidents, both natural and manmade. The field response level is comprised of 
emergency management/response personnel, under the command of an appropriate 
authority, who execute tactical decisions and activities in direct response to an incident or 
threat. Resources from the federal, state, tribal, or local levels, when appropriately 
deployed, become part of the field ICS as prescribed by the local authority.192  
                                                 
186 Claire B. Rubin, Emergency Management: The American Experience 1900–2010, 2nd ed. (Taylor 
& Francis, 2012), 167. 
187 FEMA, “NIMS and the Incident Command System” (n.d.), http://www.fema.gov/txt/nims/nims_ 
ics_position_paper.txt. 
188 Ibid. 
189 National Incident Management System (NIMS), 3. 
190 Ibid., 7–8. 
191 Ibid., 45. 
192 Ibid., 46. 
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Command of an incident under ICS can occur under either a single incident 
commander, or if multiple agencies have jurisdiction over the incident through unified 
command. Unified command can be described as 
… a team effort, UC allows all agencies with jurisdictional authority or 
functional responsibility for the incident to jointly provide management 
direction through a common set of incident objectives and strategies and a 
single IAP. Each participating agency maintains its authority, 
responsibility, and accountability.193  
Under unified command, no single jurisdiction can control the actions of the other; 
decisions are made by consensus and actions are coordinated amongst the participants. 
This situation makes sense given that the firefighting efforts that gave birth to ICS 
required multiple jurisdictions from local, state and the federal governments to all 
participate with their overlapping authority for these fires. 
When an incident is of such a magnitude that additional support is required above 
the field level, MACS was created to manage and coordinate these processes. 
The primary function of MACS is to coordinate activities above the field 
level and to prioritize the incident demands for critical or competing 
resources, thereby assisting the coordination of the operations in the field. 
MACS consists of a combination of elements: personnel, procedures, 
protocols, business practices, and communications integrated into a 
common system. For the purpose of coordinating resources and support 
between multiple jurisdictions, MACS can be implemented from a fixed 
facility or by other arrangements outlined within the system.194  
Unlike ICS, when depending on the type or location of an incident, either a single 
incident commander or a unified command could be on scene, MACS, through a MAC 




                                                 
193 National Incident Management System (NIMS), 50. 
194 Ibid., 64. 
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Typically, Agency Administrators/Executives, or their designees, who are 
authorized to represent or commit agency resources and funds are brought 
together to form MAC Groups. MAC Groups may also be known as 
multiagency committees, emergency management committees, or as 
otherwise defined by the system.195 
The primary functions performed by MAC groups are expected to be situation 
assessment, incident priority determination, critical resource acquisition and allocation, 
support for relevant incident management policies and interagency activities, 
coordination with other MACS elements, as well as with elected and appointed officials 
and of summary information.196 This situation aligns with the definition of what is 
considered “operational” for the purposes of this thesis. 
During an existential catastrophe, federal incident support to the supported state 
would occur at the Joint Field Office (JFO).197 
The JFO is the primary federal incident management field structure. The 
JFO is a temporary federal facility that provides a central location for the 
coordination of federal, State, tribal, and local governments and private-
sector and nongovernmental organizations with primary responsibility for 
response and recovery. The JFO structure is organized, staffed, and 
managed in a manner consistent with NIMS principles and is led by the 
Unified Coordination Group. Although the JFO uses an ICS structure, the 
JFO does not manage on-scene operations. Instead, the JFO focuses on 
providing support to on-scene efforts and conducting broader support 
operations that may extend beyond the incident site.198 
The JFO provides a forum where federal, state, tribal and local governments, alongside 
key members of the private sector and non-governmental organizations, through 
executing basic MACS functions, can support incident commands. The JFO is led 
through its Unified Coordination Group (UCG). Within the UCG, the FCO is the primary  
 
 
                                                 
195 National Incident Management System (NIMS), 67. 
196 Ibid., 67–69. 
197 For larger events, a JFO can support Area Field Offices (AFOs) that perform the same function but 
closer to its supported incident commands. 
198 National Incident Management System (NIMS), 141. 
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federal official responsible for coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing federal 
response activities.199 To the extent it applies, the UCG follows the principle of unified 
command.200 
State Coordinating Officers (SCOs), the state counterpart to the FCO, are not 
subject to the orders of federal officials and neither are the resources of state 
governments. As discussed previously, the Stafford Act also does not provide authority 
over federal military forces or over the law enforcement and arrest powers of federal law 
enforcement agencies.201 The FCO, normally a member of FEMA, does not in practice 
control the efforts of any of the other federal agencies. No final dispute resolution is 
available amongst federal agencies at the JFO other than to forward disputes or questions 
to higher officials. Therefore, the FCO, under current practice, coordinates the actions of 
the UCG, but has no authority to force the resolution of disputes amongst federal civilian 
agencies, federal military forces, or federal law enforcement agencies.202 
Thus, the concept of unified command, a Constitutional requirement among 
federal to state relations,203 and a legal requirement for relationships with federal military 
forces and federal law enforcement agencies, has also carried over to the relationships 
between the remaining federal agencies. Instead of having a UCG consisting of a FCO, 
                                                 
199 National Response Framework, 64. The FCO, which will be discussed later, receives their primary 
authority directly from the Stafford Act. 
200 National Response Framework, 52. 
201 Each of these two entities may have separate coordination groups. When a terrorist threat or 
incident and investigative and intelligence activities occurs, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) may 
establish a Joint Operation Center to coordinate those activities. In addition, a Joint Information Center 
(JIC) may be established to coordinate and disseminate information under ESF #15, which is led by DHS. 
See NRF, 65 and the NRF ESF #15 Annex. 
202 It is arguable that the FCO has some authority over federal law enforcement agencies to the extent 
they may be tasked to engage in non-law enforcement activities, e.g., using U.S. Marshals to sandbag a 
levy rather than engage in actual law enforcement activities. However, given the dramatic effect this could 
hypothetically have on law enforcement agencies of being able to enforce federal law and provide security, 
this thesis does not argue the FCO could have authority over federal law enforcement and that the 
relationship remains on par with federal military forces. 
203 See the 10th Amendment to the Constitution. The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. 
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SCO,204 Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official (SFLEO), and a senior federal military 
officer who amongst them have complete decisional authority, every additional federal 
agency involved in providing disaster assistance must be added to reach a complete 
unified command. This problem has likely been hidden from view because the federal 
government response to disasters in practice mainly restricts itself to a handful of ESF 
primary agencies. Thus, the legacy of ICS and NIMS from its firefighting roots has 
carried over to the relationships among federal agencies when engaged in providing 
federal disaster relief authorized by, or coordinated under, the Stafford Act. Quite simply 
no one is in charge. 
K. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE PLANS AND FRAMEWORKS 
The history of national FRPs goes back as least as far as the Federal Civil Defense 
Act of 1950. The current national response plan, the NRF,205 directly descended from 
three prior plans, the NRP, which was in effect during Hurricane Katrina, the FRP, which 
was issued just prior to Hurricane Andrew, and the Earthquake Response Plan, which 
evolved, into the Natural Hazards Response Plan.206 The latter plans were required by the 
Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977. The FRP found its statutory basis in the 
Stafford Act, and the NRP in both the Stafford Act and the Homeland Security Act.207 
However, the FRP or NRP always coexisted amongst other federal plans, their interface 
never quite clear. For instance, the book, Emergency Management: The American 
                                                 
204 Each state has the ability, on its own terms, to determine whether it can provide the SCO with 
authority over local responders, state law enforcement officers, and its National Guard. It is quite possible a 
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ensure a true unified command. 
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Operational Plan, tentatively named the FIOP-R. 
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Experience 1900–2010, details six different national plans or systems in place, including 
the FRP, in 2001,208 which included plans for environmental disasters, wildfires, 
biohazards, terrorist attack, and a nuclear or radiological release. In addition, the national 
federal plan often had additional annexes. For instance, the NRP was accompanied by a 
CIA, which was itself the parent document for the CIS.209 
The NRP CIS (described in the CIA) addresses resource and procedural 
implications of catastrophic events to ensure the rapid and efficient delivery of resources 
and assets, including special teams, equipment, and supplies that provide critical 
lifesaving support and incident containment capabilities. These assets may be so 
specialized or costly that they are either not available or are in insufficient quantities in 
most localities. The procedures outlined in the NRP CIS are based on the following. 
 The pre-identification of federal assets and capabilities; 
 The strategic location of pre-identified assets for rapid deployment; and 
 The use of prescripted MAs for Stafford Act declarations, or individual 
agency authority and funding, to expedite deployment upon notification by 
DHS (in accordance with procedures established in the NRP CIS) of a 
potential catastrophic event. 
In both Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, the national plans were criticized, partly 
because of the overreliance on them.210 The House report, Hurricane Katrina A Failure 
of Initiative, summarizes it best. 
Of all we found along the timeline running from the fictional Hurricane 
Pam to the tragically real devastation along the Gulf coast, this conclusion 
stands out: A National Response Plan is not enough.  
What’s needed is a National Action Plan. Not a plan that says Washington 
will do everything, but one that says, when all else fails, the federal 
government must do something, whether it’s formally requested or not.  
 
 
                                                 
208 Cumming, “January 24, 1991 Stickney Memorandum on FEMA’s Response Readiness.”; See also 
the federal response to a Catastrophic Earthquake, Final Proposed Plan 51 FR 23624. 
209 See National Response Plan (NRP), December 2004, 44.  
210 See U.S. Government Accounting Office, Disaster Management Improving the Nation’s Response 
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Not even the perfect bureaucratic storm of flaws and failures can wash 
away the fundamental governmental responsibility to protect public health 
and safety. 
This fixation on executing the national “plan” even reached down to state emergency 
managers. 
[Colonel Jeff] Smith, LOHSEP Deputy Director for Emergency 
Preparedness, believed, “the biggest single failure of the federal response 
was the Department of Homeland Security’s failure to recognize that 
Katrina was a catastrophic event and implement the catastrophic incident 
annex to the National Response Plan…Had DHS recognized Katrina for 
the event that it was, a truly catastrophic event, had DHS implemented the 
catastrophic incident annex to the NRP, Louisiana should have had a 
significant number of federal troops and federal assets, days prior to their 
actual arrival. . . . Instead federal troops did not arrive in number until 
Saturday, after the evacuations of the Superdome, Convention Center and 
cloverleaf were complete.” 
Compare what Colonel Smith said with what FEMA Director Mike Brown stated 
on a FEMA Video Teleconference (VTC), on Sunday, August 28, 2005, the day before 
Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana. 
On Sunday, Secretary Chertoff participated in the FEMA VTC. He heard 
assurances from then-FEMA Director Michael Brown and others that 
preparations were well in hand. For instance, Brown told attendees on the 
conference call “I want that supply chain jammed up as much as possible. 
... Just keep jamming those lines full as much as you can with 
commodities” and “get to the edge of the envelope ... if you feel like you 
[missing] go ahead and do it. I’ll figure out some way to justify it.211 
The “plan” that Colonel Smith in retrospect wanted to see executed, the same one that 
Director Brown would be relying upon to “jam supply chains” was not yet completed. An 
alternative method to perform the needed actions would need to be found. This gap could 
be filled by a federal unity of command that communicated through the concept of  
 
                                                 
211 U.S. Senate, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Special Report of the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 164. 
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Commander’s Intent,212 could fill the gaps not covered under current planning, and close 
the period in time between the occurrence of an existential catastrophe and the delivery of 
significant federal assistance. 
The current national plan, the NRF, replaced the NRP in 2008. It sought to temper 
this overreliance on the national plan as a “cure all” by redesignating itself as a 
framework and calling itself a guide, not a plan.213 The NRF, however, is now being 
updated and is scheduled to be replaced sometime in 2013. It will be supported by a 
FIOP-R required by both PPD-8 National Preparedness, and by the National 
Preparedness System found in the Homeland Security Act.214 
The move to a framework, however, may still not solve one fundamental 
misconception about any national plan, that it is an authority in itself. None of these 
national plans was issued through procedures required under the Administrative 
Procedures Act.215 While the law may call for such a plan216, it should not be confused 
with the law, which is problematic in that the highest level documents calling for very 
basic federal emergency management structures, such as the ESFs, JFOs and ICS, are the 
NRF and NIMS, neither of which have force of law. Even Professor John Harrald, in his 
chapter in Emergency Management: The American Experience 1900–2010 says, “For 
example, the Coast Guard, EPA, and FEMA had worked out a protocol to link the FRP 
and NCP authorities when oil spill response efforts occurred …”217 Professor Harrald 
misconstrues that both these plans are authorities when the FRP is not, although at least 
the NCP does appear in federal regulations.218 It does not appear the FRP ever became a 
                                                 
212 See Milan Vego, “Operational Commander’s Intent,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 57 (2d Quarter 
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Publication 6–0 Mission Command, May 2012.  
213 National Response Framework, 1. 
214 See 6 USC § 753. The statute requires each federal agency with responsibilities under the NRP, in 
reality the NRF, to develop “deliberate operational plans and corresponding capabilities.” The FIOP-R 
would fill the gap between the NRF and these individual agency operational plans. 
215 Banks, “The Legal Landscape for Emergency Management in the United States, New America 
Foundation,” 20. In addition, Banks points out that the NIMS is also not a regulation. 
216 See 6 U.S.C. § 314(a)(13) and 319. 
217 Rubin, Emergency Management: The American Experience 1900–2010, Taylor & Francis, 2012.  
218 40 CFR 300 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. 
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regulation. The supporting ESF structure is even less grounded. It is not found in any law 
or regulation but is simply a product of internal federal planning that first appeared as 11 
ESFs found in the Earthquake Response Plan issued in 1986.219 
With the issuance of these plans, however, the federal response has become 
increasingly wedded to the actions or structures called for in these documents. As these 
plans become more detailed, such as in the case of the CIS, they have decreased initiative 
as people wait for these plans to put into action. Recall the earlier quote from LOHSEP 
Deputy Director Smith waiting on the CIA to be executed?; an incredible example of the 
death of initiative. Why? The CIS, without which the CIA could not be executed, was not 
released until September 2006, a year after Hurricane Katrina.220 Emergency managers 
were so transfixed on having a plan to answer everything that they failed to do, in some 
cases, anything. These plans, lacking a strong foundation, focus, or direction in law or 
regulation, have become an increasing drag upon the federal response. While the plans 
may become larger and more detailed, they continue to lack specificity, or even better, 
provide the authority for the decentralized initiative necessary to preemptively address 
the priority of resources and interagency disputes. For instance, there is no current 
version of the CIS and the FIOP-R may not necessarily fill this need when it is issued. 
Regardless of whether a new CIS is created, without the preparation of an inventory of 
federal response capabilities, these plans will be at best incomplete since they will not be 
able to reflect the full range of federal capabilities. They also lack an operational 
adjudication system.  
There are two forums that currently exist that might form the basis of such an 
operational adjudication forum, the ESFLG and the Domestic Resilience Group (DRG), 
operating under the auspices of PPD-1 and the National Security Staff (NSS). However, 
these bodies are set up to adjudicate interagency policy disputes, not necessarily to make 
operational decisions, which require time sensitive decisions. For instance, the ESFLG 
was not formally utilized during Hurricane Sandy. In addition, the author has not even 
been able to determine if the charter under which the ESFLG operates has ever been 
                                                 
219 51 FR 23624, June 30, 1986. 
220 See footnotes 91–92. 
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signed by its member agencies, further weakening its power, though it operates through 
assumed interagency cooperation. Currently, no clear operational link exists between the 
president and the FEMA National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), which is 
functionally the highest-level federal operational coordination center for federal disaster 
coordination. 
L. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CRISIS AND CONSEQUENCE 
MANAGEMENT 
Another change in the last two decades of federal emergency management has 
been the consolidation of crisis and consequence management. These terms appeared in 
the 1990s in response to the growing threat of terrorism. Different federal agencies had 
different internal definitions for these terms,221 but the FRP of 1999 defined them as 
follows. 
Responding to terrorism involves instruments that provide crisis 
management and consequence management. “Crisis management” refers 
to measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to 
anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. The federal 
Government exercises primary authority to prevent, preempt, and 
terminate threats or acts of terrorism and to apprehend and prosecute the 
perpetrators; State and local governments provide assistance as required. 
Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement response. 
“Consequence management” refers to measures to protect public health 
and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency 
relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the 
consequences of terrorism. State and local governments exercise primary 
authority to respond to the consequences of terrorism; the federal 
Government provides assistance as required. Consequence management is 
generally a multifunction response coordinated by emergency 
management. 
                                                 
221 See Scott R. Taylor, Amy Rowe, and Brian M. Lewis, Consequence Management, In Need of a 
Timeout, Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1999, 78–85. 
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Along with the FRP, in 1995, President Clinton issued PDD-39, which set forth 
U.S. policy for counterterrorism.222 PDD-39 followed a “lead agency” model under 
which the federal agency having primary jurisdiction or subject matter expertise led the 
federal response. Under PDD-39 and the Terrorism Incident Annex to the FRP published 
in 1997, the FBI was the lead federal agency for threats or acts of terrorism during a 
terrorist incident in the United States. FEMA would support the FBI as the lead agency 
until the Attorney General would shift responsibility to FEMA as the lead federal agency. 
This system considered the FBI had the unique authorities and skills to disrupt and 
terminate a terrorist attack on the United States while acknowledging FEMA was best 
suited to lead the federal response in the aftermath. The implied premise was the most 
important action was to end the terrorist threat, especially if it was an attack using 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, both PDD-39 and the Terrorism Annex 
to the FRP agreed that a single federal agency would be in charge of the incident at any 
one time. 
The distinction between consequence and crisis management was terminated with 
the issuance of HSPD-5 in 2003. 
Even more significant changes occurred in early 2003 with the passage of 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which established the Department of 
Homeland Security, and the President’s signing of Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), which overhauled the federal approach 
to incident management. Replacing the bifurcated Presidential Decision 
Directive-39 framework with the single concept of “incident 
management,” HSPD-5 was meant to resolve the ambiguity of authority 
inherent in separated concepts of “crisis management” and “consequence 
management.” HSPD-5 designated the Secretary of Homeland Security as 
the “principal federal official for domestic incident management.” This 
means that the federal government can now always give the same answer 
to the “who’s in charge?” question in an incident of national significance.  
 
 
                                                 
222 A copy of PDD-39 can be found at Federation of American Scientists, “PDD-39,” June 21, 1995, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm, and the terrorism incident annex to the FRP from 1997 at 
Federation of American Scientists, “Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Response Plan, 
Notice of Change,” February 7, 1997, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39_frp.htm. PDD-39 was later 
reaffirmed by PDD-62 United States Policy on Counterterrorism. That document is classified but an 
abstract and press release may be found at Federation of American Scientists, “Fact Sheet,” May 22, 1998, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-62.htm. 
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Over time, the Department of Homeland Security will evolve into more of 
an operational integrator for domestic incidents, in Washington and in the 
field, although the Secretary of Homeland Security will never be formally 
in charge of all the different entities involved in responding to domestic 
incidents.223 
In Richard Falkenrath’s view, despite the clear language of PDD-39 and the FRP 
to the contrary, the division of crisis and consequence management meant the federal 
government could not point to a single federal official in charge of a terrorism incident. 
He saw crisis and consequence management as a bifurcated rather than a linear process 
for command. By issuing HSPD-5, however, they extended the imposition of a single 
federal official, in the person of the DHS Secretary as the PFO, to all “domestic 
incidents,” which includes “terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies,” not 
just for the terrorist events covered under PDD-39. 
However, the DHS Secretary does not have authority to direct non-DHS law 
enforcement assets when engaged in law enforcement activities, the foundation of crisis 
management, nor DoD forces, despite the fact these federal agencies have the primary 
responsibility to respond to terrorist events. The DHS secretary does have authority, 
although it has been delegated to the FEMA Administrator, over what was formerly 
called consequence management for both preparedness and response activities. 
Falkenrath may not have realized that the DHS Secretary had this authority.224 Presently, 
the FEMA Administrator, through delegation and inherent authorities granted under 
PKEMRA, presumably has the authority to direct agencies involved in what was 
formerly called consequence management. In addition, in PKEMRA, the FEMA 
Administrator was given the following authority now found in 6 U.S.C. § 313–314.225 If 
this authority exists to direct consequence management activities, it would provide the 
                                                 
223 Richard Falkenrath, “Problems of Preparedness: U.S. Readiness for a Domestic Terrorist Attack,” 
International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 147–186. 
224 Ibid. “Over time, the Department of Homeland Security will evolve into more of an operational 
integrator for domestic incidents, in Washington and in the field, although the Secretary of Homeland 
Security will never be formally in charge of all the different entities involved in responding to domestic 
incidents.” 
225 See Appendix G. 
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legal foundation for unity of command for the federal operational response to an 
existential catastrophe. 
M. EXECUTIVE ORDERS 12148 AND 12656 AND PRESIDENTIAL POLICY 
DIRECTIVE-8 
These two EOs control which agencies in the federal government are in charge of 
executing the president’s responsibilities under the Stafford Act and to prepare for 
national security emergencies.226 EO 12148 Federal Emergency Management conveys 
the authority to coordinate and direct federal agencies under the Stafford Act. EO 12656 
Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities assigns national security 
emergency preparedness responsibilities to federal agencies. Both EOs work in 
conjunction with PPD-8 National Preparedness.  
With the creation of FEMA in 1979, President Carter issued several EOs, one of 
which was EO 12148. Crucially, in paragraph 4-203, it delegated the president’s 
authority to execute the DRA of 1974, and coordinate and direct the federal response 
with three exceptions including the ability to declare disasters and emergencies, the 
authority to repair federal facilities and the authority relating to food coupons and surplus 
commodities. When the DRA of 1974 was amended and renamed, the Stafford Act in 
1988, EO 12673 Delegation of Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Functions, 
revised EO 12148 to comply with the amended law without substantively changing 
paragraph 4-203. With the creation of DHS in 2003, EO 13286 Amendments of 
Executive Orders, and Other Actions, in Connection with the Transfer of Certain 
Functions to the Secretary of Homeland Security redelegated paragraph 4-203 to the DHS 
Secretary. These authorities continued to be practiced by FEMA even when it was folded 
into DHS in 2003.227 The DHS Secretary officially redelegated these authorities to the 
FEMA Administrator in December 2010.228 
                                                 
226 EO 2656 Sec. 101(a) …A national security emergency is any occurrence, including natural 
disaster, military attack, technological emergency, or other emergency, that seriously degrades or seriously 
threatens the national security of the United States. 
227 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107–296. 
228 DHS Delegation 9001.1 Delegation to the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency. 
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President Reagan signed EO 12656 in 1988. This EO defines a national security 
emergency as “any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, technological 
emergency, or other emergency, that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the 
national security of the United States.” In addition to requiring all federal agencies to be 
prepared to respond adequately to all national security emergencies, each federal agency 
is required to appoint a senior policy official as an emergency coordinator responsible for 
developing and maintaining a national security emergency preparedness plan. These 
plans should include programs to mobilize personnel, the possible use of alternative 
resources, share resources with other agencies, set priorities and allocate resources among 
civilian and military claimants, and identify occupations and skills for which a critical 
need may exist. The overall coordination and responsibility for these programs and plans 
was originally given to FEMA but were transferred to the DHS Secretary by EO 13286 in 
2003. DHS Delegation 9001.1 gave this responsibility back to FEMA in 2010.  
See EO 12656 Part 17-Department of Homeland Security Sec. 1701, Lead 
Responsibilities. In addition to the applicable responsibilities covered in Parts 1 and 2, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall: 
(1) Coordinate and support the initiation, development, and 
implementation of national security emergency preparedness programs 
and plans among federal departments and agencies… 
Sec. 1702. Support Responsibilities.  
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall: 
(1) Support the heads of other federal departments and agencies in 
preparing plans and programs to discharge their national security 
emergency preparedness responsibilities, including, but not limited to, 
such programs as mobilization preparedness, continuity of government 
planning, and continuance of industry and infrastructure functions 
essential to national security… 
President Obama signed PPD-8 in March 2011. It replaced HSPD-8 previously 
issued by President Bush in December, 2003. It directed the development of a National 
Preparedness Goal (NPG) that identifies the core capabilities necessary for preparedness 
and a National Preparedness System (NPS) to guide activities that will enable the nation 
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to achieve the goal. Its purpose includes defining the core capabilities necessary to 
prepare for the specific types of incidents that pose the greatest risk to the security of the 
nation. The DHS Secretary was assigned the responsibility to develop the NPG and it was 
issued in September 2011,  
PPD-8 also required the creation of a NPS covering prevention, protection, 
mitigation, response, and recovery. Each framework requires the NPS to include an 
interagency operational plan to support it including a more detailed concept of 
operations, description of critical tasks and responsibilities, detailed resource, personnel, 
and sourcing requirements and specific provisions for the rapid integration of resources 
and personnel. It also requires all agencies with roles in the frameworks to develop 
department-level operational plans to support the interagency operational plans. The DHS 
Secretary was also assigned the responsibility to develop a description of the NPS and to 
coordinate the effort in creating it. The NPS description was issued in November 2011. 
Interestingly, Congress, in the PKEMRA, ordered the creation of a NPS as part of 
a greater comprehensive preparedness system.229 Several differences occur between the 
NPS found in statute and described in PPD-8. First, Congress directed that the president 
execute the creation of the NPG and NPS through the FEMA Administrator.230 Instead, 
PPD-8 gave this responsibility to the DHS Secretary and both the NPS description and 
the NPG were issued by DHS, not FEMA, although both are found under the FEMA 
website and FEMA was intimately involved in its creation.231 Second, the NPS set forth 
by Congress has a different set of components than those found in the NPS created by 
DHS.232 Probably the most crucial of these are the federal response capability inventory 
                                                 
229 6 U.S.C. §§ 741–754. 
230 See 6 U.S.C. §§ 742–744. Also see 6 U.S.C. § 314(a)(19), which, when listing the responsibilities 
of the FEMA Administrator states, “assisting the President in carrying out the functions under the national 
preparedness goal and the national preparedness system and carrying out all functions and authorities of the 
Administrator under the national preparedness system.” 
231 http://www.FEMA.gov. PPD-8 did state within it that, “This directive shall be implemented 
consistent with relevant authorities, including the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 
2006 and its assignment of responsibilities with respect to the Administrator of the federal Emergency 
Management Agency.” 
232 See 6 U.S.C. § 744. 
 87
and the Catastrophic Resource Report.233 Neither FEMA nor DHS has ever issued the 
federal response capability inventory. Only in August 2012 did FEMA provide its first 
Catastrophic Resource Report. The former was required by law to have been completed 
by the end of 2007 and the latter was to be issued annually since 2007. Strangely, FEMA 
never publically released the Catastrophic Resource Report and FEMA Protection and 
National Preparedness, which created the report, never distributed or fully coordinated it 
within FEMA.234 In addition, the document is strategic in nature and not of direct use for 
the operational level of federal response, although it could provide a structure for more 
detailed future operational planning efforts. While DHS did issue a National 
Preparedness Report in March 2012, it does not fulfill statutory requirements for the 
federal response capability inventory and the Catastrophic Resource Report nor provide 
details about what federal assets would be used in a catastrophic event nor estimate the 
resources required. In fact, no official federal standard exists of what constitutes a 
catastrophic event, which means no benchmark is available to which a set of capabilities 
can be matched. The closest government standard may be FEMA’s “maximum of 
maximums.”235 
Currently, no set of federal capabilities is identified to address an event of this 
magnitude on their own or in conjunction with state resources as required by law, 
although the core capabilities being developed under PPD-8 could be expanded to focus 
on any future standard developed to define an existential catastrophe. Also, in other 
words, if the CIS was ever updated and reissued, it would not reflect a complete survey of 
federal capabilities to provide the most efficient federal response to a catastrophic 
incident, much less an existential catastrophe.  
An efficient, capability-based federal planning effort would fulfill the 
Congressional mandate to create an inventory of federal capabilities and estimate the 
                                                 
233 6 U.S.C. § 751 & 6 U.S.C. § 752(b). 
234 The author only learned of the report in mid-August 2013, and it was never coordinated with 
FEMA’s Response Directorate that would actually coordinate the employment of the resources found in the 
report. The only public reference to it is on Obsidian’s website, a FEMA contractor, and also on one of 
Obsidian’s employee’s Linkedin accounts. Obsidian, “Strategic Preparedness Analysis and Reporting” 
(n.d.), http://www.obsidiandc.com/project-summaries/strategic-preparedness-analysis-and-reporting/. 
235 See footnotes 31–32. FEMA, “2012 The State of FEMA.”  
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shortfalls in responding to at least a MOM incident. Each one of those pre-identified 
capabilities could have a PSMA written for it to trigger its commitment to the disaster. 
Given the FEMA Administrator’s goal of stabilizing the event within 72 hours, these 
capabilities could be organized into those that could be expected to deploy within 72 
hours and those expected to require more than 72 hours to deploy.  
N. FEDERAL INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUPS AND WHITE 
HOUSE SUPERVISION236 
Since FEMA’s creation in 1979, federal coordination has seen little stability in its 
connection to the White House and in senior federal interagency coordination groups. 
The FEMA IG Report, Federal Response Planning and Coordination, from September 
1992 provides a short history of federal coordination structures up to that point. These 
early coordination structures included the Integrated Emergency Management System 
Concept (IEMS), the Integrated Emergency Coordination Structure (IECS), the National 
Emergency Response Structure (NERS) later re-titled the NSEC, and the FRP. From 
these attempts at disaster inter-agency coordination, the “functional group concept” 
remains in the form of the 15 ESFs that fall under the NRF. The attempts at federal inter-
agency coordination in the 1980s and early 1990s reveals a trend that continued for the 
next two decades, namely that federal coordination at the operational level and higher 
remained ad hoc and subject to change. The result is that as in the case of FEMA, the 
EPA and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 1992, federal agencies could 
continue to disregard the federal interagency coordination processes in their planning, 
especially as no formal supervision of federal agency plans appeared to exist.237 As 
FEMA’s IG Performance Audit after Hurricane Andrew explained “Since we found that 
this system [the NSEC] is still considered valid by some agencies (although disregarded 
by many) and it dealt specifically with the issue of Government-wide coordination, we 
                                                 
236 See also Appendix F Excerpt on FEMA’s Response Coordination Structures 1979–1992 from the 
FEMA Inspector General Report Federal Response Planning and Coordination, September 1992. 
237 See 6 U.S.C. § 753(c), which requires all federal agencies with responsibilities under the NRP to 
have operational plans and provides specific details of what must be included in those plans. 
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suggested that it be reconsidered.”238 FEMA vigorously denied this problem, but in its 
response, undercut its own argument when it stated: 
While the report stated that the “ ... OIG concludes that these relationships 
are essential to FEMA’s mission and as prescribed by Executive Orders 
12148, 12656 and the Stafford Act ..., “there is an implication that these 
functions are not already being performed or, if they are being performed, 
that there are specific problems that need to be remedied. Whether we are 
discussing day-to-day or emergency response operations, FEMA has 
extensive linkages with other federal agencies and the White House at all 
levels through wide varieties of forums, including interagency policy 
groups, interagency coordinating committees, the National Security 
Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Cabinet Affairs 
Office on virtually a daily basis, etc. The response operations relating to 
Hurricane Andrew have demonstrated the efficacy of many of these 
systems, including the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group.239 
With so many groups operating independently of each other, it is no wonder difficulties 
harmonizing the federal response occurred. 
With the formal adoption of the FRP in 1992, the Catastrophic Disaster Response 
Group (CDRG), which predated the NSEC, regained traction over the NSEC.240 
According to the FRP: 
The CDRG, composed of representatives from all FRP signatory 
departments and agencies, operates at the national level to provide 
guidance and policy direction on response coordination and operational 
issues arising from the FCO and ESF response activities. CDRG members 
are authorized to speak for their agencies at the national policy level. 
During a disaster the CDRG convenes as necessary, normally at FEMA 
Headquarters; the EST [Emergency Support Team] provides any needed 
support.241 
The CDRG was replaced by the IIMG after FEMA’s merger with DHS.242 According to 
the NRP, the IIMG was to be activated by the DHS Secretary for high profile, large-scale 
                                                 
238 FEMA IG Performance Audit, January 14, 1993, 71–72. 
239 Memorandum for Russell F. Miller from Antonio Lopez and Grant C. Peterson, “Draft Inspection 
Report: Federal Response Planning and Coordination,” September 11, 1992, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/fema/ig-response.pdf, 7. 
240 Carafano and Weitz, Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis, 220. 
241 Federal Response Plan (FRP), April 1999, 22. 
242 Carafano and Weitz, Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis, 220. 
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events that present high-probability targets, such as NSSEs (National Security Special 
Events), and in heightened threat situations.243 Consisting of high level representatives of 
federal agencies and NGOs, its duties included serving as the focal point for federal 
strategic incident management planning and coordination, making recommendation to the 
DHS Secretary on operational courses of action, assessing national impacts of an 
incident, anticipating federal resource and operational requirements, and maintaining 
ongoing coordination between the PFO and JFO coordination groups.244 The IIMG was 
also to coordinate with and provide information to the White House. 
The performance of the IIMG was widely criticized after Hurricane Katrina. 
Secretary Chertoff failed to activate the IIMG until 36 hours after landfall despite White 
House pressure to do so earlier.245 When the IIMG was activated, its relationship with the 
HSOC was unclear at best and the IIMG devolved into an information gathering and 
dissemination center duplicating other federal efforts and creating another layer of 
bureaucracy.246 The IIMG was not included in the NRF and its role not formally 
replaced. The Senate report on Hurricane Katrina did provide, however, the following 
advice for a future IIMG: 
The IIMG would be disbanded and replaced by a permanent policy staff 
composed of detailees from relevant federal agencies who would conduct 
planning for emergencies and would help resolve conflicts among 
different federal entities. Conflicts that could not be resolved at this level 
would be forwarded to higher-level agency officials or the HSC 
[Homeland Security Council] for resolution. The NOC [National 
Operations Center] would include a strong analytic team capable of 
sorting through and assessing information and determining which pieces 
would become part of the common operating picture.247 
                                                 
243 National Response Plan (NRP), 22. 
244 Ibid. 
245 U.S. House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan 
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246 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, “A Performance Review of 
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With the demise of the IIMG, no formal operational level interagency body exists 
to identify or adjudicate interagency disputes when coordinating the federal operational 
response to a disaster. The NRCC is not currently organized to have senior interagency 
representation with the authority to mobilize agency resources necessary to respond to an 
existential catastrophe. The closest entity to an interagency operational level adjudication 
body is the ESFLG. According to its charter, finalized in October 2010:  
The ESFLG is an interagency body for identification and resolution of 
operational issues related to the National Response Framework (NRF), the 
National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), appropriate Homeland 
Security Presidential Directives (HSPD), and other related directives. The 
ESFLG facilitates information exchange and coordinates policy 
implementation on national-level issues. The ESFLG determines which of 
its issues are appropriate for elevation to the Interagency Policy 
Committees (IPC), including the Domestic Resilience Group (DRG), for 
further consideration and resolution. The ESFLG, through its membership, 
is responsible for the coordination of interagency guidance and policy 
implementation, and the oversight of appropriate planning efforts.248 
ESFLG membership includes the primary agencies for each of the 15 ESFs under 
the NRF.  
 Department of Agriculture  
 Department of Agriculture/Forest Service  
 Department of Defense (OSD, Joint Staff)  
 Department of Defense/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers  
 Department of Energy  
 Department of Health and Human Services  
 Department of Homeland Security  
 Department of Homeland Security/federal Emergency Management 
Agency  
 Department of Homeland Security/National Protection and Programs 
Directorate/Cybersecurity & Communications/National Communications 
System  
 Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Coast Guard  
                                                 
248 Conflicting information was received whether the ESFLG member agencies have actually signed 
the current charter. The copy provided to the author is unsigned. 
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 Department of Housing and Urban Development  
 Department of the Interior  
 Department of the Interior/National Park Service  
 Department of Justice  
 Department of Transportation  
 Environmental Protection Agency  
 General Services Administration  
 Small Business Administration  
Members are expected to be able to speak authoritatively on behalf of their 
agencies. The ESFLG is chaired by the FEMA Assistant Administrator for Response and 
meets monthly. It did not formally meet, however, during Hurricane Sandy. Based upon 
the author’s first hand experience, the ESFLG appears to be limited to policy making, not 
operational decision making, and it does not appear the ESFLG has a formal role during 
an actual disaster response. Unlike its predecessors, it does have a clear chain of authority 
to report its issues and disputes to the DRG, which is an IPC of the HSC.249 As an IPC, 
the DRG is a standing committee of senior federal agency and department members.250 It 
may forward policy issues for adjudication to the NSC Deputies Committee, which may 
send issues for resolution to the NSC Principals Committee, which meets at the cabinet 
secretary level. 
 
                                                 
249 President Obama merged the staffs of the HSC and the National Security Council with PPD-1 
issued on February 13, 2009. However, a separate HSC and NSC are provided for in statute even though 
the Obama Administration appears to have abandoned the use of the HSC and instead uses an expanded 
NSC as the forum to discuss homeland security related issues. 
250 National Exercise Program (NEP) Base Plan, March 18, 2011, 3. 
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Figure 1.  Homeland Security Council Policy Adjudication Diagram251 
Under the NSS, these issues are staffed in the Resilience Directorate, which has two 
components, Preparedness and Response.252 
O. THE FEDERAL COORDINATING OFFICER AND THE PRINCIPAL 
FEDERAL OFFICIAL 
Under current law, three civilian positions have some inherent authority to 
provide for the ability to coordinate, and to a certain extent direct, the federal response to 
a catastrophic disaster. These positions are the PFO, the FEMA Administrator, and the 
FCO.253 The positions are not necessarily mutually exclusive as the position of FCO can 
be delegated to any federal official including a PFO or the FEMA Administrator.254 
1. FCO 
The FCO position was first established in the Disaster Relief Act of 1969:  
The President shall, immediately upon his designation of an area as a 
major disaster area, appoint a federal coordinating officer to operate under 
                                                 
251 National Exercise Program (NEP) Base Plan, 5. 
252 David Marcozzi, “National Security Staff within the Executive Office of the President,” Yale New 
Haven Health System, May 2012, http://www.ynhhs.org. 
253 This paper does not seek to address whether inherent Article II executive powers held by the 
President could also provide this authority. 
254 See 42 U.S.C. § 5143. 
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the Office of Emergency Preparedness in such area. Such officer shall be 
responsible for the coordination of all federal disaster relief and assistance, 
shall establish such field offices as may be necessary for the rapid and 
efficient administration of federal disaster relief programs, and shall 
otherwise assist local citizens and public officials in promptly obtaining 
assistance to which they are entitled.255 
At the time, the FCO operated under the OEP, which was part of the White 
House. The chain of command for the first FCO ran from the head of OEP, retired 
general George Lincoln, to the president. Sometimes, as in the case of Frank Carlucci 
who fronted the federal government’s response to Tropical Storm Agnes, it went directly 
to the president.256 Interestingly in Carlucci’s case, he was not actually appointed FCO; 
the OEP Regional Director retained that position, but Carlucci was considered by all to 
be the senior federal official and effectively wielded the power of a FCO. Carlucci was 
not appointed “Flood Czar” until 50 days after the floods, but his appearance dramatically 
shifted the perception of the federal government. In the words of the Pennsylvania 
Governor, Milton Shapp “But in Milton, Reading, York, Pottstown—you can go right 
around the State in community after community. In Harrisburg Itself, we had a major 
disaster. But here it was so intense, so immense, that the complete failure of the system 
became evident. Then the president solved it. He put Frank Carlucci here and said, “He is 
representing me.” Frank Carlucci came up here and he took over and he banged heads 
together. He had the authority to do it. We worked with him and some order came out of 
chaos. It was not perfect, but it was a darn sight better than anything that happened 
before. This is the type of thing that I think is essential when you have a major 
calamity.”257  
When OEP was disbanded and its disaster relief functions were mostly taken up 
by the newly created FDAA within HUD in 1973, the FCO chain of command was 
                                                 
255 Disaster Relief Act of 1969 Public Law 91–79, Sec. 9.  
256 William C. Kashatus, “Agnes ‘Flood Czar’ Steered Federal Aid to Region,” Standard Speaker, 
February 14, 2010, http://www.standardspeaker.com/news/agnes-flood-czar-steered-federal-aid-to-region-
1.612385. 
257 To Investigate the Adequacy and Effectiveness of Federal Disaster Relief Legislation, Part 3, May 
11–12, 1973, Serial No. 95-H6, 891.  
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dramatically lengthened.258 The duties of the current position of FCO can be found in the  
NRF, which states, “Within the Unified Coordination Group, the FCO is the primary 
federal official responsible for coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing federal 
response activities.”259  
Today, the position of FCO is filled by a member of FEMA’s Office of Federal 
Disaster Coordination, which has a roster of approximately 35 FCOs. FEMA has also 
created the position of Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator (FDRC), which effectively 
has the same power as an FCO but for recovery. No statutory or regulatory requirement 
states that a FCO must come from FEMA.260 
The authority for the position of FCO comes from two sources, the president and 
the FEMA Administrator.261 The FCO simultaneously wields these powers that on their 
face provide FCO’s authority directly from the president to  
coordinate the administration of relief, including activities of the State and 
local governments, the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the 
Mennonite Disaster Service, and other relief or disaster assistance 
organizations, which agree to operate under his advice or direction… take 
such other action, consistent with authority delegated to him by the 
President and consistent with the provisions of this Act, as he may deem 
necessary to assist local citizens and public officials in promptly obtaining 
assistance to which they are entitled.262 
The last section is important as it provides the statutory basis for the FCO to utilize the 
powers found under Sections 402,263 403,264 and 502265 of the Stafford Act, which 
                                                 
258 See EO 11725 Transfer of Certain Functions of the Office of Emergency Preparedness. 
259 National Response Framework, 64.  
260 See 42 U.S.C. §5143 and 44 CFR 206.41. 
261 The FCO also gets authority from FEMA Regional Administrators via their appointment as 
Disaster Recovery Manager (DRM). However, this term is an anachronism from prior years and 
superfluous to the authority granted from the FEMA Administrator and President and should probably be 
eliminated. See 44 CFR 206.41(b). 
262 42 U.S.C. § 5143(b)(3)–(4). 
263 42 U.S.C. § 5170a. 
264 42 U.S.C. §5170b. 
265 42 U.S.C. § 5192. 
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collectively allow the president, and FCO, to direct federal agencies, reimburse them for 
their work, and otherwise coordinate their actions. 
Through their appointment from the FEMA Administrator, the FCO receives 
powers outside Titles IV and V of the Stafford Act. The PKEMRA gave specific, 
enumerated powers to the FEMA Administrator including: 
… federal leadership necessary to prepare for, protect against, respond to, 
recover from, or mitigate against a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or 
other man-made disaster, including… providing the federal Government’s 
response to terrorist attacks and major disasters, including…managing 
such response…and coordinating other federal response resources, 
including requiring deployment of the Strategic National Stockpile, in the 
event of a terrorist attack or major disaster…aiding the recovery from 
terrorist attacks and major disasters…carrying out the mission of the 
Agency… of… response, by conducting emergency operations to save 
lives and property through positioning emergency equipment, personnel, 
and supplies, through evacuating potential victims, through providing 
food, water, shelter, and medical care to those in need, and through 
restoring critical public services…266 
The FCO may also receive additional powers found in Title VI of the Stafford Act 
through their delegation from the FEMA Administrator. Title VI is the restatement of 
Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, which gave exceptionally broad authorities to the 
Federal Civil Defense Administrator upon declaration of a state of civil defense 
emergency proclaimed by the president or Congress.267 While the most extraordinary 
powers of the act were eliminated when the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 was 
revoked and restated in the Stafford Act, some exceptional authorities remain including 
the right to procure private property by condemnation.268  
                                                 
266 6 U.S.C. § 314. See Appendix G for the full text. 
267 Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Public Law 81920. 
268 See 42 U.S.C. § 5196(i)(1): The director (administrator) may procure by condemnation or 
otherwise, construct, lease, transport, store, maintain, renovate, or distribute materials and facilities for 
emergency preparedness, with the right to take immediate possession thereof. 
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2. PFO269 
The PFO actually consists of two versions. The first is found in HSPD-5 
Management of Domestic Incidents. In this directive from 2003, the president has 
designated the Secretary of DHS as the “principal federal official for domestic incident 
management… responsible for coordinating federal operations within the United States to 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other 
emergencies…” The directive notes four conditions when this authority is triggered: (1) a 
federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance 
of the Secretary, (2) the resources of state and local authorities are overwhelmed and 
federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate state and local authorities, (3) 
more than one federal department or agency has become substantially involved in 
responding to the incident, or (4) the Secretary has been directed to assume responsibility 
for managing the domestic incident by the president. It directs “all federal departments 
and agencies shall cooperate with the Secretary in the Secretary’s domestic incident 
management role.” 
Even with the subsequent passage of the PKEMRA in 2006, the authority and 
position of PFO under HSPD-5 remains in effect. With the exception of those federal 
agencies that might have their own independence preserved by law, such as  the DoD, 
uninterrupted statutory chain of command with its combatant commanders,270 given one 
of those four conditions, the Secretary can execute the duties of PFO under HSPD-5. 
However, as a member of the president’s cabinet with exceptional responsibilities beyond 
disaster response including border security, immigration, and law enforcement, the 
Secretary may not be expected to devote their full energies to directing the federal 
response to a catastrophic disaster. For this reason, a second PFO position exists, which 
can be found under the NRF, and its predecessor, the NRP.  
                                                 
269 As previously noted, the current version of the NRF released in May 2013 does not include the 
PFO except in reference to the DHS Secretary’s authority under HSPD-5. 
270 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 162 and 164. 
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The second PFO position, essentially a direct delegate of the DHS Secretary, can 
be found under the NRF,271 and its predecessor, the NRP. It is also the PFO position that 
is referred to in PKEMRA.272 Under the NRP, which was in effect during Hurricane 
Katrina, the position of PFO was defined as follows: 
The PFO is personally designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to facilitate federal support to the established ICS Unified Command 
structure and to coordinate overall federal incident management and 
assistance activities across the spectrum of prevention, preparedness, 
response, and recovery. The PFO ensures that incident management 
efforts are maximized through effective and efficient coordination. The 
PFO provides a primary point of contact and situational awareness locally 
for the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Secretary is not restricted to 
DHS officials when selecting a PFO.  
The PFO does not direct or replace the incident command structure 
established at the incident, nor does the PFO have directive authority over 
the SFLEO, FCO, or other federal and State officials. Other federal 
incident management officials retain their authorities as defined in existing 
statutes and directives. The PFO coordinates the activities of the SFLEO, 
FCO, and other federal officials involved in incident management 
activities acting under their own authorities. The PFO also provides a 
channel for media and public communications and an interface with 
appropriate jurisdictional officials pertaining to the incident. Once 
formally designated, PFOs relinquish the conduct of all normal duties and 
functions. PFOs may not be “dualhatted” with any other roles or 
responsibilities that could detract from their overall incident management 
responsibilities.273 
Several changes were made to the position of the PFO when the NRP was 
changed to the NRF after Hurricane Katrina. The position of PFO under the current NRF 
now reads: 
Principal federal Official (PFO). By law and by Presidential directive, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal federal official 
responsible for coordination of all domestic incidents requiring 
multiagency federal response. The Secretary may elect to designate a 
single individual to serve as his or her primary representative to ensure 
consistency of federal support as well as the overall effectiveness of the 
                                                 
271 As stated previously, all references to the NRF, unless stated otherwise, are to the 2008 version. 
272 See 6 U.S.C. (c)(2). 
273 National Response Plan (NRP), 33. 
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federal incident management. When appointed, such an individual serves 
in the field as the PFO for the incident.  
… 
The same individual will not serve as the Principal federal Official and the 
federal Coordinating Officer (see below) at the same time for the same 
incident. When both positions are assigned, the FCO will have  
 
responsibility for administering Stafford Act authorities, as described 
below. The Secretary is not restricted to DHS officials when selecting a 
PFO.  
The PFO does not direct or replace the incident command structure 
established at the incident. Nor does the PFO have directive authority over 
a federal Coordinating Officer, a Senior federal Law Enforcement 
Official, a DOD Joint Task Force Commander, or any other federal or 
State official. Other federal incident management officials retain their 
authorities as defined in existing statutes and directives. Rather, the PFO 
promotes collaboration and, as possible, resolves any federal interagency 
conflict that may arise. The PFO identifies and presents to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security any policy issues that require resolution.274 
It was clear it would be difficult to reconcile the duty of the PFO to “coordinate 
the activities of the SFLEO, FCO, and other federal officials involved in incident 
management activities acting under their own authorities” with the admonition that the 
PFO not “have directive authority over the SFLEO, FCO, or other federal and state 
officials.” The reaction of Congress to the use of a PFO during Hurricane Katrina was 
extraordinary and direct. 
In PKEMRA, Congress made it clear the PFO’s ability to coordinate activities did 
not mean they could direct other federal agencies. Congress took the step of placing into 
statute the very same language from the now defunct NRP limiting directive authority.275 
This step was not enough for Congress, so beginning with the DHS Appropriation Act for 
FY 2008, DHS has essentially been barred by law from spending money on the PFO 
position, as it exists under the NRF.  
For instance Section 522 of Public Law 111–83 states:  
                                                 
274 National Response Framework, 67. 
275 6 U.S.C. § 319(c). 
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SEC. 522. Except as provided in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this section, 
none of the funds provided by this or previous appropriations Acts shall be 
used to fund any position designated as a Principal Federal Official, or any 
successor position, for any Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) declared disasters or 
emergencies— 
(1) The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the application of this 
section provided that any field position appointed pursuant to this waiver 
shall not hold the title of Principal Federal Official, shall functionally 
report through the Federal Coordinating Officer appointed under section 
302 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act (42 U.S.C. 5143), and shall be subject to the provisions of subsection 
(c) of section 319 of title 6, United States Code. The Secretary may not 
delegate the authority to grant such a waiver. 
(2) Not later than 10 business days after the date on which the Secretary of 
Homeland Security issues a waiver under this section, the Secretary shall 
submit notification of that waiver to the Committees on Appropriations of 
the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee of the House of Representatives, and the 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee of the Senate 
explaining the circumstances necessitating the waiver, describing the 
specific role of any officials appointed pursuant to the waiver, and 
outlining measures taken to ensure compliance with subsection (c) of 
section 319 and subsections (c)(3) and (c)(4)(A) of section 313 of title 6, 
United States Code. 
The position of PFO once held by Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen in Hurricane 
Katrina is now, for all intents and purposes, defunct. What remains is the position of PFO 
as personally embodied by the DHS Secretary under HSPD-5. 
P. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide evidence the president has the 
authority to implement unity of command through a single federal official. This ability is 
limited, however, and does not include federal agencies that are engaged in law 
enforcement efforts or the DoD, which has its own distinct chain of command. This 
authority would also allow the president to utilize the DRF to reimburse federal agencies 
for disaster work, which could be performed under their existing authority. It would be a 
key tool for the federal official exercising unity of command on behalf the president, and 
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crucial to ensuring the cooperation of federal agencies. It would also allow Congress a 
simpler, and possibly more efficient way, to fund federal response costs for an existential 
catastrophe. FEMA’s regulations, some of which were adopted from regulations written 
decades ago, currently prohibit reimbursement for work performed under an agency’s 
inherent authorities. However, it appears FEMA’s regulations are based on a matter of 
policy, not law, and could be changed to support unity of command by uniting the 
authority to direct all federal response actions to an existential catastrophe with the ability 
to pay for them. 
The current system for federal interagency disaster coordination was developed 
over several decades and incorporates several silos of development. These silos include 
national federal plans, the adoption of NIMS and ICS, the consolidation of crisis and 
consequence management, EOs 12148 and 12656, PPD-8, the positions of the PFO and 
FCO, and the current system of White House supervision relying on policymaking 
structures, which are organized to make deliberate, steady state policy decisions, rather 
than to make operational decisions. Since all  these parts grew at different times from 
different perspectives, they have never been fully integrated, especially when combined 
with the concept of unity of effort at the federal operational level of disaster response. 
Together, they are unable to meet the needs of the president to supervise the federal 
operational response to an existential catastrophe properly. However, if the president 
chose to integrate these different parts and implement them at the federal operational 
level using unity of command through a single federal official, it is argued that it would 
significantly improve the federal response to an existential catastrophe. The next chapter 
of this thesis explores what federal official is best suited to prepare for and manage the 
federal operational response to an existential catastrophe exercising unity of command. 
 102
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 103
IV. WHAT FEDERAL POSITION IS BEST SUITED TO PROVIDE 
UNITY OF COMMAND FOR THE FEDERAL OPERATIONAL 
RESPONSE TO A CATASTROPHIC DISASTER 
The potential exists for unity of command for the federal operational response to 
an existential catastrophe. The authority to mobilize, coordinate, direct and reimburse the 
federal civilian agencies engaged in what was formerly known as consequence 
management would support it. If unity of command for federal consequence management 
was implemented, it raises the question where might this authority best reside in the 
federal government? Performing a policy analysis, seven federal officials or positions 
have been chosen as potential alternatives to exercise unity of command over federal 
consequence management for an existential catastrophe. Each official or position is 
evaluated against a set of criteria that arises from reoccurring themes that appear in the 
history of the foundations of the federal response to disasters. Alternatives are ranked 
against each other using the criteria chosen from one to seven, with the lower score being 
the more favorable alternative. The alternative with the lowest overall score would 
indicate it would be the most appropriate option to exercise unity of command for the 
federal operational response. These criteria should represent the minimum number of 
factors necessary to implement unity of command at the operational level for federal 
consequence management to an existential catastrophe. Once an alternative is chosen, the 
federal response to Hurricane Katrina will be revisited by utilizing the model of unity of 
command exercised by the chosen alternative, and will envision an alternative response 
to the disaster. 
A. ALTERNATIVES 
Seven alternatives have been chosen to exercise unity of command. They consist 
of agency heads, or appointed positions, that have exercised some level of authority over 
the federal response in past disasters. The alternatives are as follows. 
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 Status Quo—Continue to rely on unified command, a unified command 
group and ad hoc interagency operational adjudication structure.276 
 The Secretary of Homeland Security 
 The Commanding General, United States Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM) 
 The FEMA Administrator 
 The Principal Federal Official (PFO) 
 The Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) 
 A lead federal agency based upon the type of event—A return to PDD-39. 
The status quo reflects the current system for the federal operational response 
based upon unity of effort. At the field level, a FCO appointed from FEMA uses the UCG 
at the JFO to coordinate the federal response but does not direct federal agencies. The 
FCO can issue a MA to federal agencies with the promise for reimbursement but cannot 
order them actually to perform the work. Disputes over whether work to be performed by 
the federal government falls under that agency’s existing authority or whether an agency 
will accept a MA must be elevated to officials outside the JFO. This may be routed 
through FEMA’s Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCC) and NRCC but the 
actual adjudication is done through ad hoc methods, distinct from the interagency policy 
adjudication process under PPD-1. Senior officials will either contact each other directly 
as one or more agencies elevate issues, or they will be addressed through ad hoc working 
groups.  
Resourcing requirements from state and local governments can be routed up 
through the JFO structure for interagency visibility but no single source for initiating top-
down “push” resourcing across the federal government exists. No official federal entity is 
currently organized at the federal operational level to holistically collect, prioritize, and 
provide resources to multiple federal agencies, as well as situational awareness of all 
remaining federal resources released to disaster response except what is spontaneously 
created during a disaster. However, the FEMA NRCC, supporting RRCC’s and JFO’s do 
                                                 
276 Related, but distinct from the federal interagency policy process executed under PPD-1. 
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maintain a level of situational awareness of assets committed through the response from 
tracking the response to state requests for assistance and as reported out through ESF’s. 
The DHS Secretary is the principal federal official for incident management under 
HSPD-5 and is the head of the DHS with direction, authority, and control over it.277 The 
Secretary is vested with all functions of all officers, employees, and organizational units 
of the department.278 The mission of the DHS is set forth in statute and includes 
preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing the vulnerability of the 
United States to terrorism, minimizing the damage, and assist in the recovery from 
terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States, execute all functions of entities 
transferred to the department, and by acting as a focal point regarding natural and 
manmade crises and emergency planning. The Secretary has been delegated the authority 
to execute the key provisions of the Stafford Act but has further delegated that 
responsibility to the FEMA Administrator. 
The commanding general, USNORTHCOM, is the DoD combatant commander 
for the United States, excepting Hawaii, which falls under United States Pacific 
Command (PACOM), and also serves as the commander for the North American 
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).279 As one of the six geographic combatant 
commanders for the DoD, this position reports directly to the Secretary of Defense.280 As 
stated on its website: 
 
                                                 
277 6 U.S.C. § 112. 
278 However, in the case of FEMA, for instance, see 6 U.S.C. § 316, which prevents the Secretary 
from substantially or significantly reducing the authorities, responsibilities, or functions of FEMA or the 
capability of FEMA to perform those missions, authorities, responsibilities, except as otherwise specifically 
provided for in an Act enacted after the PKEMRA. This situation presumably protects not just the authority 
given to FEMA and the Administrator in the PKEMRA but also the authority given directly to the 
Administrator in Title VI of the Stafford Act, formerly the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.  
279 See U.S. Northern Command, “About USNORTHCOM” (n.d.), http://www.northcom.mil/About 
USNORTHCOM.aspx, and United States Pacific Command, USPACOM Facts, Headquarters, United 
States Pacific Command” (n.d.), http://www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/facts.shtml. Under the definition of 
an existential catastrophe, events affecting Hawaii would not reach that scale of an event; however, 
PACOM could be substituted for USNORTHCOM as discussed herein for a catastrophic event in Hawaii. 
280 Ibid. 
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USNORTHCOM consolidates under a single unified command existing 
missions that were previously executed by other DoD organizations. This 
provides unity of command, which is critical to mission accomplishment. 
USNORTHCOM plans, organizes and executes homeland defense and 
civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The 
command is assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions, as 
ordered by the President or Secretary of Defense… USNORTHCOM’s 
civil support mission includes domestic disaster relief operations that 
occur during fires, hurricanes, floods and earthquakes. Support also 
includes counter-drug operations and managing the consequences of a 
terrorist event employing a weapon of mass destruction. The command 
provides assistance to a Primary Agency when tasked by DOD. Per the 
Posse Comitatus Act, military forces can provide civil support, but cannot 
become directly involved in law enforcement.281 
The mission of the FEMA Administrator and FEMA were delineated by the 
PKEMRA in 2006.282 The primary mission of FEMA “is to reduce the loss of life and 
property and protect the Nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of 
terrorism, and other man-made disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-
based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, 
response, recovery, and mitigation.”283 The FEMA Administrator’s powers include 
developing, leading, and managing the federal response to disasters and acts of terrorism, 
building NIMS, and consolidating federal emergency plans into a single plan and 
administering the NRP. The FEMA Administrator is the principal advisor to the 
president, the HSC, and the DHS Secretary for all matters relating to emergency 
management in the United States and may be designated a member of the cabinet in the 
event of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other man-made disasters.284 Congress 
also requires the Administrator to meet certain qualifications including five years of 
executive leadership and a demonstrated ability in emergency management and homeland 
security.285 In addition, the DHS Secretary “may not substantially or significantly reduce 
the authorities, responsibilities, or functions of the Agency or the capability of the 
                                                 
281 U.S. Norther Command, “About USNORTHCOM.”  
282 See 6 U.S.C. §§ 313–314.  




Agency to perform those missions, responsibilities, except otherwise specifically 
provided in an Act enacted after the date of enactment of the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act of 2006.”286 
The positions of PFO and FCO have been previously described in detail. The 
position of PFO, for this alternative, is the one akin to the one exercised by Admiral 
Allen in 2005 and would be a direct delegate of the DHS Secretary, operating under 
current law and authority. The position of FCO would be a more robust position than is 
currently exercised, using the full extent of the position’s authority as provided by the 
Stafford Act through the president, the FEMA Administrator and Regional 
Administrators. No statutory or regulatory provision limits the appointment of FCOs to a 
member of FEMA.287 The FCO would be drawn from FEMA’s current FCO cadre or a 
similarly situated federal officer from another agency. FEMA’s FCOs are currently 
temporary full-time (TFT) employees at the GS-15 level. 
The Lead Federal Agency (LFA) model will be based upon the approach found in 
PDD-39 and the FRP as it related to other federal emergency plans.  
B. Concurrent Implementation of Other federal Emergency Plans 
1. An incident involving hazardous substances, weapons of mass 
destruction, or other lethal agents or materials may require a response 
under another federal emergency operations plan (National Contingency 
Plan, federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, etc.). These plans 
delineate measures necessary to handle or contain released materials and 
keep the public properly informed and protected. 
2. Several of these plans designate a Lead federal Agency (LFA) to 
coordinate the federal response. The LFA is determined by the type of 
emergency. In general, an LFA establishes operational structures and 
procedures to assemble and work with agencies providing direct support to 
the LFA in order to obtain an initial assessment of the situation, develop 
an action plan, and monitor and update operational priorities. The LFA 
ensures that each agency exercises its concurrent and distinct authorities  
 
 
                                                 
286 6 U.S.C. § 316. 
287 The FEMA regulation is 44 CFR 206.41. 
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and supports the LFA in carrying out relevant policy. Specific 
responsibilities of an LFA vary according to the agency’s unique statutory 
authorities. 
3. If the incident also involves concurrent implementation of the FRP, the 
LFA and FEMA coordinate to the maximum extent practical to ensure 
effective, unified federal actions, consistent with their distinct authorities 
and responsibilities. Direct FEMA support to an LFA is limited to 
FEMA’s own authorities, resources, and expertise as an individual agency. 
4. In a response to an emergency involving a radiological hazard, the LFA 
under the FRERP is responsible for federal oversight of activities on site 
and federal assistance to conduct radiological monitoring and assessment 
and develop protective action recommendations. When a radiological 
emergency warrants action under the Stafford Act, FEMA uses the FRP to 
coordinate the non-radiological response to consequences off site in 
support of the affected State and local governments. If the FRERP and 
FRP are implemented concurrently, the federal On-Scene Commander 
under the FRERP coordinates the FRERP response with the FCO, who is 
responsible for coordination of all federal support to State and local 
governments. (Operational interfaces between the FRP and other federal 
emergency plans are covered in more detail in the pertinent ESF and 
incident annexes).288 
The LFA is determined by the type of emergency. In general, an LFA 
establishes operational structures and procedures to assemble and work 
with agencies providing direct support to the LFA in order to obtain an 
initial assessment of the situation, develop an action plan, and monitor and 
update operational priorities. The LFA ensures that each agency exercises 
its concurrent and distinct authorities and supports the LFA in carrying out 
relevant policy. Specific responsibilities of an LFA vary according to the 
agency’s unique statutory authorities.289 
As envisioned under this alternative, the LFA would have the additional powers to direct 
other federal agencies supporting its efforts. Multiple LFAs would not exist and any 
change between LFAs would be a linear, not bifurcated process. For instance, should the 
United States be attacked using one or more Improvised Nuclear Devices (INDs), the 
Attorney General, through the FBI, would be the LFA. For an existential catastrophe 
caused by a man-made event, such as a nuclear power plant failure, or a pandemic or 
                                                 
288 FRP, April 1999, 11–12. 
289 Ibid. 
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agricultural catastrophe, the agencies that have authority to regulate and respond under 
the own authorities would be the LFA. The shared characteristic of these LFAs is the 
federal government does not need a Stafford Act declaration to respond to the 
catastrophe, although a declaration may occur later as gaps in authority are discovered 
and need to be filled. For example, one gap might be long-term housing in response to a 
biological hazard that makes a wide area of the country uninhabitable. 
B. CRITERIA 
The seven alternatives will be ranked using the following criteria. 
 Compliance with current law 
 Political acceptance by the: 
 President 
 Congress 
 Federal agencies 
 States 
 Efficiency in mobilizing, coordinating and directing the federal response 
through: 
 Identifying federal response capabilities 
 Organizing federal response capabilities 
 Coordinating federal response capabilities 
 Directing federal response capabilities 
 Engaging the Whole Community for response 
 Public Acceptance including the Whole Community 
 For the criteria political acceptance and efficiency, the sub-criteria will be 
averaged to give an overall score for the criteria. The four primary criteria were chosen 
because they appear to include all the historically relevant parties for federal disaster 
response to include the minimum level of acceptance for implementation of unity of 
command. Since the purpose for creating unity of command is to provide for the 
mobilization, coordination, and direction of federal entities, a legal basis for it must  
exist. Prior to 1980, it was mostly accomplished through EOs and presidential 
reorganization plans submitted to Congress. With the HSA and the PKEMRA, a more 
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vigorous authority for these activities in statute alongside existing EOs, regulations and 
guidance with significant influence, such as the NRF, now do exist. 
Political acceptance is defined as whether the primary actors in catastrophic 
disaster response will accept, as a matter of political expediency, unity of command over 
the federal civilian response to an existential catastrophe. Thus, in addition to such 
facially apparent actions as Congress not limiting unity of command in law, as it did with 
the PFO, it must break through the interagency culture, which may favor the status quo. 
The five sub-criteria were chosen, as all these actors are necessary for unity of command. 
Fundamentally, unity of command for the federal civilian response belongs to the 
president himself either through his constitutional powers or through that given to him 
from Congress. The premise of unity of command is the power of the president is 
delegated to a single entity at the appropriate level in the federal government to execute 
his direction and intent. This power has appeared before, such as the experience of Frank 
Carlucci in 1972 or Admiral Allen in 2005, but has not been consistently exercised, and 
in both cases, it occurred after the primary federal response was over. While acceptance 
by the president will always remain an individual choice that may differ from president to 
president, what can be consistently captured is the president does in fact have a choice of 
delegating his authority to mobilize, direct, and coordinate the federal civilian response to 
a single person. 
The reason the president may choose to exercise unity of command is based on 
two main arguments. The first is it shortens and clarifies the chain of command. The 
president can expect his orders and intent are more clearly understood, as it would go 
through fewer layers of bureaucracy. It would also be similar to the president’s current 
relationship to his senior combatant commanders in the DoD who report only through the 
Secretary of Defense. Second, it could provide a buffer for the president should the 
federal response be perceived poorly. If the response goes well, the president could 
receive the credit for appointing and supporting the federal official exercising unity of 
command. However, if it goes poorly, the president will now be able to factually report a 
federal official currently possesses the power and resources to respond to a catastrophe, 
and the poor response is the result of one of two problems; either the catastrophe was so 
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terrible as to outstrip any reasonable federal response, or the result of poor leadership of 
that federal official, who despite having the necessary support and resources, failed to 
take advantage of them. While the president will always receive criticism, he would be 
shielded from at least some criticism that would come from having a “rump” coordinator 
of the federal response such as in the case of Hurricane Katrina. 
Next to the president, Congress must also accept unity of command. As with the 
experience of the PFO, Congress has the ability to marginalize and defund this power if it 
chose. While arguments could be made the president has constitutional powers that could 
minimize Congress’s intrusion, given the foundation for unity of command is based upon 
legislation including the Stafford Act and PKEMRA, it is unlikely a president would 
expend the political capital necessary to overcome a negative reaction by Congress. 
While the president and the Congress might both agree to unity of command, 
actually, for it to function, a functional level of acceptance by a critical mass of federal 
agencies must exist, enough so to encompass the federal capabilities necessary to respond 
to an existential catastrophe. While statutory and executive authority, and appropriations, 
may go a long way, federal agencies may perceive they will be asked to cede power they 
may have previously exercised independently, or at least perceived they did. Mobilizing 
federal agencies to spend time preparing for a catastrophe is not their primary function. 
Time spent mobilizing and preparing for an existential catastrophe results in a lost 
opportunity cost for resources, in personnel time and funding that could have been spent 
on their primary mission. This situation results in a level of friction to any change 
towards a system emphasizing unity of command. This friction may be mitigated once it 
is explained the primary purpose is not to hoard this power but instead to delegate it 
operationally and tactically. 
Federal disaster law, from the days of ad hoc legislation and through the disaster 
relief acts, has always been based upon a premise rooted in the Tenth Amendment that 
response to catastrophes is primarily a responsibility of the states.290 An existential 
catastrophe may raise alternative legal constructs that might include the constitutional 
                                                 
290 Amendment X: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. 
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requirement, found in Article IV, that the United States guarantee a republican form of 
government to the states.291 However, much of what would be considered mobilization 
would clearly occur prior to any catastrophe and regardless would require the cooperation 
of the states. Given the importance of state capabilities to the response to an existential 
catastrophe, and the importance of restoring and maintaining the legal authority of state 
governments, political acceptance of the states is necessary for unity of command. 
The first two criteria, compliance with current law and political acceptance, are 
followed by efficiency, which is the substance of unity of command. Efficiency stands 
for the promise that unity of command will improve the federal response to an existential 
catastrophe through measured improvement to the federal government’s ability to 
mobilize, coordinate, and direct the federal response.  
Five sub-criteria have been identified to capture the cycle of mobilization, 
coordination, and direction of the federal response. The first is improving the ability to 
identify federal capabilities prior to an existential catastrophe that could be used for the 
response. As discussed previously, it would include creating and updating the Federal 
Response Inventory Capability and annually issuing the Catastrophic Resource Report.  
Identification of federal capabilities is crucial for several reasons. First, it is 
impossible to have a timely response if the first hours of an existential catastrophe are 
spent locating and requesting federal resources. Second, without a catalogue of federal 
capabilities, any gap assessments are incomplete since federal capabilities may be 
involved, which already exist but are found in non-traditional providers to the federal 
response. It is also possible that capabilities believed to reside in the federal government 
do not actually exist. Third, it would allow the evaluation of the most efficient use of 
federal resources to fulfill capability requirements; it may result that less expensive  
options are available, in terms of lost opportunity costs or financial and personnel costs, 
to the current utilization of federal capabilities, to free them up for more important or 
difficult tasks. 
                                                 
291 Article IV Section 4: The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican 
form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, 
or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence. 
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After identification comes organization. Once federal capabilities have been 
identified, they must be organized to allow for efficiency. Efficiency in terms of 
organization means given a specific task, the most appropriate federal capability has been 
identified to fulfill it. Appropriate means balancing timeliness and cost. Cost includes the 
lost opportunity cost; can another competing task be better filled by this capability? It 
also includes direct costs in funding and numbers of federal personnel or assets dedicated 
to that capability. The process to prepare for the most efficient use of federal capabilities, 
a function of time and cost, is found in the organization of identified capabilities. 
The next two sub-criteria, coordination and direction, can be discussed 
concurrently. Coordination was previously defined as “the ability of the President to 
provide order amongst federal agencies responding under their inherent, supplemental, or 
event triggered authorities, to respond to a catastrophic incident.”292 In contrast, direction 
was defined as “the President’s ability, using either his Constitutional or Congressionally 
provided authority, to order federal agencies to take specific actions, or courses of action, 
based upon his strategic, political and to the extent exercised by the president, operational 
judgment.” Given the power of unity of command over the federal civilian response to an 
existential catastrophe, the federal official exercising it will be required to provide both 
coordination and direction at the operational level under the delegated authority from the 
president. In this context, coordination can be thought of as ensuring federal agencies are 
not duplicating efforts, are fully engaged to the extent strategic decision makers have 
approved, and together are applying the most efficient use of federal capabilities. 
Direction is the actual ordering of these agencies to engage in the most efficient use of 
federal capabilities to respond to the existential catastrophe. 
Last is engaging the Whole Community. The word “engage” was chosen because 
the federal official chosen to exercise unity of command over the federal civilian 
                                                 
292 For an alternative view of “coordination,” see the U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities: Types, Rationales, 
Considerations, by Frederick M. Kaiser, CRS Report R41803 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional 
Information and Publishing, May 31, 2011), which defines coordination as “an arrangement in which a lead 
agency or officer directs an operation, project, or program among one or more other agencies.” Part of the 
problem with how coordination is exercised in the federal response to disasters is that what is actually 
being practiced is collaboration, not coordination. 
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response is generally limited in their power when working with non-federal partners. 
While limited coordination authority in the Stafford Act occurs in regards to relief 
organizations, and in the general authorities of the DHS Secretary and the FEMA 
Administrator, generally federal officials cannot force the coordination and direction of 
the diverse members of the Whole Community.  
For Stafford Act coordination of relief organizations, see Use and Coordination of 
Relief Organizations 42 U.S.C. § 5152: 
(a) In providing relief and assistance under this Act, the President may 
utilize, with their consent, the personnel and facilities of the American 
National Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the Mennonite Disaster Service, 
and other relief or disaster assistance organizations, in the distribution of 
medicine, food, supplies, or other items, and in the restoration, 
rehabilitation, or reconstruction of community services housing and 
essential facilities, whenever the President finds that such utilization is 
necessary. 
(b) The President is authorized to enter into agreements with the American 
National Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the Mennonite Disaster Service, 
and other relief or disaster assistance organizations under which the 
disaster relief activities of such organizations may be coordinated by the 
federal coordinating officer whenever such organizations are engaged in 
providing relief during and after a major disaster or emergency. Any such 
agreement shall include provisions assuring that use of federal facilities, 
supplies, and services will be in compliance with regulations prohibiting 
duplication of benefits and guaranteeing nondiscrimination promulgated 
by the President under this Act, and such other regulation as the President 
may require. 
For the general authorities of the DHS Secretary, See 6 U.S.C. § 112: 
(c) Coordination with non-federal entities. With respect to homeland 
security, the Secretary shall coordinate through the Office of State and 
Local Coordination 1 (established under section 361 of this title) 
(including the provision of training and equipment) with State and local 
government personnel, agencies, and authorities, with the private sector, 
and with other entities, including by—(1) coordinating with State and 
local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, and with the private 
sector, to ensure adequate planning, equipment, training, and exercise 
activities; (2) coordinating and, as appropriate, consolidating, the federal 
Government’s communications and systems of communications relating to 
homeland security with State and local government personnel, agencies, 
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and authorities, the private sector, other entities, and the public; and (3) 
distributing or, as appropriate, coordinating the distribution of, warnings 
and information to State and local government personnel, agencies, and 
authorities and to the public. 
For the FEMA Administrator, see generally 6 U.S.C. § 313: 
Where the Administrator’s powers include leading the nation as a whole 
and includes specific direction to partner with state, local and tribal 
governments, the private sector and non-governmental organizations. 
Limited occasions occur during which Congress has granted the power to federal 
agencies, such as the Defense Production Act,293 where a federal official could have 
some authority that would fall under coordination or direction, but they are specific 
exceptions to the rule. However, given the breadth of an existential catastrophe, it will 
require a response of the Whole Community, which will require the engagement of the 
federal government as the federal government needs to ensure it does not identify, 
organize and utilize its capabilitiesin a vacuum. In fact, in many, if not most instances it 
will occur the most efficient capabilities to accomplish a task lie outside the federal 
government. The federal official can identify these superior capabilities found throughout 
the Whole Community through exercising their role as coordinator. 
The final criterion is public acceptance. It can be argued that public acceptance is 
not necessary to implement unity of command over the federal civilian operational 
response to an existential catastrophe. If the president wants it, Congress does not stop it 
and federal agencies do not impede it, what else is necessary? First Congress, the state 
governments and the president, ultimately, react to public opinion, as does the 
Presidency.294 Second, it is presumptuous to think the federal government can act 
entirely on its own in its response. As argued above, to respond to an existential 
catastrophe all persons in the Whole Community need to apply their capabilities as 
                                                 
293 50 U.S.C. App. § 2061–2172. 
294 Prior to Congress passing any of the major Disaster Relief Acts, Congress held multiple hearings 
on disaster relief, often in the field, which includes numerous private citizens as witnesses alongside local 
and state government officials. The DRA of 1950, in particular, included numerous direct pleas from 
individuals seeking disaster relief. In fact, prior to the DRA of 1950, federal disaster relief often relied on 
such pleas for assistance. See the discussion of the DRA of 1950 in the Congressional Record at 81 CR 
11895–11915, and Senate Report Disaster Relief, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Public Works United States Senate, 81st Congress, 2nd sess., S.2415, July 19, 1950. 
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efficiently as possible. Without the public participating in the identification and 
coordination of resources in capabilities prior to a disaster, planning will fail. Without 
coordination during a disaster, duplication of effort and a failure of identifying unmet 
needs will occur. Without the public sector understanding and being prepared to 
coordinate amongst themselves and with the federal government, confusion and friction 
will result. For all these reasons, if unity of command is to achieve its purpose, to 
improve the efficiency of the federal operational response to an existential catastrophe, 
public acceptance is necessary. 
C. EVALUATION 
1. Compliance with Current Law 
Rank order:  (1) FEMA Administrator 
 (2) DHS Secretary 
 (3) Status Quo 
 (4) Lead Federal Agency 
 (5) USNORTHCOM 
 (6) FCO  
 (7) PFO 
A single integrated set of federal laws for catastrophes does not exist. However,  
three mutually overlapping types of laws do essentially exist. The first series of laws are 
those inherent to federal agencies and are limited to specific types of events. Examples 
would be the Public Health Service Act295 as later amended by the Pandemic and All-
Hazards Preparedness Act,296 the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),297 the Clean Water Act,298 and the Animal 
                                                 
295 Public Health Service Act, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–300mm–
61). 
296 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, Public Law 109–217 (2006). 
297 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948)(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1251–1387). 
298 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Public Law 
96–510 (1980)(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9628). 
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Health Protection Act.299 These laws authorize federal agencies, or the president, to take 
action to respond to certain types of incidents. For example, under CERCLA  
Whenever any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial 
threat of such a release into the environment, or there is a release or 
substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or 
contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the 
public health or welfare, the President is authorized to act, consistent with 
the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of, 
and provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance, 
pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including its removal from any 
contaminated natural resource), or take any other response measure 
consistent with the national contingency plan which the President deems 
necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment.300 
While parts of these laws may need additional authorities to trigger their activation, such 
as a declaration of a national emergency,301 they provide standing, but limited authority, 
to respond to existential catastrophes. These inherent authorities are not all-encompassing 
powers. For instance, CERCLA does not provide the president the authority to house and 
feed families dislocated from their homes due to a release of a hazardous substance. 
The second set of law is encompassed under the Stafford Act. As previously 
noted, it provides both meta-authority, essentially allowing the president to “tie together” 
numerous federal authorities that may have bearing on an incident but which need to be 
coordinated, and specific authority that allows the president to take actions to meet 
immediate threats to life and property filling in gaps in legal authority to respond to a 
disaster not already covered under other authorities. 
The last set of laws is found in the Homeland Security Act, as amended by the 
PKEMRA, and gives specific authorities to coordinate, lead, and direct the federal 
response to various incidents. It operates in conjunction with the powers given to the 
president and the FEMA Administrator in the Stafford Act. The federal officer or position 
                                                 
299 Animal Health Protection Act, Public Law 107–171, subtitle E (2002) (codified as amended at 7 
U.S.C. §§ 8301–8322). 
300 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). 
301 National Emergencies Act, Public Law 94–412 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–
1651). 
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that best ties together these three legal constructs would be in a stronger position to 
execute unity of command. It is against these questions, which that the alternative 
positions are judged.  
The position of FEMA Administrator is uniquely positioned to execute authorities 
under all three series of laws. While the FEMA Administrator has little inherent authority 
to respond to a disaster beyond that found in Title VI of the Stafford Act, and controls 
few actual response assets,302 the FEMA Administrator otherwise is exceptionally well 
positioned to mobilize, coordinate, and direct the federal operational response to an 
existential catastrophe. It is the only position in the federal government where authority 
can be found to exercise all three types of authorities without additional action by 
Congress. In addition, little if any change to existing executive orders would be required. 
Prior to PKEMRA, the DHS Secretary may have been in a superior position to 
exercise these three lines of authority. The PKEMRA limited the Secretary’s powers to 
remove or diminish the substantive authorities belonging to FEMA and the FEMA 
Administrator. However, the DHS Secretary still is in a position of authority over the 
FEMA Administrator, and arguably, has vested in their position all the Administrator’s 
powers. PKEMRA created two potentially mutually competing concepts, that the FEMA 
Administrator reports to the DHS Secretary; yet the Secretary cannot take powers from 
the Administrator. This conundrum can probably be solved by envisioning that only the 
Administrator or the Secretary can exercise the powers given to the FEMA 
Administrator, which would include the powers given to the Administrator under 
PKEMRA, and likely, the Administrator’s authority to execute the delegated powers of 
the Stafford Act.303 Senator Trent Lott, however, may have made the best argument for 
                                                 
302 The FEMA Administrator controls few actual response assets that include the 28 Urban Search and 
Rescue (U.S.&R) Task Forces within the United States, communication assets found within its Mobile 
Emergency Response Support (MERS) Division and prepositioned commodities stored at FEMA 
Distribution Centers (DCs). The vast majority of federal response assets rest outside of FEMA; however, 
no single inventory of federal assets is available since DHS and FEMA have never created the federal 
response capability inventory. 
303 See 6 U.S.C. § 314(a)(7) directing the Administrator to assist the President in executing the 
Stafford Act. 
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FEMA’s unique position, as he discussed the PKEMRA on the Senate floor on July 11, 
2006.304 
The status quo is a confederation of sorts. It is centered around the FEMA 
Administrator, the DHS Secretary, and the acquiescence of other federal agencies under a 
system consistent with the NRF and its structure centered on ESFs. It may not reflect the 
full extent of the authority provided to the FEMA Administrator in PKEMRA, or the 
authority delegated from the president under the Stafford Act, HSPD-5 and other 
authorities, but it does not appear to violate any statutory prohibitions. As currently 
implemented, it does not provide for unity of command across the federal civilian 
agencies. 
On its face, no legal prohibition exists against the president ordering the 
Commanding General USNORTHCOM to serve as a unified commander of civilian and 
military forces, excepting federal law enforcement agencies. However, as stated 
previously, the authority to direct the federal response to a disaster through the Stafford 
Act does not include exceptions to the general prohibition against the use of military 
forces to engage in law enforcement activities. From a purely legal perspective, the 
Commanding General USNORTHCOM would provide a wider net of federal integration 
than any of the alternatives by consolidating the chain of command for both federal 
civilian agencies not directly engaged in law enforcement activities and the federal 
military. USNORTHCOM would also have the small benefit of consolidating the 
authority under the Stafford Act to utilize federal military forces for up to 10 days at the 
request of a governor but in the absence of a declaration under the Stafford Act.305 
The leaders of federal agencies have the inherent ability to respond to incidents 
under their own authorities independent of the Stafford Act. However, given the size of 
the response to an existential catastrophe, no single federal agency has sufficient legal 
                                                 
304 See Appendix H for the complete text of his statement. Senator Lott’s comments were part of the 
discussion over Senate Amendment 4560 to Amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to Establish the 
United States Emergency Management Authority. While FEMA was not subsequently renamed, the 
amendment did in fact pass the Senate 87–11, and the concepts incorporated in the final version of 
PKEMRA. See Thomas.loc.gov, Bill Summary & Status 109th Congress (2005–2006) S. Amdt. 4560 for a 
complete version of the amendment. 
305 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(c). 
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authority to mobilize, coordinate, and direct the federal operational response. While they 
could be provided the powers of the FCO and PFO, just like the Commanding General 
USNORTHCOM, they would not have the wider authorities given to the FEMA 
Administrator and DHS Secretary, nor the ability to direct federal military forces. 
The position of FCO draws its legal authority from the president through the 
Stafford Act. However, it does not have the breadth of authority available to either the 
DHS Secretary, FEMA Administrator, or federal agency heads implementing their 
inherent authorities. A FCO, who is not also the FEMA Administrator or the DHS 
Secretary, may be limited in authority to provide the level of coordination in those two 
positions, and otherwise, may not be able to harness the full authorities of all other 
federal civilian agencies. 
The position of PFO is even less grounded in authority than the other positions. 
Its only authority in statute states what the position cannot do. By itself, the appointment 
of PFO cannot deliver the authority to provide unity of command amongst the federal 
civilian agencies. 
2. Political Acceptance 
Rank Order:  (1) Status Quo 
 (2) FEMA Administrator 
 (3) DHS Secretary 
 (4) USNORTHCOM 
 (5) Lead Federal Agency 
 (6) FCO 
 (7) PFO 
Adopting unity of command necessarily means upsetting the status quo of relying 
on federal unity of effort to prepare for and respond to an existential catastrophe; in other 
words, altering established roles and norms going back, in some cases, two decades or 
more. A critical component to achieving unity of command is whether within the federal 
system its various parts will accept it, which includes the president, whose power is being 
delegated and exercised by subordinates, Congress, which must continue to authorize it 
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and appropriate funds to execute it, and the federal agencies, which provide the resources 
to execute the federal response. In addition, the political acceptance of the states that have 
their own powers to exercise during disaster response is essential.  
As these parties jockey amongst one another for influence, the political process 
determines their relationships and the distribution of power, influence, responsibility, 
blame, and resources among them. Unity of command of the federal civilian response 
must navigate these politics to be adopted and to be successfully implemented. For the 
president, Congress, federal agencies, and state governments, each will weigh its own 
interests in adopting unity of command. 
Remaining with the status quo, unity of effort amongst federal agencies will 
create the least amount of political discomfort. While the deficiencies of unity of effort 
have been discussed previously, the fact remains that despite these problems, even when 
coupled with the poor federal response to large disasters, none of these actors has been 
moved to change the status quo. In other words, likely, it may take an even more 
catastrophic event, coupled with an inadequate federal response, before change occurs, or 
one of the parties must invest the political capital for change, which is not impossible. 
However, it cannot be discounted as a sign the federal interagency has reached a 
consensus over time that the current system is sufficient to meet future threats. 
In the 1970s, the pressure of state governors led to President Carter reversing the 
course set by the Nixon administration a few years before. President Carter would 
respond by returning most federal response coordination functions to a single federal 
agency without the pressure of any single, large-scale disaster. Flooding in the upper 
Midwest, a disaster but not a national crisis, formed the final impetus for the creation of 
modern federal disaster legislation by Congress in 1950. Neither was the Stafford Act of 
1988 a response to any recent single national catastrophe. However, the creation of 
FEMA, the DRA of 1950, and the Stafford Act appear to be exceptions to the general 
rule; it takes a poor federal response to a disaster for significant legislative change. This 
pattern was found in the DRA’s of 1966, 1969, 1970, and 1974, the restatement of the 
Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 in the Stafford Act, and the PKEMRA in which 
legislative changes were made in response to recent catastrophes. 
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More fertile ground for change may be found within the Executive Branch in 
which constant tinkering through EOs and national plans and frameworks, such as the 
NRF, allow reoccurring opportunities for change. For these internal Executive Branch 
processes to lead to change, only the president, or the perceived support of the president, 
could likely change the inertia to stay with the several decade long tradition of unity of 
effort. First, the purpose of exercising unity of command is to improve the president’s 
ability to lead the nation’s response to an existential catastrophe, thus, the president must 
find value in it. Second, this thesis has provided evidence that the primary legal support 
for exercising unity of command is found in the Stafford Act, and that power is vested 
directly in the president from Congress. However, several arguments might propel the 
president to make a proactive change without waiting for the next catastrophe.  
The most powerful argument for the president might be a simple one of political 
expedience. While the president will always accept an inordinate amount of praise or 
blame,  currently no one deflects the latter from the president. For example, the relief of 
Mike Brown as the head of FEMA did little to change the perception that President Bush 
bore much of the responsibility for the poor federal response to Hurricane Katrina. 
Despite later attempts by the Administration to portray Brown as having been given full 
command of the federal response with all the necessary tools, the president was never 
able to change the narrative.306 However, what if the president actually gave the tools to a 
subordinate to mobilize, coordinate and direct the federal response fully? While the 
president always remains ultimately responsible for the federal response, he could now 
plausibly state that he had provided all the necessary tools, resources, and authorities to a 
single qualified individual to execute the intent of the president with the advice of his 
cabinet and staff that could set up a “win-win” situation for the president. If the federal 
response is seen as successful, the president can reap the reward for having the foresight 
to appoint the federal official given unity of command. If the response goes poorly, the 
president can now say he had given all the necessary support to that person whose failure 
to capitalize this support adequately is responsible for the poor response. The president 
                                                 
306 The attempt to shift blame to Brown probably reached its zenith in the letter prepared by DHS 
counsel, Phil Perry, for J. Keith Ausbrook, Chief Counsel to the House Select Bipartisan Committee on 
Katrina dated February 8, 2006. See Appendix 7 to the House Report on Hurricane Katrina. 
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can then relieve that person for cause, but unlike in 2005, the president will be able to 
articulate the specific support and responsibilities delegated to that person that should 
have resulted in a more efficient federal response. 
While examples or arguments exist for why the president, Congress, or the states 
might seek to change the status quo prior to the next catastrophe, it is unlikely federal 
agencies on their own would seek change. Foremost is the fact that any change coming 
from the federal interagency community without legislative adjustments would likely 
require the support of president, the only figure with the power to compel the whole 
interagency into action. Therefore, while federal agencies may not seek to change the 
current status quo spontaneously, they do have the ability to impede and frustrate change 
brought by the president or Congress. The point of unity of command, as stated 
previously, is to “pay forward” and delegate this responsibility. If federal agencies are not 
willing to accept this responsibility, or more likely, seek to impede decisions prioritizing 
and sending resources to other agencies at the expense of their own, they can potentially 
extinguish any of the benefits gained from unity of command.  
Amongst the other options, the question is what level of political friction is likely 
to be encountered if they were vested with the authority for unity of command. The 
FEMA Administrator and the DHS Secretary already realize a significant amount of 
interagency responsibilities for planning for and responding to disasters. While providing 
them unity of command over federal civilian agencies may be a dramatic expansion of 
their current roles, it would not be inconsistent with their current responsibilities. The 
president and Congress are already familiar with the position of DHS Secretary and the 
FEMA Administrator exercising lesser, but related authority. 
The Commanding General USNORTHCOM would also have significant 
advantages when it came to personal relationships with the president and Congress. The 
DoD Combatant commanders enjoy an exceptionally short chain of command to the 
president, so much so that the president often confers directly with them on matters of 
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policy and strategy.307 The DoD still engenders an image of operational and tactical 
efficiency from Capitol Hill to state governments that would weigh in the favor of 
USNORTHCOM. However, state governments and Congress would likely have real 
concerns should the Commanding General USNORTHCOM be placed in charge of the 
federal civilian operational response.  
The idea of placing military forces in charge of civilian agencies domestically 
would turn a long-standing American tradition of civilian leadership of military forces on 
its head.308 The idea that military forces would lead the federal response to disaster was a 
subject of debate after Hurricane Andrew in that the recent success of the Gulf War stood 
in contrast to the anemic federal response to Hurricane Andrew. However, those 
arguments were rejected for several reasons, many of which can be found in the NAPA 
Report Coping with Catastrophe, which went as far as citing a Parameters article on what 
a military coup could look like in the year 2012.309 
The LFA model might hold more appeal to the federal interagency community. 
This more inclusive option would allow federal agencies to maintain and acknowledge 
their traditional expertise while providing them primary authority for the response to 
catastrophes in their area of expertise. However, unlike the previous positions, it is 
unlikely that agencies with sub-cabinet leaders would enjoy the same level of 
relationships with the president and Congress or have as established ties with state 
governments and their emergency management enterprise beyond their technical 
counterparts. It is also unknown if agencies would want to take on the additional 
                                                 
307 For example, think of the close relationship Presidents Bush and Obama had with the U.S. Central 
Command (CENTCOM) commanders over the last decade and even with the senior commanders for Iraq 
and Afghanistan who reported to CENTCOM. For example, General David Petraeus served as both as the 
Commanding General for CENTCOM and later led multi-national forces in Afghanistan. General Stanley 
McCrystal led the multi-national forces in Afghanistan. Both had continuing direct contact with the 
President in those positions.  
308 The idea of civilian control over military forces dates to the foundation of the country. Several 
Federalist Papers devote their energy to detailing restraints over a standing army. See, for instance, 
Federalist #8 and # 26. 
309 Charles J. Dunlop, “The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012,” in Parameters; U.S. 
Army War College Quarterly XXll, no. 4 (Winter 1992–93): 2–20. Then LtCol Dunlop would later rise to 
the position of Major General and become the Air Force Staff Judge Advocate. He would also go on to coin 
the term “lawfare.” 
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coordination requirements, which if not provided additional resources, would have to 
come from existing capabilities. Federal agencies may prefer a more centralized approach 
on which they can focus their core competencies and allow other agencies or federal 
offices to handle interagency coordination responsibilities. 
The FCO position is probably most limited by the fact it would place a relatively 
lower ranking official in charge of the resources and personnel of numerous federal 
agencies. FEMA’s FCO cadre is currently staffed at the GS-15 level; roughly the level of 
a military colonel, with their national Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATs) 
led by junior members of the Senior Executive Service (SES). This lack of seniority 
diminishes the contact with the president and Congress that would be necessary for their 
continued support to realize their responsibility to oversee the federal response. 
Additional friction could also be encountered from other federal agencies at which other 
federal officials, who nominally outrank the FCO otherwise, would be required to support 
them both during an event and before it. FCOs would benefit, however, from their 
continual contact with state officials during smaller disasters creating a situation in which 
they may actually command more respect outside the federal government than within it. 
The PFO would have the advantage over a FCO within the federal government as 
the PFO historically is provided from more senior federal officials. However, the PFOs, 
without changes to their responsibilities, would not have the continual exposure to state 
officials that FCOs have. More importantly, Congress has taken an exceptionally dim 
view of the PFO as an operational position as evidenced by its defunding of the position 
and restricting its control over the FCO.310 This hostility would likely doom any 
expansion of the role of PFO and diminish any enthusiasm within the Executive Branch 
and the president. While the president might be tempted by the flexibility of a PFO, he 
could already accomplish that with the FCO position. 
 
                                                 
310 See earlier discussion of the PFO in Chapter II. 
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3. Efficiency in Mobilizing, Coordinating, and Directing 
Rank Order:  (1) FEMA Administrator 
 (2) DHS Secretary 
 (3) FCO 
 (4) USNORTHCOM 
 (5) Status Quo 
 (6) PFO 
 (7) Lead Federal Agency 
As discussed previously, five criteria have been identified for ranking the 
efficiency of mobilizing, coordinating, and directing the federal civilian operational 
response to an existential catastrophe. They are identifying federal response capabilities, 
organizing federal response capabilities, coordinating federal response capabilities, 
directing federal response capabilities, and engaging the Whole Community. 
Identification during the mobilization or preparedness stage would likely include two 
major themes; the first would be cataloging federal resources for inclusion in the federal 
Response Inventory Capability and the Catastrophic Resource Report. The second theme 
would be the credentialing and typing of these resources. Organized along the lines of the 
core capabilities found in the National Preparedness Goal, these capabilities would each 
be the subject of a PSMA. The PSMAs would form the basis for the next step, that of the 
organization of federal response capabilities. 
Considering the Comprehensive Preparedness System already dictates the FEMA 
Administrator to conduct this work, the Administrator should be well suited to execute 
these tasks. Building upon recent work in developing the National Preparedness Goal and 
other related documents and frameworks, the Administrator should be able to leverage 
existing resources and personnel within FEMA to do this work. The two largest 
drawbacks would be whether FEMA had enough resources on its own to manage such a 
task, and whether the Administrator could convince other federal agencies to commit the 
resources to catalog their capabilities and then continue to update them. It is likely 
presidential involvement, perhaps in the form of an EO, might be needed to get the 
necessary high-level attention of all federal agencies. 
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The DHS Secretary, through their Office of Operations Coordination and 
Planning (OOCP),311 might also be situated to perform these tasks. However, OOCP has 
a much more narrow focus than FEMA, and mostly emphasizes intelligence and 
information sharing and defeating terrorist threats. 
Relying on multiple federal agencies, each in their LFA role, might provide the 
greatest ability to discover non-traditional resources and could draw upon their own 
expertise in determining the most efficient use of resources. However, if the LFA route 
was chosen, it could lead to silos of resources without some overarching mechanism to 
coordinate the various capabilities being identified in each subject area and create 
redundant efforts. It would be difficult to mesh LFA resource identification efforts 
without eventually resorting to a single agency with responsibility to draw them all 
together or to supervise and apply pressure to those LFA efforts that fall short of 
expectations. 
USNORTHCOM has the advantage of drawing upon an enormous planning 
capability in both personnel and experience that no other federal agency can match. 
USNORTHCOM is also a professional heir to the efforts of the U.S. Army in Western 
Europe in 1945, which successfully managed the largest humanitarian effort in U.S. 
history. However, many of the same arguments discussed before about the effect of the 
military supervising traditional civilian functions would apply. In addition, given the 
primary DoD focus on national security, DoD resources would be subject to being 
recommitted to national security threats and away from supporting the persistent effort to 
identify federal response resources. 
The FCO and PFO positions both suffer from the fact that these positions are 
response oriented and have little authority during the mobilization stage. Neither position 
likely has the gravitas necessary to lead the identification of federal resources given the 
senior leadership buy in necessary across the federal government. However, it could be 
hoped that FCOs, or PFOs, should the position be functionally restored, be a part of the 
effort to identify and organize federal response resources to give them additional 
                                                 
311 Department of Homeland Security, “About the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning” 
(n.d.), http://www.dhs.gov/about-office-operations-coordination-and-planning. 
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visibility and expertise in the capabilities they may eventually be expected to utilize when 
responding to a catastrophe. 
Last is the status quo. Given that the federal government, DHS, and FEMA have 
so far yet to create a comprehensive government-wide process to identify federal 
response resources as evidenced by their failure to issue the Federal Preparedness Report 
and the buried Catastrophic Resource Report, it  may be the least effective of any of the 
options. Put another way, it is likely none of the other options would be worse at 
identifying, preparing, and utilizing the full spectrum of federal capabilities, but all might 
have the potential to do so more efficiently than the status quo. 
The key task to organizing these identified federal response capabilities is 
capturing them in appropriate plans. Imagine two primary sets of capabilities, the first 
would be a revival of the CIS,312 organized by NPG core capabilities, that forms a master 
list of all identified federal response capabilities. The second would be more specialized 
lists of capabilities, again organized along core capabilities, necessary to execute all 
federal operational plans. Each capability would be captured in a PSMA. Once a master 
list of capabilities had been established, likely in the CIS, planners could simply refer to 
this master list to draw the necessary capabilities needed to solve identified problems and 
to support federal planning efforts.  
The order of federal agencies and arguments for identifying federal response 
capabilities essentially mirrors the arguments for organizing them although DoD’s 
significant planning resources would be of particular use for organizing federal 
capabilities. In addition, only FEMA may mission assign other federal agencies and is 
specifically charged with creating PSMAs.313 
Unlike identification and organization, which are steady state, continuing actions, 
coordination, and direction, while practiced prior to an event, occur upon the threat or 
actual occurrence of a catastrophe. In other words, the FCO and PFO positions, which 
                                                 
312 See footnote 232 on the function of the CIS. 
313 Even if the President redelegated FEMA’s Stafford Act responsibilities, the HSA provides that the 
President shall ensure through the FEMA Administrator the creation of PSMAs and in its definition of 
MAs, states only FEMA may issue MAs. See 6 U.S.C. § 741(5) and § 753(c). 
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have tenuous ties to the first two criteria, are in a much better position to do these 
activities. However, given the current status of the PFO, its ranking is based on its current 
neutered powers, which makes it a poor choice for both these activities. For instance, the 
statutory inability of the PFO to command the position of FCO makes it impossible to say 
the PFO could actually direct the action of all federal civilian response efforts. 
The key distinction between coordination and direction could probably be stated 
that in the former, it is mainly a matter of deconfliction and situational awareness while 
the latter requires the more difficult step of prioritization of resources. Prioritization 
could occur in either external resources flowing to a federal agency, at the expense of 
them being withheld from other agencies that could also utilize those resources, or in the 
internal prioritization of an agency’s resources through ordering it to expend them on an 
activity that it would not necessarily have engaged in on its own accord. 
The ranking of agencies under the two criteria do not necessarily mirror each 
other. For instance, while the FEMA Administrator might be better suited to coordinate 
federal agencies, it is essentially what the Administrator does right now, directing 
agencies to act, especially when they would not do so on their own, requires a significant 
expenditure of political capital. In this case, the DHS Secretary might have more success 
than the FEMA Administrator. 
The last criteria, Engaging the Whole Community, is a reminder that the federal 
response does not occur in a vacuum, and in many cases, capabilities found outside the 
federal government will form the crux of the response to an existential catastrophe. These 
capabilities can be found amongst state, local and tribal governments, the private sector, 
non-governmental entities, voluntary organizations and individual citizens. The Whole 
Community must be engaged for two reasons to mobilize, coordinate, and direct the 
federal response effectively. The first may be one of law.  
Federal disaster law, premised upon the Tenth Amendment and embodied by the 




federal government in a supplemental role to state governments. An existential 
catastrophe may change this paradigm. For instance, if a state government is completely 
incapacitated, the federal government, under its Constitutional guarantee to provide a 
republican form of government to its citizens, might become the first responder to the 
existential catastrophe, which is even more likely if, as stated in the definition of an 
existential catastrophe, traditional first responders are all survivors and victims and 
unable to respond. However, it is not guaranteed that an existential catastrophe would 
destroy state governance, and to presume so is probably inconsistent with the basic 
division of powers between state and federal government. 
The second reason is one of efficiency. The current FEMA Administrator, Craig 
Fugate, often invokes a story of once seeing FEMA set up a distribution center in the 
parking lot of a functioning Wal-Mart. Using a holistic approach that recognizes all the 
nation’s resources, wherever they may be found, is essential as in an existential 
catastrophe demand will likely outstrip available capabilities and resources, and 
redundancy must be minimized. This type of situation also recognizes that the federal 
government has few tools to direct or prioritize the deployment of non-federal 
capabilities and is best suited, and most cases limited by law, to playing the role of 
coordinator to provide national unity of effort. By not replicating the work of the Whole 
Community, federal resources and capabilities can flow to underserved areas and gaps 
resulting in a broader delivery of disaster relief services. 
Considering FEMA’s visibility and engagement at all levels of government, non-
governmental organizations, the private sector and citizens, the FEMA Administrator is 
uniquely placed to execute a concept he is credited with creating. In addition, since the 
Whole Community considers actors outside the government, the FCO position  probably 
has a greater position of influence than it has within the federal government. FCOs have 




4. Public Acceptance 
Rank Order:  (1) Status Quo 
  (2) FEMA Administrator 
 (3) DHS Secretary 
 (4) USNORTHCOM 
 (5) PFO 
 (6) FCO 
 (7) Lead Federal Agency 
The final criterion is public acceptance and its key factor is trust. The public must 
place its trust in two questions. The first is that plausible existential threats to the nation 
exist, and second, that providing unity of command for the federal civilian response will 
result in tangible benefits for them. The first question would be easy if it was solely 
linked to actions in response to an existential catastrophe. However, adequately 
mobilizing, coordinating, and directing the federal response requires numerous activities 
in the absence of a specific threat. The federal government must identify and organize its 
own capabilities while planning on how to integrate them with the capabilities that exist 
outside the federal government, which means the answer to the first question of trust is 
principally a matter of education. Currently, no comprehensive campaign is available to 
educate the public about risk. Even when such information is obtainable, it is often 
shielded from the public, such as the Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA), and in 
no case was a sustained, public awareness campaign ever in existence.314 The same can 
be said for FEMA’s MOM, which has never been officially delivered to the public. While 
some progress has been made with events like the Great ShakeOut,315 nonetheless, the  
 
 
                                                 
314 Strategic National Risk Assessment, “The Strategic National Risk Assessment in Support of PPD 
8: A Comprehensive Risk-Based Approach toward a Secure and Resilient Nation,” December 2011, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-strategic-national-risk-assessment-ppd8.pdf. An unclassified 
overview can be found at this link. 
315 ShakeOut, “Shakeout Regions and Current Registration Levels” (n.d.), http://www.shakeout.org/. 
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federal government has never engaged in a long form conversation with the public on 
risk. Until this occurs, the public will probably continue to favor the status quo. 
If, however, the federal government did begin to implement unity of command 
over the federal civilian response; those positions, which have the most contact with the 
public, would likely receive the greatest level of trust if only based upon their familiarity, 
which favors the FEMA Administrator whose role places him in contact with officials 
across the public and private spectrum. The DHS Secretary also fits this criterion; 
however, their contacts are more diffuse including intelligence and law enforcement. 
These additional duties belonging to the Secretary could also be slightly detrimental to 
public trust as people may have reservations that disaster relief activities could also be 
used for law enforcement purposes. For instance, the DHS Secretary includes 
immigration enforcement in their portfolio. While federal law ensures all persons, 
regardless of immigration status receive emergency assistance,316 certain populations and 
organizations may be uneasy working on emergency response issues with the Secretary 
charged with enforcing immigration law. These concerns may even be grounded in some 
truth since FEMA is part of DHS and interagency information sharing rules amongst 
departments in the same agency are much less onerous than those between separate 
agencies.317 The Secretary’s law enforcement powers may also be of concern to those 
suspicious of federal power. 
Similar to the DHS Secretary, USNORTHCOM might also suffer from some of 
the same questions if they became the public face of the federal civilian response. While 
the DoD is generally seen as an effective organization,318 nonetheless, significant 
questions would arise about using them domestically in this role as explained earlier. Due  
 
 
                                                 
316 See 6 U.S.C. § 1621, which allows any person to receive “short-term, non-cash, in-kind emergency 
disaster relief” regardless of immigration status. 
317 See 6 U.S.C. § 552a. 
318 Gallup Consulting, “In the Public We Trust, Renewing the Connection between the Federal 
Government and the Public,” November 2008, http://www.ourpublicservice.org/OPS/documents/ 
InthePublicWeTrustNov24.pdf. 
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to their greater exposure and rank, the PFO position might actually have an advantage 
over a FCO. LFAs would create a problem of consistency. With numerous agencies each 
leading their own subject matter area, it would likely diffuse the overall federal message 
and make it more difficult to create a coherent and consistent picture of the federal 
response to the public. 
5. Final Ranking 
(1)  FEMA Administrator  
(2)  DHS Secretary  
(3)  Status Quo 
(4)  USNORTHCOM 
(5)  FCO 
(6)  PFO 



























PFO FCO Lead 
Federal 
Agency 
Legal Compliance 3 2 5 1 7 6 4 
Political Acceptance 2 3 3.75 2.5 6 6 5.25 
President 1 2 3 4 5 7 6 
Congress 4 2 3 1 7 5 6 
Federal Agencies 1 3 5 4 6 7 2 
States 2 5 4 1 6 3 7 
Efficiency in Mobilizing, 
Coordinating and 
Directing 
5.6 2.2 4 1.4 5.2 3.6 6 
Identifying federal 
Response Capabilities 
7 1 4 2 6 5 3 
Organizing federal 
Response Capabilities 
5 3 2 1 6 4 7 
Coordinating Federal 
Response Capabilities 
5 3 4 1 6 2 7 
Directing Federal 
Response Capabilities 
7 1 4 2 3 5 6 
Engaging the Whole 
Community 
4 3 6 1 5 2 7 
Public Acceptance 1 3 4 2 5 6 7 
Total 2.9 (3) 2.55 (2) 4.19 (4) 1.73 (1) 5.55 (6) 5.4 (5) 5.56 (7) 
Table 1.   Ranking of Alternatives to Exercise Unity of Command for the Federal Operational Response to an Existential 
Catastrophe 
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Based upon the analysis of all seven choices, the FEMA Administrator appears to 
be best suited to exercise unity of command over the federal operational response to an 
existential catastrophe. In this position, the FEMA Administrator would be the senior 
most federal official whose sole responsibility was to mobilize, coordinate and direct 
federal capabilities responding to an existential catastrophe. As the alternatives were 
ranked, it becomes clear they separate into two tiers with the USNORTHCOM 
commander in between. In addition to the FEMA Administrator, the DHS Secretary also 
appears to be a strong choice, although their strategic responsibilities as part of the NSC 
may make it difficult for the Secretary to exercise this function. Interestingly, the other 
top tier choice is simply to retain the status quo relying on unity of effort and dispersed 
responsibility, which raises the question whether giving unity of command over the 
federal operational response to the wrong person or position may have a detrimental 
effect on the federal operational response.  
In the next chapter, this thesis reimagines the FEMA Administrator’s response to 
Hurricane Katrina but with a new model of federal operational interagency response in 
place. Read in context with the serious defects in the mobilization, coordination, and 
direction of the federal operational response listed in the first chapter, it might provide an 
example of how much more efficient the federal operational response to an existential 
catastrophe might be with the implementation of unity of command. 
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V. REVISITING UNITY OF COMMAND UPON THE FEDERAL 
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 
The following assumes that the FEMA Administrator319 at the time of Hurricane 
Katrina, Michael Brown, was vested with the authority to provide unity of command over 
the mobilization, coordination, and direction of the federal civilian response to Hurricane 
Katrina. Assumptions are made that he would have competently utilized this power and 
that he had the explicit support of the president, the HSC staff,320 and Secretary Chertoff. 
It also assumes the present legal framework, including the PKEMRA, existed at the time 
of the hurricane. 
A. MOBILIZING FOR HURRICANE KATRINA—HURRICANE PAM 
Beginning with mobilization prior to the event, FEMA embarks on a two-prong 
strategy to prepare for large-scale disasters. The first is a federal government wide 
canvassing of federal response capabilities. These capabilities, typed and credentialed, 
are bundled together to populate the CIS that was never issued prior to Hurricane Katrina. 
With the additional supervision, authority, and support of the president and his staff, 
FEMA is both held to a timely standard to finish the CIS and given adequate support to 
force the cooperation of other federal agencies as needed to complete the CIS on time. 
In addition to the CIS, identified, typed, and credentialed capabilities are linked to 
individual PSMAs, which are used for the second prong to populate PSMAs into existing 
national operational plans and exercises. When the Hurricane Pam exercise is held 
beginning in July 2004, it is no longer a “bridging exercise.”321 Instead, it is able to 
exercise PSMAs that have been previously identified for hurricane response and for 
                                                 
319 At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the FEMA Administrator was still called a Director and also held 
the position of Undersecretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response. 
320 The staffs of the HSC and the NSC were not combined into the NSS until the Obama 
Administration, at the time, it would have been the HSC staff. 
321 “The intent of Hurricane Pam was to produce the preliminary “bridging document” addressing 
catastrophic hurricane response between state and local plans and the National Response Plan. The 
Hurricane Pam documents were designed to serve as a foundation for more detailed catastrophic planning 
in the future, and to provide the architecture for an integrated catastrophic plan.” U.S. Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs” (n.d.), www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/012406beriwal. 
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catastrophic incidents. Participants are required to actually simulate the steps necessary to 
activate and deploy resources, and using exercise play, develop estimated times of 
arrival. The exercise forces federal agencies to address real time identified gaps in 
capabilities by resorting to a combination of PSMAs not identified in planning efforts, 
non-traditional capabilities, and contracts with the private sector.  
The FEMA Administrator is able to use their authority to require the adequate 
level of federal agency personnel to participate. Federal agency leaders who attend the 
exercise are the same caliber of leadership who can instantly command additional 
resources from across their agencies a year later during Hurricane Katrina. This exercise 
allows these leaders to both simulate difficult decisions, such as stripping agency 
resources from their primary duties to support the response to the hurricane, and also 
helps familiarize them with current plans, other leaders, and their own agency’s 
capabilities.  
The exercise also acquaints leadership with the role of the ESFs and forces each 
ESF to identify resources from primary and supporting agencies more efficiently. ESFs 
are now given a standard for choosing from among existing PSMAs, identifying 
additional federal resources in real time, and additional contracting duties to fulfill 
requests for resources not found in the federal government.  
With specific capabilities to be exercised, participants likely discover gaps in 
coordination a year prior to Hurricane Katrina. ESF #13 Public Safety and Security 
having been forced to collaborate during the identification, typing, and credentialing of 
capabilities, has identified and addressed the lack of law enforcement coordination 
between DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) prior to Hurricane Pam. Similarly, 
ICE, CBP, and FPS are all pressed beforehand to validate their roles within ESF #13 and 
what capabilities they have available to support the federal response. When ESF #9, 
Search and Rescue (SAR), simulates the need for aerial SAR, which draws resources 
from both the DoD and the USCG, the two agencies realize they have not yet prepared to 
integrate air space operations and deconfliction; if they have not already. 
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The final change to Hurricane Pam is the FEMA Administrator has the authority 
and support to direct federal agencies to take specific, identified steps to address gaps and 
shortfalls identified during the exercise. If, after this, final remediation process gaps and 
shortfalls remain that cannot be addressed from identified federal capabilities or 
contracting, FEMA now provides Congress this information through the Federal 
Preparedness Report and Catastrophic Resource Report. The FEMA Administrator 
supervises this process through a fortified ESFLG that provides the Administrator a 
forum to determine the progress of federal agencies and a link to the HSC for those issues 
that require strategic level decisions. 
B. COORDINATING AND DIRECTING THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO 
HURRICANE KATRINA 
As the threat of Hurricane Katrina grows, the federal government, led by the 
FEMA Administrator, begins preparations to assist State governments. Using the ESFLG, 
the FEMA Administrator, on their own initiative, is able to convene senior federal 
operational leadership, which replaces the need for the IIMG. As the threat grows, the 
FEMA Administrator and the ESFLG develop specific requests for additional resources 
to be released to them and identify the need for the president and the cabinet to provide 
strategic leadership and decisions. Accordingly, the FEMA Administrator, now leading 
the ESFLG and in the role of principal advisor for emergency management to the 
president, the HSC, and the DHS Secretary, asks the president to convene the HSC, 
possibly including all cabinet members, as much as two days prior to landfall in 
Louisiana and Mississippi. At this meeting, the FEMA Administrator, along with the 
National Hurricane Center, provide the president and the HSC with specific information 
on the threat, efforts under way, and identified gaps. The FEMA Administrator makes 
specific requests for additional resources beyond what has been released to the ESFLG 
leadership and asks the president to reach out preemptively to affected governors with 
specific questions to ask them about their capabilities and preparedness activities that 
could not be addressed by the ESFLG and the FEMA Administrator in their 
conversations with state officials. With future needs already being anticipated, the 
Secretary of Defense can begin balancing national security interests in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan with the need to support response efforts in Louisiana and Mississippi, such 
as determining what level of strategic airlift to make available to response efforts. 
After landfall, only one federal point of coordination exists for the federal 
response as the FEMA Administrator operationalizes the ESFLG and moves forward 
with the UACG. Consisting of the same federal leaders who run the ESFLG plus 
additional federal officials necessary to draw upon all anticipated federal resources, the 
FEMA Administrator provides a single face to the federal response. The PFO and DoD 
Task Force do not have two competing federal organizations.  
When the Administrator is provided information directly on the day of landfall 
that levee breaches in New Orleans have changed the facts on the ground from a 
hurricane to a flood, he does not need to ask permission for additional assistance. Instead, 
working through the FCO for Louisiana and with the USACE and ESF #3, on his own 
initiative, he works to see that resources are immediately set in motion to repair the 
levees while ensuring ESF #9 begins SAR missions. Alongside his FCO, he 
simultaneously contacts state officials including the SCO, and likely the governor and 
mayor of New Orleans (if he can be reached), to inform them of the information and 
ensure federal resources support the state in the response. Only then does he notify the 
DHS Secretary and HSC of the levee breach as a point of situational awareness and as a 
warning more federal resources may need to be released shortly to respond to the new 
facts on the ground. The Administrator leaves the details of such actions for his FCO to 
execute who exercises authority delegated from the Administrator and in conjunction 
with state officials as they work to support the needs of incident commanders and area 
FCOs directly. Mayor Nagin no longer has to phone the president for busses; instead, he 
informs the FEMA Administrator directly who is able immediately task ESF #1 to 
provide the necessary transportation resources, or better yet, delivers the request to the 
FCO who can draw upon all the resources released to him through the ESFLG. 
As New Orleans floods the day after landfall and the need for SAR and 
evacuations is more clearly understood, the FEMA Administrator is able to force the 
issue of evacuees located at the Superdome and the Convention Center in New Orleans 
with the mayor and governor. Instead of self-deploying, LTG Russel Honore has already 
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fallen in with the UACG and is tasked with directly supporting FEMA’s efforts to assist 
the state and city in evacuating these locations. A one-day delay in beginning evacuations 
and another day’s delay when LTG Honore stopped FEMA’s plans for evacuation no 
longer occurs. Secretary Chertoff, instead of being asked by reporters to remark on the 
images of marooned evacuees, is thus able to report on specific federal actions, taken in 
coordination with state and city officials, and which are playing out on TV screens 
around the world. When ESF #8 and HHS fail to begin removing bodies, the FEMA 
Administrator orders them to do so, and alleviating any questions of authority, invokes 
the broad emergency response powers found in Section 403 of the Stafford Act to 
approve the work. Within three days from landfall, all evacuees have been relocated from 
the Superdome and Convention Center, SAR efforts in the 9th Ward are finishing up, and 
recovery efforts are already beginning to overtake the response.  
While the response focuses on New Orleans and Louisiana, the FEMA 
Administrator is able also to prioritize those labors with parallel efforts undertaken in 
Mississippi. Through the UACG, he is able to prioritize requests for assistance from both 
states and support them with additional resources. When gaps in resources are located, he 
can now inform the HSC and the president of the need for additional federal resources 
not already released to the members of the UACG and the FEMA Administrator. 
Concentrating on these actions, and providing the public face to the nation, the FEMA 
Administrator leaves his FCOs, consistent with his intent and that of the governors, free 
to conduct operations alongside state and local officials.  
Clearly, these results occur in hindsight and assume the actors would have worked 
harmoniously and quickly to address the catastrophe that unfolded. However, key points 
might have changed the entire response to Hurricane Katrina. The first is the 
empowerment of the FEMA Administrator. When presented a problem or request from 
the state, such as the need to begin a major evacuation and SAR effort, he already has the 
resources available to begin those efforts without asking for permission or can quickly 
collect them from members of the ESFLG. The only need to speak to superiors is to keep 
them informed and to make specific requests for additional resources required or 
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anticipated. Second, as the single POC for the federal response,322 no confusion occurs 
amongst state and local officials about who is in charge of the federal response and where 
their requests for assistance should be directed. Third, in those cases in which federal 
agencies have failed to make adequate preparations or would not act under the own 
accord, the FEMA Administrator has the power to direct and reimburse federal agencies 
to take actions authorized under the Stafford Act, including actions that might fall under 
the existing authorities of other federal agencies. Finally, all this allows the president to 
have a direct link to the federal response through the FEMA Administrator. As necessary, 
the president can directly communicate their intentions to the Administrator, and in 
conjunction with their staff, supervise their performance in line with the president’s 
expectations and weighing the strategic decisions entailed by such a catastrophe. In short, 
the president now has a way to influence events on the ground directly that they did not 
previously have.  
                                                 
322 As a natural disaster, no need for crisis management is needed; accordingly, federal law 
enforcement needs are in support of consequence management, led by the FEMA Administrator and the 
integration and presence of the senior DoD commander as part of the UACG eliminates the need for a 
separate DoD command. 
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VI. WHAT A NEW SYSTEM OF MOBILIZING, COORDINATING 
AND DIRECTING THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO AN 
EXISTENTIAL CATASTROPHE MIGHT LOOK LIKE 
If the federal government adopted unity of command for the federal civilian 
operational response to an existential catastrophe, what type of federal interagency 
system would support it and be best situated to take advantage of its benefits? First, it 
would need leadership and a forum for that leadership to be exercised. It has been argued 
that the FEMA Administrator is best suited to provide this federal operational leadership. 
If so, that provides the answer to who will provide this leadership and direct connection 
to the president. While the president and the cabinet, with the support of the NSS 
concentrating on strategic issues, the FEMA Administrator exercises their authority to 
guide the federal civilian operational response in line with the expectations of the 
president. Second, it would need a system to exercise this authority. Third, this authority 
would need to be integrated into preparedness, the mobilization stage.  
A. A REVITALIZED EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION LEADERSHIP 
GROUP 
Beginning with preparedness, a revitalized ESFLG would be the focal point for 
exercising unity of command prior to catastrophes. The ESFLG charter would be 
changed to reflect its new purpose. First, membership would be based upon real 
operational authority. All ESFLG members must have the ability to control the assets of 
their particular department or agency. Alternatively, for larger agencies, members must 
have the authority to control at least an initial allocation of agency resources without 
needing to ask for further permission to deploy them. The steady state ESFLG would be 
chaired either by the FEMA Administrator, or more likely, the Associate Administrator 
for Response and Recovery, or the Assistant Administrator for Response who is the 
current ESFLG chair. Unlike the current ESFLG, a SFLEO and a senior member of 
USNORTHCOM, possibly the Deputy Commanding General or the Director or Deputy 
Director of its Joint Operations (J-3), who would perform two roles, would also be 
designated. The first would be to coordinate all crisis management activities that fall 
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under the jurisdiction of federal law enforcement and military authorities with the 
consequence management activities of the civilian ESFLG members. Second, each also 
serves as their department’s senior ESFLG representative for consequence management 
activities. In the case of DOJ, as the primary ESF agency for ESF #13, and the DoD as a 
critical ESF Support Agency for multiple ESFs.323 While not co-chairs of the ESFLG, the 
SFLEO and NORTHCOM leaders each represent statutorily distinct responsibilities and 
report directly to the president for law enforcement and national security. 
All primary ESF departments and agencies would be required to attend each 
monthly ESFLG meeting along with crucial supporting agencies, such as the DoD. All 
supporting agencies would be prepared to attend as necessary and at least one meeting 
per year would require the attendance of the full membership; all federal agencies with 
responsibilities under the NRF or supporting national plans. Each ESFLG member would 
be appointed as the emergency coordinator for their agency as required by EO 12656. 
The key characteristic is that membership would not change between the preparedness 
and policymaking functions prior to a catastrophe, and the operational functions in 
anticipation of and in response to a catastrophe to allow for a seamless transition from 
policy making to operational decision making. 
Second, the function of the ESFLG would change to emphasize the resolution of 
issues at the operational level. Currently, the purpose of the ESFLG is to perform as “a 
senior level entity that coordinates responsibilities, resolves operational and preparedness 
issues relating to interagency response and recovery activities at the national level, and 
provides planning guidance and oversight for the development of interagency response 
and recovery focused plans and activities.”324 The ESFLG would emphasize “resolution 
of issues” with the FEMA Administrator in position with the responsibility to supervise 
the resolution of operational level issues and with each of its members in position to 
execute final decisions. The ESFLG would change from a policy making body to one 
with operational decision-making capability and authority. With the empowerment of the 
                                                 
323 The USACE, which is part of the DoD, is currently the primary agency for ESF #3 along with 
FEMA. 
324 ESFLG Charter dated October 22, 2010. 
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ESFLG, consideration may be made whether the DRG as an additional layer of 
bureaucracy needs to continue or whether it remains strictly a policy-making body and 
does not interfere with the ESFLG’s direct connection to the NSC and the NSS during the 
response to catastrophes. 
As an IPC, the DRG is “attended by Assistant Secretary or equivalent level and 
Deputy Assistant Secretary or equivalent participants respectively from the departments 
and agencies that make up the HSC deputies. For some IPCs, such as the DRG that 
handles response and preparedness issues, the membership may be slightly larger to 
account for the number of departments and agencies involved with those issues. The 
attendees are expected to be able to speak on behalf of their departments and agencies 
and provide resources.”325 As previously stated, the ESFLG membership should already 
be able to utilize all the resources of their agency or at least have an initial allocation of 
resources under their command. If this requirement makes membership of the ESFLG 
and the DRG duplicative, they should be consolidated. However, a significant increase in 
responsibility would result for departmental assistant or deputy assistant secretaries, since 
as their department’s emergency coordinator, they would be expected to attend monthly 
ESFLG meetings and be the primary operational director for their agency or department 
in an actual catastrophe. The answer may be to create specific agency delegations from 
agency secretaries or leaders to the most senior operational director in each agency as the 
agency’s emergency coordinator and ESFLG representative. 
Delegating authority for the utilization of agency resources below the assistant 
secretary level would allow operational control of department resources to those most 
familiar with agency and department capabilities that would be used to respond to a 
catastrophe. However, if departmental secretaries and other agency leaders are 
performing their strategic functions and providing the final line of advice to the president, 
the assistant secretary level of agency leadership may no longer have a role. This level of 
agency leadership could find themselves too junior to work directly with the president 
and too senior to spend significant time preparing and learning to utilize their agency’s 
                                                 
325 Kelly Wolslayer, “Collaborative Policy Making: Vertical Integration in the Homeland Security 
Enterprise” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2011), 30–31. 
 146
capabilities to respond to a catastrophe. One possibility is for this level of departmental 
and agency leadership to concentrate on the continuity of their agency’s primary mission 
while their most senior operational director controls their resources previously committed 
to disaster response and their agency or department leader provides strategic advice to the 
president and their staff. This structure could allow for a division of labor for both the 
maximum mobilization of the agency or department while still letting part of senior 
management concentrate on the continued affairs of the agency or department. This 
arrangement would be somewhat similar to the DoD model in which service chiefs can 
concentrate on providing advice to the DoD Secretary and the president, and provide 
direction to their services while leaving responsibility for the actual utilization of their 
forces to combatant commanders. 
When an anticipated or actual catastrophe occurs, the ESFLG transitions to an 
UACG. Unlike the UACG, which was exercised in NLE 2010, but which does not appear 
to have been adopted for further use, the new UACG would be premised upon unity of 
command and not unity of effort. The new UACG would have an element of unified 
effort that would exist between the DoD, the SFLEO, and the FEMA Administrator, each 
responsible for their own part of the federal response over military, law enforcement, and 
civilian resources, respectively. Unity of command exists in the fact that within these 
three positions rests complete command and control of the entirety of federal resources 
committed to responding to the catastrophe. In turn, these three positions are supported 
by the emergency coordinators for ESF supporting agencies necessary to respond to the 
catastrophe. These supporting agency emergency coordinators provide advice to the 
UACG on the capabilities of their agencies and situational awareness of activities 
conducted under their existing authorities and coordinated through the UACG. They 
assume responsibility for exercising their own statutory authorities to respond to an 
existential catastrophe except when otherwise directed by the FEMA Administrator. 
Simply put, the UACG commands the entirety of all federal capabilities and authorities 
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made available by the president to respond to an existential catastrophe.326 The UACG 
cycle of operations can be identified as (1) identify the problem/situational awareness, (2) 
decide, (3) coordinate, (4) execute, (5) supervise, and (6) review. 
At least one question for leadership of FEMA’s ESFLG/UACG concept remains. 
The analysis of providing for unity of command over the federal civilian response to an 
existential catastrophe was based upon the authority of the FEMA Administrator either 
through the PKEMRA or as delegated under the Stafford Act. However, the FEMA 
Administrator must still execute their statutory responsibilities as the principal advisor to 
the president, HSC, and the DHS Secretary for all matters relating to emergency 
management in the United States. Thus, the FEMA Administrator is placed in the 
difficult position of being required to provide strategic advice to the president and the 
HSC on the one hand, and be responsible for utilizing federal civilian capabilities to 
respond to the catastrophe on the other. In practice, the Deputy FEMA Administrator 
may effectively command the UACG, using the delegated authorities of the FEMA 
Administrator, while the FEMA Administrator retains his primary responsibility to advise 
the president and the HSC, or the president may choose to switch those roles. 
If this arrangement is adopted in which the FEMA Deputy Administrator is the 
primary operational commander for the federal civilian response, the president, the 
FEMA Administrator, and the Deputy Administrator will also need to determine who will 
be the primary conduit to the nation’s governors. While this will likely be a case-by-case 
answer, and nothing will interfere with the prerogative of the president to deal directly 
with the governors, on a strictly operational basis, the FEMA Administrator might be best 
suited for this role, even if the Deputy Administrator actually commands the federal 
civilian response, and coordinates it with the crisis management activities of federal law 
enforcement and military authorities. 
                                                 
326 FEMA also has national IMATs that effectively fulfill the mission of providing a forward senior 
federal presence in disasters. These teams are being reorganized for the summer of 2013; however, it does 
not appear they will have the authority or membership necessary to be a new UACG. One possibility would 
be for the IMATs to continue in their role for lessor disasters, but for catastrophes or existential 
catastrophes, they would be supplanted by the new UACG, and the IMAT members would fill staff roles 
for the new UACG. 
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B. NEW ASSUMPTIONS AND METRICS 
For the new ESFLG/UACG to be successful, it will need to change the way the 
federal government prepares for an existential catastrophe. To begin, the steady state 
ESFLG will focus on creating, issuing, and updating the federal response capability 
inventory and Catastrophic Resource Report. To do this, the ESFLG, with the support of 
all primary and supporting agencies’ emergency coordinators, must inventory all their 
agencies capabilities. These capabilities would be grouped into three general categories. 
The first would be those capabilities immediately available for agency emergency 
coordinators to use to respond to a catastrophe and whether those capabilities could be 
deployed to an incident within 72 hours. The second category of capabilities would be 
those not currently available for utilization by that agency’s emergency coordinator but 
which could respond to a catastrophe if released by the agency’s leader or the president; 
in essence, the nation’s strategic reserve. Third would be all other identified capabilities 
of an agency that do not currently support national response plans. This third category is 
important in that it may later lead to the identification of non-traditional capabilities 
found within the federal government. Categories would include both physical assets and 
personnel, and services. The federal response capability inventory should be reviewed 
every one to three years, and allow for real time updating of capabilities by federal 
agencies. The ESFLG/UACG would also have the important role of ensuring these 
capabilities focused on areas not already adequately covered by the rest of the Whole 
Community. 
The Catastrophic Resource Report by law must be issued annually to Congress. 
The purpose of the report under the new ESFLG would be to explain the deficiency in 
resources, if any, identified to respond to a MOM event, and what is available as detailed 
in the federal response capability inventory. As plans become more detailed and 
exercised, future Catastrophic Resource Reports can focus on more specific threats or 
regions, for example, a major earthquake affecting the Los Angeles area, a pandemic 
influenza event, or a cyber attack upon the nation’s energy infrastructure.  
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The ESFLG will also need to acknowledge and seek to address the current gap in 
federal response capabilities in the first 72 hours of an event. Under the current bottom up 
process, federal capabilities supplement state and local first responders. However, it may 
take up to 72 hours or more after an event before state and local responders can 
communicate their unmet needs to their federal partners. In existential catastrophes, state 
and local first responders will themselves become victims and survivors requiring federal 
capabilities to provide response capabilities and reestablish basic services immediately. 
In parallel, both state and federal governments will need to continue to expand their 
coordination with private sector and non-governmental capabilities in both the first 72-
hour gap and beyond.  
A critical function of the ESFLG will be to integrate federal capabilities with their 
state and local counterparts, the private sector, and NGOs. The ESFLG would have to 
determine if this could be done best from Washington, DC or if it should move forward 
as a UACG. Integration would occur through the ESFLG identifying gaps, including 
these parties in their planning efforts, and exercising these plans to determine what works 
and what problems and gaps remain to be solved. The ESFLG could also work with 
governors to leverage FEMA’s Regional Administrators and regional planning initiatives, 
to pre-identify needs that can be immediately be released on agreement with the 
governor, prior to requests from local responders making their way up for federal 
assistance. For example, Hurricane Sandy showed the need to provide capabilities to 
restore power and provide gasoline to affected areas and first responders are especially 
important in dense urban areas. In the future, the ESFLG could work with the Governor 
of New York and their emergency management staff so that upon approval from the 
governor, federal agencies immediately begin to push gasoline supplies into affected 
areas and directly to first responders. Following the intent of the governor, federal tankers 
move out through affected areas in the first 24 hours, or if it is a no-notice event, the first 
48–72 hours. Dividing the area up into grids, they deliver fuel daily to medical, law 
enforcement, and other critical facilities identified as priorities in conjunction with state 
officials, which closes the gap in time when local responders are unable, or unavailable, 
to request specific assistance, yet follows the parameters for assistance provided by the 
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governor. These preplanned activities can also be integrated into federal, state, and local 
operational plans based on the type and size of event and could be automatically triggered 
for an existential catastrophe immediately upon approval of a Stafford Act declaration. 
The role of ESFs should also be clearly defined. In the 1980s under the national 
earthquake plan, the role of ESFs appeared in federal regulations, but did not continue 
with the adoption of the FRP, NRP, and NRF. Currently the role and responsibilities of 
ESF primary and support agencies can only be found in the NRF, which has not been 
signed by the affected agencies, as in the case with the FRP and NRP.327 Without the 
support of regulations, EOs or even a signed charter, the role of ESFs is shaky at best and 
liable to subjective interpretation based upon individual agency’s needs and culture. With 
such an unstable foundation, it is no wonder that current federal response efforts lack 
supervision and accountable metrics both pre and post event as no established standard 
exists to which to hold ESFs. 
Finally, while not necessarily rising to the level of existential catastrophes, the 
ESFLG must also address how Stafford Act coordination structures align with 
coordinating non-Stafford Act events. For instance, neither the Exxon Valdez and British 
Petroleum Macondo oil spills nor the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza outbreak resulted 
in Stafford Act declarations. The ESFLG, and ultimately, the DRG (if it continues to 
exist), the NSC and the president need to determine how to leverage the Stafford centric 
coordination structures and capabilities for these events. In time, the ESFLG might grow 
beyond its Stafford centric response and expand to cover the coordination and response to 
all national level incident responses, although the response to non-Stafford events would 
continue under the leadership of other agencies. 
The ultimate objective of these ESFLG efforts would be to meet the FEMA 
Administrator’s goal of getting enough federal capabilities to a catastrophe within the 
first 72 hours of the event to begin making a difference on the ground and to engage the 
nation’s Whole Community to maximize the country’s response to an existential 
catastrophe. The ESFLG accomplishes this goal by providing direction and identifying 
                                                 
327 Like the NRP and the FRP, the NRF was approved under an interagency process; in this case, 
convened under the authority of PPD-1. 
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and delivering resources into the hands of incident commanders while helping integrate 
them with existing capabilities of state, tribal, and local governments, the private sector, 
and citizens. For critical capabilities for which demand exceeds available federal 
resources, the ESFLG can serve to prioritize the delivery of federal capabilities. 
Meanwhile, incident commanders are delegated maximum flexibility to integrate and 
employ these resources and capabilities, and are encouraged to use out of the box 
asymmetric means to deliver these capabilities and to coordinate their use with the Whole 
Community. 
C. MISSION ASSIGNMENTS 
A key tool for the ESFLG will be harnessing the tool it will use to employ the 
capabilities identified. MAs will need to be integrated with capabilities as they are 
inventoried under the supervision of the ESFLG, which is consistent with PPD-8 and the 
move towards capability-based planning. The process might look as follows. The ESFLG 
approves a list of capabilities from a particular federal agency for use in disaster 
response. Those capabilities are then subject to a cost estimate, which also incorporates 
subjective factors, such as length and location of deployment to form the basis of a 
PSMA, which, on this scale for the first time, includes a rational basis for estimated costs 
for employing federal capabilities.  
In addition, the MA program needs to be upgraded significantly within FEMA. 
Until just prior to Hurricane Sandy, the FEMA MA program was led by a GS-13 in the 
FEMA Response Business Management Division. It has since been moved to the 
Response Coordination Branch but is still staffed at the GS-13 level. A loose analogy 
would be if a major were the Director of Operations, or at least its order writing function, 
for the DoD Joint Chiefs, a position currently held by a Navy Vice Admiral. 
In conjunction with national planning efforts at FEMA and DHS, each national 
operational plan incorporates PSMAs to execute these plans, and each plan is required to 
be accompanied by an annex listing identified PSMAs. Hopefully, as part of this process, 
redundant capabilities will be discovered across federal agencies that can be compared 
for cost and efficiency, which is currently lacking. Taking this one step further, it might 
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eventually form the foundation for a system in which MAs can be put up for bid amongst 
federal agencies that have a short time to provide the most efficient capability to match 
the requested mission assignment. 
The ESFLG forms the fulcrum for moving to capability-based MAs, joining them 
to current and future plans, exercises, and operations. It will form a central foundation of 
knowledge in the ESFLG membership and its staff that creates a deep pool of knowledge 
in what existing capabilities (each matched with a PSMA) are found in the federal 
government, how best to implement them holistically, and where might non-traditional 
sources of capabilities be found. It may also lead to new ways to identify capabilities, 
such as using Office of Personnel Management (OPM) databases on federal employees to 
identify unique skills useful in catastrophes, such as engineers, doctors, and veterinarians 
in organizations that do not normally provide those services. The addition of MAs to the 
ESFLG portfolio also supports the argument that the FEMA Administrator should have 
final responsibility for directing the ESFLG as MAs are unique to FEMA and cannot be 
issued by other federal agencies. 
D. CONGRESS 
All these solutions have so far focused on issues internal to the Executive Branch, 
but Congress also plays a role. In addition to providing the statutory foundations for unity 
of command and giving the president, and to a lesser extent the DHS Secretary and 
FEMA Administrator, responsibility for the federal government’s response to 
catastrophes, it also funds these activities and oversees their execution by the Executive 
Branch. For the latter, Congress has not shown a critical interest except after major 
catastrophes, such as Hurricane Katrina, or 9/11. For one, Congressional oversight, as has 
been repeatedly shown, is fractured among as many as 108 committees overseeing DHS 
and homeland security.328 The last significant contraction in homeland security oversight 
probably occurred in 1994 when the House Armed Services Committee relinquished 
                                                 
328 Joshua D. Clinton, David E. Lewis, and Jen Selin, “Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of 
Congressional Oversight,” Social Science Research Network, May 3, 2012, http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2050734, 1. 
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oversight authority over civil defense programs with the repeal of the Federal Civil 
Defense Act of 1950 and its restatement as Title VI of the Stafford Act.329  
Even when Congress determines that homeland security activities fall short of 
their statutory responsibilities, Congress rarely, if ever acts. For instance, in a letter dated 
February 26, 2010 to the DHS Secretary from the United States Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the committee noted DHS and FEMA in 
their draft NDRF had failed to meet the requirements set forth for a National Disaster 
Recovery Strategy in 6 U.S.C. § 771. FEMA went ahead and issued the NDRF anyway to 
no discernible response from Congress. Neither did FEMA’s National Disaster Housing 
Strategy issued on January 16, 2009 meet the requirements of the National Disaster 
Housing Strategy found at 6 U.S.C. § 772. In addition, DHS and FEMA have never 
issued the previously mentioned federal response capability inventory, and has belatedly 
issued a stovepiped Catastrophic Resource Report. 
E. IMPLEMENTATION 
To implement these changes, they would need to be captured by the Executive 
Branch at multiple levels of responsibility. First, the president should update HSPD-5 
with a new PPD that makes the FEMA Administrator responsible for conducting the 
federal operational response to an existential catastrophe under the direction and 
supervision of the president and the NSC/HSC. This new PPD should also inform the 
federal interagency community that the ESFLG would be the single forum to adjudicate 
operational level disputes during a response under the Stafford Act, with the FEMA 
Administrator having final decision-making authority. The new PPD should tie itself to 
EO 12656 and remind federal agencies of their duty to support planning and preparedness 
efforts. It should also require federal agencies to provide representatives to the ESFLG 
who have the authority to direct all agency resources released to the federal response 
                                                 
329 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995. See also House Report 103–499, May 
10, 1994, where the committee report stated, “The committee believes it should get out of the civil defense 
business for two reasons. First, the program has lost its defense emphasis. The threat of attack is no longer 
the driving force behind the program. Rather, the chief threats today come from tornadoes, earthquakes, 
floods, chemical spills, and the like. Second, there are too many House and Senate committees (over 20) 
with legislative jurisdiction over FEMAs activities. This has fragmented oversight of the agency and 
hampered its ability to perform effectively.” 
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effort. The PPD should encourage agencies to give these ESFLG members authority to 
activate critical federal response capabilities immediately without further direction. It 
should also address the role of intermediate senior officials during a response who are not 
part of the NSC/HSC but are senior to the ESFLG members. As suggested previously, the 
new PPD might suggest these officials be responsible for continuing the normal 
operations and responsibilities of their agencies. 
The new PPD should account for policy functions at the operational level. In other 
words, the PPD should also describe whether for non-operational policy decisions, 
essentially those matters handled by the ESFLG when not responding to an existential 
catastrophe, additional policymaking groups should be inserted between the ESFLG and 
the president, and the NSC/HSC. A role for the DRG might be retained, but limited to 
non-operational decisions only. 
The final step to implement these recommendations within the federal 
government would be to update FEMA’s regulations on MAs. At a minimum, these new 
regulations should more accurately reflect the types and uses of MAs. They also should 
amend the reimbursement provisions to allow the FEMA Administrator to reimburse 
other federal agencies for disaster response work directed by the Administrator under 
Sections 402 and 502 of the Stafford Act.330 It is also suggested that MAs be organized 
under the specific work they are intended to support. For example, if a federal agency 
were ordered to construct long-term housing for evacuees, they would receive a “408 
Direct Federal Assistance (DFA)” MA, which reflects the specific Stafford Act section 
authorizing that type of work. 
The other essential implementation requirement for these recommendations would 
be funding. Specifically, Congress would have to continue to provide flexibility in its 
appropriations language for the DRF. A need might also arise to ask Congress for 
additional flexibility amongst federal agencies to transfer funds from existing accounts to 
                                                 
330 The actual mission assignments should also reflect the specific authority for their work, generally 
found in Sections 403 and 502, but for more specific work requests might be found in other sections such 
as 407 for debris removal and 408 in building long-term housing for evacuees. 
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support preparedness efforts conducted under the ESFLG and the FEMA Administrator, 
and possibly, include additional funds specifically for these efforts. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Through a combination of geology, weather, war or malevolence, the United 
States will eventually face an existential catastrophe. Its effects will cascade throughout 
the country and put its future at risk. State and local government resources will be 
overwhelmed and the federal government will need to supplement its response efforts 
immediately. The federal response to an existential catastrophe will likely see it forced to 
assume the role of first responder as local responders are either victims, survivors, or 
otherwise incapable of conducting an adequate response to the catastrophe. 
The history of the federal government’s response to major disasters has generally 
been perceived as poor, and in some cases, worse. For an existential catastrophe, the 
federal government, and most importantly, the president, who is responsible for executing 
the federal response, will not have the luxury of time to gather resources and capabilities. 
It will not have the time to wait for perfect situational awareness. The president will have 
an exceptionally short window to bring the weight of federal resources to bear before the 
nation’s trust deteriorates. In times of crisis, the president holds a unique position in 
American life, and the president’s response to an existential catastrophe will define their 
legacy and the nation’s future. Most importantly, immediate survivors and the entire 
nation, its Whole Community, will need a swift but efficient federal response to 
supplement their efforts, where they have already begun, to fill in the gaps where they 
have not.  
The president needs to be able to balance their need to provide strategic direction 
to the nation’s disaster response, while addressing the continuity of the federal 
government’s functions including other critical responsibilities, such as national defense. 
It has been repeatedly demonstrated the federal government’s current process for 
mobilizing, coordinating, and directing the federal operational response is inadequate. 
This process was developed over time and has resulted in an uneven level of supervision 
by the White House, planning and preparedness efforts unsynchronized with operations, 
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and a lack of clear accountability below the president. The current system of federal 
interagency coordination through unity of effort exacerbates these issues stemming from 
the urgency of time, capabilities, and accountability. 
Historically, the federal response to disasters improved when the president took 
an active part in supervising the federal response.331 The appointment of Frank Carlucci 
in Pennsylvania and Admiral Thad Allen in the Gulf Coast at the least led to the 
perception the federal government was now operating more efficiently with the direct 
support of the president. However, the sheer volume of the president’s responsibilities 
makes it impossible to actually  manage the federal response, certainly at the operational 
level. This thesis has argued that the most efficient way for the president to supervise the 
federal response to an existential catastrophe is to delegate their authority over the federal 
response for operational decisions to a single federal official to allow the president and 
the cabinet, likely through the NSC,332 to focus on strategic decisions and to determine 
how much of the federal government will pivot to respond to the existential catastrophe 
while still maintaining other key government functions. While unity of command may 
not be the solution to an existential catastrophe, it may be a more efficient way to a 
solution. When faced with the largest humanitarian relief effort in U.S. history, Western 
Europe at the end of the Second World War, the U.S. Army, utilizing unity of command, 
was able to leverage its ability to mobilize, coordinate and direct millions of service 
members to deliver assistance to millions of refugees, the homeless, and POWs. 
To determine which federal official should be selected, criteria from historically 
reoccurring themes for disaster response were identified. Seven different federal officials 
or positions with historical relevance to managing federal disaster response operations 
were chosen as alternatives to receive this authority. Based upon the criteria, the FEMA 
Administrator was chosen from among the seven different options as best positioned to 
accept this responsibility. The FEMA Administrator, or their deputy, would lead the 
portion of the federal operational response formerly known as consequence management. 
                                                 
331 See footnotes 7 and 9. 
332 The current President has essentially utilized the NSC for functions previously handled by the HSC 
and adjusted the NSC accordingly for homeland security issues. 
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Supported by an empowered ESFLG, whose members have the authority to direct all 
agency capabilities released to respond to the catastrophe, they will control all federal 
civilian resources released to them by the president and his cabinet. The chain of 
command from the president to incident commanders would be reduced to a minimum 
while these commanders will be empowered to use their best judgment in utilizing the 
resources and capabilities provided to them. Federal law enforcement officials and the 
DoD will both support consequence management activities and coordinate their crisis 
management actions with the FEMA Administrator and their federal civilian partners. 
Implementing these responsibilities through unity of command, the FEMA Administrator 
could provide the best opportunity for the president to provide the level of federal 
leadership necessary to confront the catastrophe. 
The authority for the FEMA Administrator to realize this new responsibility has 
been demonstrated through an analysis of key provisions of the Stafford Act. This 
authority, in conjunction with the Administrator’s inherent authority provided under the 
PKEMRA, and coupled with funding available through the DRF, would provide the 
FEMA Administrator with the tools necessary to coordinate and direct the federal 
operational response. Further, these same tools would allow the Administrator and the 
ESFLG to execute the necessary preparedness activities to ensure the federal government 
maximized its opportunity to meet an existential catastrophe immediately and efficiently. 
These preparedness activities would include identifying, organizing, and exercising 
federal capabilities. The ESFLG would capture the results of these activities in the federal 
response capability inventory, and Catastrophic Resource Reports required by law, and 
integrate them into planning and response efforts by coupling identified capabilities with 
PSMAs. 
Providing the FEMA Administrator the authority to exercise unity of command 
over the federal operational response could still be uncertain. For this to occur, Congress, 
state governments, and federal agencies would have to buy in to the concept. While 
implementation of unity of command might bring the prospect of additional funding to 
federal agencies, they might also see it as a threat to their traditional responsibilities and 
the current flexibility they have in current ESF structure. While state governments might 
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appreciate the consolidated authority, which makes it easier to route their requests for 
assistance or to coordinate with them, they may also feel hesitant to embrace a new 
system. The president may also hesitate in implementing it given no immediate pressure 
currently exists to do so, and by setting standards for preparedness and response, the 
failure to meet these standards may be used against the president. Moreover, the president 
may enjoy the relative ad hoc nature of the current system. Finally, with no historical 
example of an existential catastrophe striking the United States, no one can be quite sure 
of the effects of these changes until the time to implement them arrives. The creation of 
this new system for the federal interagency response to an existential catastrophe will 
also require significant changes to EOs and presidential guidance. If any of these 
dynamics fail, it will be difficult to implement the new system. 
Despite these challenges, it appears the current system to support the federal 
operational response to an existential catastrophe is inadequate. By adopting unity of 
command, for the first time, the federal government would have a true measure of its 
response capabilities, as measured against a standard found in the maximum of 
maximums, and a forum and process to identify, organize, and release to incident 
commanders the resources and capabilities necessary to respond to an existential 
catastrophe that spans the mobilization, coordination, and direction of federal 
capabilities. It could also provide the medium to expand the coordination and integration 
of federal response capabilities greatly with the Whole Community. Through unity of 
command for the federal civilian operational response to a catastrophic disaster as 
exercised by the FEMA Administrator, and in unity of effort with federal law 
enforcement and military forces, the president would have the opportunity to impose their 
will on an existential catastrophe, and if history is a guide, provide the country with its 
best chance to respond to this nation’s first existential catastrophe. 
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APPENDIX A. MISSION ASSIGNMENTS 
MAs issued under the authority of the Stafford Act are the way in which federal 
agencies are asked to take actions to respond to a catastrophic disaster, and which also 
function to provide the fiscal mechanism to reimburse those agencies for the work they 
performed. Current FEMA practice, which stretches back to at least the beginning of the 
formation of FEMA, is to “ask not task” other federal agencies. In other words, if another 
federal agency declines a MA, it either looks for another federal agency to perform the 
work or must seek resolution through some kind of higher decision making body in the 
federal government. 
The statutory definition of a MA is “a work order issued to a Federal agency by 
the Agency [FEMA], directing completion by that agency of a specified task and setting 
forth funding, other managerial controls, and guidance.”333 The current FEMA Standard 
Operating Procedure (SOP) describes the use of MAs to meet the following 
circumstances: 
Mission assignments are issued by FEMA under the authority of the 
Stafford Act to meet urgent, immediate, or short-term needs of states or 
local governments unable to provide the resources needed to save lives, 
protect property, or preserve public health or public safety during a major 
disaster or emergency, or to avert the threat of a major disaster or 
emergency.334   
                                                 
333 6 U.S.C. § 741(4). This definition supports the direction to FEMA to create PrePSMAs under the 
Federal Preparedness for the National Preparedness System at 6 U.S.C. § 753(c) To expedite the provision 
of assistance under the NRP, the President shall ensure that the Administrator, in coordination with federal 
agencies with responsibilities under the NRP, develops prescripted mission assignments, including 
logistics, communications, mass care, health services, and public safety. See also 44 CFR 206.2(18) 
“Mission assignment: Work order issued to a Federal agency by the Regional Administrator, Assistant 
Administrator for the Disaster Operations Directorate, or Administrator, directing completion by that 
agency of a specified task and citing funding, other managerial controls, and guidance.” It does not appear 
that Congress is inclined to substitute “setting forth” for “citing.” Reference may be made to the definitions 
of “citing” and “forth” elsewhere although the author referred to the online Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
for guidance. 
334 FEMA Mission Assignment Program Standard Operating Procedures, ver. 3, May 2011, Appendix 
B: Definitions, 43. 
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FEMA currently divides MAs into three categories: Direct Federal Assistance 
(DFA), Technical Assistance (TA),335 and Federal Operational Support (FOS).  
Chapter 2–1 of the FEMA Mission Assignment Program Standard Operating 
Procedures states the following about DFA, TA, and FOS.  
I. Federal Operational Support (FOS): Issued by FEMA directing 
another Federal agency to provide direct technical, operational, or 
logistical support to FEMA or another Federal agency in 
anticipation of or in response to a Presidential declaration of a 
major disaster or emergency. 
 Requested by the Federal Government  
 100% Federally funded  
 Eligible before or after a declaration  
 Example: A mission assignment issued to activate the United 
States Forest Service (USFS) to the NRCC to perform duties of 
ESF #4 in support of disaster operations. 
II. Technical Assistance (TA): Issued by FEMA in response to a state 
approved request to direct a Federal agency to provide only 
technical expertise to state or local government when the state has 
the resources, but lacks the knowledge or skills needed to perform 
the work related to the disaster or emergency.  
 Must be requested by the State  
 100% Federally funded  
 Eligible after a declaration  
 Example:  A mission assignment issued to the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers (USACE) to provide assistance to affected 
counties in the writing of debris contracts. 
III. Direct Federal Assistance (DFA): Issued by FEMA in response to 
a state approved request to direct a Federal agency to provide 
goods and services to state or local government when the affected 
jurisdiction lacks the capability to perform or to contract for 




                                                 
335 TA will likely be eliminated as a category of MAs by FEMA in 2013. 
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 Must be requested by the State  
 Subject to a cost share—normally 75% Federal share, 25% State 
share  
 The State may request the President to amend the cost share of 
federal obligations in extreme situations.  
 Eligible after a declaration  
 Example:  A mission assignment issued to the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish temporary medical 
facilities for disaster victims within the affected disaster area.336 
FOS was created around 1994 by the FEMA response staff that needed to issue 
MAs to other federal agencies before such assistance was requested by a state,337 which 
was probably a direct result of the hearings and reports on Hurricane Andrew. These 
hearings and reports found federal agencies were willing to prepare to deploy assets 
before a Stafford Act declaration but were unwilling to do so until FEMA issued a MA. 
FOS MA’s allow FEMA to issue a MA to another federal agency without a declaration 
but cannot be used to provide actual disaster assistance.  
DFA and TA predate the creation of FOS.  
(a)  IN GENERAL—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
including any agreement, the Federal share of assistance, including any 
direct Federal assistance, provided for the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Florida, Alabama, and Texas in connection with Hurricanes Katrina, 
Wilma, Dennis, and Rita under sections 403, 406, 407, and 408 of the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 
U.S.C. 5170b, 5172, 5173, and 5174) shall be 100 percent of the eligible 
costs under such sections. 
(b) APPLICABILITY– 
(1) IN GENERAL—The Federal share provided by subsection (a) shall 




                                                 
336 FEMA Mission Assignment Program Standard Operating Procedures, Chapter 2–1. 
337 Former FEMA MA program manager, in discussion with the author, July 2011. 
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(2) LIMITATION—In the case of disaster assistance provided under 
sections 403, 406, and 407 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act, the Federal share provided by subsection (a) 
shall be limited to assistance provided for projects for which a “request for 
public assistance form” has been submitted.338 
It can be inferred from this provision that Congress has acknowledged the 
statutory authority for DFA stems from the above ascribed sections of the Stafford Act 
along with Section 502. See also FEMA Recovery Policy 9523.9 100% Funding for 
Direct Federal Assistance and Grant Assistance, which refers to Sections 403 and 407 of 
the Stafford Act for authority. 
DFA is described in FEMA regulations and consists of “emergency work” or 
debris removal under Sections 403, 407 and 502(5) of the Stafford Act.  
When the State and local government lack the capability to perform or to 
contract for eligible emergency work and/or debris removal, under 
sections 402(1) and (4), 403, 407, 502(a)(1), (5) and (7) of the Act, the 
Grantee may request that the work be accomplished by a Federal agency. 
Such assistance is subject to the cost sharing provisions outlined in § 
206.203(b) of this subpart. Direct Federal assistance is also subject to the 
eligibility criteria contained in Subpart H of these regulations. FEMA will 
reimburse other Federal agencies in accordance with Subpart A of these 
regulations.339  
By naming particular subsections of Sections 402 and 502 that do not include 
debris removal, it appears that these sections of the Stafford Act are considered the 
complete statutory authority for all DFA including both emergency work and debris 
removal. However, while it names particular parts of Sections 402 and 502, and 
specifically, does not include those parts referring to “technical and advisory assistance” 
in Section 402(3) and Section 502(3), it does cite all of Section 403 as the authority for 
DFA. This view is problematic if “technical advice” under Section 403(a)(3)(H) is the  
 
 
                                                 
338 DFA does not appear in U.S. Code in the context of federal disaster assistance except for a 
provision of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability 
Appropriations Act, 2007, Public Law 110–28, 121 Stat. 112 (2007), Sec. 4501.  
339 44 C.F.R. 208(a) Direct Federal Assistance. 
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same as “technical and advisory assistance” under Sections 402 and 502, and FEMA 
sought to include all types of TA in a separate category. However, TA is not specifically 
defined in FEMA regulations or statute. 
DFA is also subject to the eligibility requirements of FEMA’s Public Assistance 
program.340 FEMA regulations define emergency work as “emergency protective 
measures to save lives, to protect public health and safety, and to protect improved 
property.”  
Emergency protective measures to save lives, to protect public health and 
safety, and to protect improved property are eligible. See also id. at 
206.225(a)(3). In order to be eligible, emergency protective measures 
must:(i) Eliminate or lessen immediate threats to live, public health or 
safety; or (ii) Eliminate or lessen immediate threats of significant 
additional damage to improved public or private property through 
measures which are cost effective.341 
                                                 
340 44 C.F.R. 208(a) Direct Federal Assistance. 
341 44 C.F.R. 206.225(a) (1).  
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APPENDIX B.  DISASTER RELIEF ACT OF 1950 PUB. L. NO. 81-975 
[DISASTER RELIEF ACT OF 1950] 
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APPENDIX C. DISASTER RELIEF ACT OF 1970 PUB. L. NO. 91-606 
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APPENDIX D.  DISASTER RELIEF ACT OF 1974 PUB. L.  
NO. 93-288 
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APPENDIX E. HISTORY OF MISSION 
ASSIGNMENT/PRESIDENTIAL COORDINATION AND 
DIRECTION STATUTES FROM THE DISASTER RELIEF ACT OF 
1950 THROUGH THE STAFFORD ACT 
Disaster Relief Act of 1950 
Section 3 
In any major disaster, Federal agencies 
are hereby authorized when directed by 
the President to provide assistance (a) by 
utilizing or lending, with or without 
compensation therefor, to States and 
local governments their equipment, 
supplies, facilities, personnel, and other 
resources, other than the extension of 
credit under the authority of any Act;  
Disaster Relief Act of 
1970 
Disaster Relief Act of 
1974 
Section 5(a) 
In the interest of providing maximum 
mobilization of Federal assistance under 
this Act, the President is authorized to 
coordinate in such manner as he may 
determine the activities of Federal 
agencies in providing disaster assistance. 
The President may direct any Federal 
agency to utilize its available personnel, 
equipment, supplies, facilities, and other 
resources, in accordance with the 
authority herein contained. 
Section 7 
In carrying out the purposes of this Act, 
any Federal agency is authorized to 
accept and utilize with the consent of 
any State or local government, the 
services and facilities of such State or 
local government, or of any agencies, 
officers, or employees thereof….The 
President may, also, out of such funds, 
reimburse any Federal agency for any of 
its expenditures under section 3 in 
connection with a major disaster, such 
reimbursement to be in such amounts as 










to Section 203(c) 
 
)))
Stafford Act of 1988 
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APPENDIX F. EXCERPT ON FEMA’S RESPONSE 
COORDINATION STRUCTURES 1979–1992 FROM THE FEMA 
INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT FEDERAL RESPONSE 
PLANNING AND COORDINATION, SEPTEMBER 1992  
An additional challenge has been the requirement for FEMA to coordinate with 
other Federal agencies as they respond to domestic and national security emergencies. 
One of the first attempts to meet these challenges was initiated in 1980, with the 
Interagency Emergency Policy Board. This concept attempted to pull together human 
resources from across FEMA’s organizational boundaries to meet specific crisis 
requirements. Similarly, interagency staff were to serve as a central government-wide 
policy making body. The historical record is unclear, but it appears this concept was 
never tested nor did it survive the change in administrations.  
In 1982, FEMA developed the Integrated Emergency Management System 
Concept (IEMS). This concept for the first time aligned mitigation, planning and 
response initiatives as a coherent approach to emergency management. While not an 
organizational initiative, it influenced the way FEMA thought about its organization, and 
soon after, FEMA management reorganized and established the Emergency Operations 
Directorate. The directorate’s primary objective at the time was to ensure a coordinated 
FEMA response under one directorate and through this, eliminate replication of planning 
and response operations in each FEMA program office. Subsequently, in 1984, the results 
of a report commissioned by FEMA became available. The report, entitled “FEMA’s 
Response in Emergency operations”, concluded that “the agency currently has no means 
for assuring an integrated and coordinated response in extraordinary situations or larger 
scale, multi-faceted emergencies.” The report went on to recommend adoption of a 
concept named the Integrated Emergency Coordination Structure (IECS). Although this 
concept is no longer officially recognized, key elements of the concept endure, among 
them the Director’s Emergency Council (DEC), Emergency Response Teams (ERT) and 
the Emergency Support Teams (EST).  
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While internal emergency organizational efforts continued, another effort sought 
to facilitate FEMA’s external emergency coordination plans and processes. In 1987, the 
president’s Domestic Policy Council (DPC) concluded that a “generic interagency 
structure would provide a more efficient and effective means of coordinating Federal 
emergency responses than would multiple plans with different organizing principles.” 
The DPC’s proposed solution was entitled National Emergency Response Structure 
(NERS). The key feature was a consistent set of organizational principles and procedures 
for all response agencies to use in both domestic and national security emergencies. 
Significantly, the concept provided interagency coordination channels and links to the 
Chief Executive through an interagency council and a “national coordinating official” 
appointed by the president. Response operations would be conducted through a “lead 
federal agency concept” and inter-agency functional groups. This “functional group 
concept” exists today in both our domestic and national security plans.  
In January 1988, the NERS Concept was re-titled the National System for 
Emergency Coordination (NSEC) and approved by the president. In communicating the 
decision to the Domestic Policy council, the approval specifically stated that NSEC was a 
means for “ensuring that the Federal Government provided timely, effective and 
coordinated assistance to state and local governments in extreme catastrophic 
technological, natural or other domestic disasters of national significance.” The concept 
clearly provided for a command relationship between the Executive Office of the 
president and other federal agencies through an appointed national coordinating official. 
Significantly, NSEC cites the Plan for Federal Response to a Catastrophic Earthquake, 
which is now named the Federal Response Plan (FRP), and acknowledges it as the key 
plan through which assistance gets funneled to State and local governments. Concurrent 
with this action in June 1988, then Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, General Colin L. Powell, instructed agencies to develop a National Security Plan 
with a “functionally” oriented structure as a companion approach for national security 
emergencies. This, he concluded, “will assure a consistent response by the Federal 
Government regardless of the nature of an emergency and will eliminate the need to 
change response mechanisms in the midst of a crisis.”  
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Today, the NSEC concept is still included in official documents and many of the 
planning tenets still endure, although the concept has been disregarded by many agencies, 
including FEMA. However, the Environmental Protection Agency, Department of 
Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission still include NSEC as a planning 
assumption and acknowledge its relevance to their response plans, i.e., the National 
Contingency Plan for oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution (NCP) and the Federal 
Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP). 
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APPENDIX G. FEMA’S BASELINE AUTHORITY UNDER PKEMRA 
(6 U.S.C. §§ 313-314) 
Sec. 503. Federal Emergency Management Agency (6 U.S.C. § 313) 
(a) In General—There is in the Department the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
headed by an Administrator. 
(b) Mission— 
(1) PRIMARY MISSION—The primary mission of the Agency is to reduce the loss of 
life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts 
of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation in a 
risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, 
response, recovery, and mitigation. 
(2) SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES—In support of the primary mission of the Agency, the 
Administrator shall— 
 (A) lead the Nation’s efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover 
from, and mitigate against the risk of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-
made disasters, including catastrophic incidents; 
 (B) partner with State, local, and tribal governments and emergency response 
providers, with other Federal agencies, with the private sector, and with nongovernmental 
organizations to build a national system of emergency management that can effectively 
and efficiently utilize the full measure of the Nation’s resources to respond to natural 
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, including catastrophic 
incidents; 
 (C) develop a Federal response capability that, when necessary and appropriate, 
can act effectively and rapidly to deliver assistance essential to saving lives or protecting 
or preserving property or public health and safety in a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or 
other man-made disaster; 
 (D) integrate the Agency’s emergency preparedness, protection, response, 
recovery, and mitigation responsibilities to confront effectively the challenges of a 
natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster; 
 (E) develop and maintain robust Regional Offices that will work with State, local, 
and tribal governments, emergency response providers, and other appropriate entities to 
identify and address regional priorities; 
 (F) under the leadership of the Secretary, coordinate with the Commandant of the 
Coast Guard, the Director of Customs and Border Protection, the Director of Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement, the National Operations Center, and other agencies and 
offices in the Department to take full advantage of the substantial range of resources in 
the Department; 
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 (G) provide funding, training, exercises, technical assistance, planning, and other 
assistance to build tribal, local, State, regional, and national capabilities (including 
communications capabilities), necessary to respond to a natural disaster, act of terrorism, 
or other man-made disaster; and 
 (H) develop and coordinate the implementation of a risk-based, all-hazards 
strategy for preparedness that builds those common capabilities necessary to respond to 
natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters while also building the 
unique capabilities necessary to respond to specific types of incidents that pose the 
greatest risk to our Nation. 
(c) Administrator— 
(1) IN GENERAL—The Administrator shall be appointed by the President, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate. 
(2) QUALIFICATIONS—The Administrator shall be appointed from among individuals 
who have— 
 (A) a demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emergency management and 
homeland security; and 
 (B) not less than 5 years of executive leadership and management experience in 
the public or private sector. 
(3) REPORTING—The Administrator shall report to the Secretary, without being 
required to report through any other official of the Department. 
(4) PRINCIPAL ADVISOR ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT— 
 (A) IN GENERAL—The Administrator is the principal advisor to the President, 
the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary for all matters relating to emergency 
management in the United States. 
 (B) ADVICE AND RECOMMENDATIONS— 
  (i) IN GENERAL—In presenting advice with respect to any matter to the 
President, the  Homeland Security Council, or the Secretary, the Administrator shall, as 
the Administrator  considers appropriate, inform the President, the Homeland Security 
Council, or the Secretary, as the case may be, of the range of emergency preparedness, 
protection, response, recovery, and  mitigation options with respect to that matter. 
  (ii) ADVICE ON REQUEST—The Administrator, as the principal advisor 
on emergency management, shall provide advice to the President, the Homeland Security 
Council, or the  Secretary on a particular matter when the President, the Homeland 
Security Council, or the Secretary requests such advice. 
  (iii) RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS—After informing the 
Secretary, the Administrator may make such recommendations to Congress relating to 
emergency management as the Administrator considers appropriate. 
(5) CABINET STATUS— 
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 (A) IN GENERAL—The President may designate the Administrator to serve as a 
member of the Cabinet in the event of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other man-
made disasters. 
 (B) RETENTION OF AUTHORITY—Nothing in this paragraph shall be 
construed as affecting the authority of the Secretary under this Act. 
 
Sec. 504. Authority and Responsibilities (6 U.S.C. § 314) 
(a) In General —The Administrator shall provide Federal leadership necessary to prepare 
for, protect against, respond to, recover from, or mitigate against a natural disaster, act of 
terrorism, or other man-made disaster, including— 
(1) helping to ensure the effectiveness of emergency response providers to terrorist 
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies;  
(2) with respect to the Nuclear Incident Response Team (regardless of whether it is 
operating as an organizational unit of the Department pursuant to this subchapter)— 
 (A) establishing standards and certifying when those standards have been met;  
 (B) conducting joint and other exercises and training and evaluating performance; 
and  
 (C) providing funds to the Department of Energy and the Environmental 
Protection Agency, as appropriate, for homeland security planning, exercises and 
training, and equipment;  
(3) providing the Federal Government’s response to terrorist attacks and major disasters, 
including— 
 (A) managing such response;  
 (B) directing the Domestic Emergency Support Team, the National Disaster 
Medical System, and (when operating as an organizational unit of the Department 
pursuant to this subchapter) the Nuclear Incident Response Team;  
 (C) overseeing the Metropolitan Medical Response System; and  
 (D) coordinating other Federal response resources, including requiring 
deployment of the Strategic National Stockpile, in the event of a terrorist attack or major 
disaster;  
(4) aiding the recovery from terrorist attacks and major disasters;  
(5) building a comprehensive national incident management system with Federal, State, 
and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, to respond to such attacks and 
disasters;  
(6) consolidating existing Federal Government emergency response plans into a single, 
coordinated national response plan;  
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(7) helping ensure the acquisition of operable and interoperable communications 
capabilities by Federal, State, local, and tribal governments and emergency response 
providers; 
(8) assisting the President in carrying out the functions under the Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) and carrying out 
all functions and authorities given to the Administrator under that Act; 
(9) carrying out the mission of the Agency to reduce the loss of life and property and 
protect the Nation from all hazards by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, 
comprehensive emergency management system of— 
 (A) mitigation, by taking sustained actions to reduce or eliminate long-term risks 
to people and property from hazards and their effects; 
 (B) preparedness, by planning, training, and building the emergency management 
profession to prepare  effectively for, mitigate against, respond to, and recover from any 
hazard; 
 (C) response, by conducting emergency operations to save lives and property 
through positioning emergency equipment, personnel, and supplies, through evacuating 
potential victims, through providing food, water, shelter, and medical care to those in 
need, and through restoring critical public services; and 
 (D) recovery, by rebuilding communities so individuals, businesses, and 
governments can function on their own, return to normal life, and protect against future 
hazards; 
(10) increasing efficiencies, by coordinating efforts relating to preparedness, protection, 
response, recovery, and mitigation; 
(11) helping to ensure the effectiveness of emergency response providers in responding to 
a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster; 
(12) supervising grant programs administered by the Agency; 
(13) administering and ensuring the implementation of the National Response Plan, 
including coordinating and ensuring the readiness of each emergency support function 
under the National Response Plan; 
(14) coordinating with the National Advisory Council established under section 508; 
(15) preparing and implementing the plans and programs of the Federal Government 
for— 
 (A) continuity of operations; 
 (B) continuity of government; and 
 (C) continuity of plans; 
(16) minimizing, to the extent practicable, overlapping planning and reporting 
requirements applicable to State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector; 
 219
(17) maintaining and operating within the Agency the National Response Coordination 
Center or its successor; 
(18) developing a national emergency management system that is capable of preparing 
for, protecting against, responding to, recovering from, and mitigating against 
catastrophic incidents; 
(19) assisting the President in carrying out the functions under the national preparedness 
goal and the national preparedness system and carrying out all functions and authorities 
of the Administrator under the national preparedness System; 
(20) carrying out all authorities of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the 
Directorate of Preparedness of the Department as transferred under section 505; and 
(21) otherwise carrying out the mission of the Agency as described in section 503(b). 
(b) All-Hazards Approach—In carrying out the responsibilities under this section, the 
Administrator shall coordinate the implementation of a risk-based, all-hazards strategy 
that builds those common capabilities necessary to prepare for, protect against, respond 
to, recover from, or mitigate against natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-
made disasters, while also building the unique capabilities necessary to prepare for, 
protect against, respond to, recover from, or mitigate against the risks of specific types of 
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APPENDIX H. STATEMENT BY SENATOR TRENT LOTT BEFORE 
THE UNITED STATE SENATE, JULY 11, 2006 152 CONG REC S 
7306 VOL 152, NO. 89, JULY 11, 2006, PGS 7318-7319. 
Amendment No. 4560 
 Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I come to the floor to join in the support of amendment 
No. 4560 to the Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill. I thank Senator 
Collins for her leadership in this area and for her willingness to work on a solution that I 
think will be good for the Federal Emergency Management Administration, as it is now 
known, in the Department of Homeland Security, and result in a better effort by the 
successor to FEMA in the future. 
 Let me begin by saying that I appreciate the support of my colleagues in the 
Senate as we have gone through the aftermath of Katrina and we have come to the floor 
three or four times asking for help in a variety of areas to help us with the recovery, to get 
funds for the different Federal agencies, to get funds even to the Federal Emergency 
Management Administration to help us recover. A lot of progress has been made. I want 
to acknowledge that. 
 In 3 years or 5 years, we are going to look back and say that the aid we received 
from the Federal Government was absolutely indispensable and allowed us to get through 
this very difficult process. 
 In the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, there were wonderful stories that 
could be told about the actions of the Coast Guard specifically, let me point out, and by 
other military installations, faith-based groups, volunteer groups, charitable 
organizations, by corporate America that sent aid, supplies, money, people. The utilities 
worked laboriously to get power back on and telephones operative. It was a monumental 
undertaking. 
 For those who want to be critical of the recovery effort-and I am one of those-you 
have to first acknowledge that this was a devastating disaster of Biblical proportions, 
more than any of us could have comprehended, more than any of us who lived in the line 
of fire from Hurricane Katrina understood even in the immediate aftermath, including 
me. 
 I was there in the immediate aftermath. We lost our house. We are like everybody 
else along the coastline of Mississippi and Louisiana. It is a very difficult experience. But 
our people have been resilient, they have been determined, and we are making progress. 
 We did get through the preparations for the hurricane, saving lives immediately 
after, getting basics to people who needed them-just basic water and ice. We have gotten 
almost all of the debris removed, except in some of the swamp and water canals and 
channels that still has to be removed. We are seeing rebuilding start. Just yesterday, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development released $3 billion for the home grants 
through CDBG so that people who lost their home, had no insurance, and had a mortgage 
and probably lost their job and their car, their truck, or their dog will have some way to 
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get up to $150,000 to get their homes repaired or rebuilt. So we have made a lot of 
progress. 
 I think it is time that we look even more to the future: How are we going to get 
through the rebuilding period? We are working with elevations, heights that FEMA is 
requiring; we are dealing with small business loans, all that goes on with the rebuilding 
effort. 
 But I am worried about the next disaster. There were some very disappointing 
results at FEMA. And I want to hasten to say that FEMA, which became a dirty, four-
letter word, has a lot of good people in it and has done a lot of really good things, but it 
could have been and it should have been better. And what troubles me so much, as a 
Congressman and Senator and even before that as a staff member-I have dealt with the 
recovery effort after five hurricanes, two major tornadoes, two major ice storms, and a 
flood. I have dealt with disasters. I have dealt with the emergency arm of the Federal 
Government, going back to 1969 after Hurricane Camille, when the disaster effort and 
recovery was carried out by the Office of Emergency Preparedness, OEP. Its offices are 
right across the street from the Old Executive Office Building, run by a general, a retired 
Army general, and reportable only to the President of the United States. 
 They did a marvelous job after Hurricane Camille. The chain of command was 
short. In those days, the Corps of Engineers brought in the heavy equipment, the trucks, 
the bulldozers, the front-end loaders, the Bobcats. They cleaned up the debris. Now you 
have to go through Treasury, a check goes to FEMA, FEMA goes to the Corps, the Corps 
of Engineers goes to the contractor-out of State probably-and the contractor goes to 
subcontractors, to sub-subcontractors and, meanwhile, a lot of money is frittered away as 
everybody takes their bite, on down the line. 
 Of course, one of the most difficult things was getting the trailers, the temporary 
housing to people in the area. The logistics of getting trailers is not a big problem, but 
getting them to the people turned out to be a huge problem. The insanity of how it was 
managed was inexplicable. I won’t go through how difficult it was. 
 We are still dealing with that. We still have some people who are living in tents 
because FEMA said: We won’t deliver you a trailer if you are in a flood zone. If that is 
all the property you have-you could bring a trailer into a flood zone, and if you had to, 
you could hitch it up and pull it out. But people are still living in very difficult 
circumstances.  
 I believe we made a mistake when we were creating this huge, new, mammoth 
Department of Homeland Security where we put all of these different entities, agencies, 
and bureaus into that agency that wound up having 150,000 or more people in it. 
 I remember when we were discussing creating this Department of Homeland 
Security in an office right down the hall. Senator Stevens and Senator Collins and some 
of us raised questions about how the Coast Guard was going to be handled, and we 
wound up carving out a special arrangement for the Coast Guard. I won’t get into the 
details of it at this moment. But I raised questions about FEMA, too: Are we sure we 
want to put our emergency management organization into this big, mammoth department 
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and maybe become overrun by homeland security and terrorism? And the answer was: 
Oh, absolutely. They need to coordinate manmade disasters, natural disasters, disaster 
preparation, disaster recovery; it needs to be seamless and they all need to be operating 
under the same authority. 
 Well, I relented. I think it was a mistake. I think the emergency management 
organization has a unique responsibility in preparation for disasters. Yes, they can be 
manmade as well as natural disasters, but also in the recovery. But I think the chain of 
command was out of control. The number of officials who were meeting in a room, they 
would fill up the room and identify all the problems: Oh, we have a flood main broken 
here. We have schools where the wall is falling in. We have debris in the road. They 
would get through with the meeting, everybody would leave, and somebody would say: 
Did anybody get any assignments? Did they agree to do anything? No.  
 The people that did do something, though, were in the Coast Guard. They helped 
move people out before the hurricane, rescued people during and after the hurricane, and 
generally did a magnificent job. Do you know why? Because they had this carved-out, 
unique position, even though they were in the Department of Homeland Security. They 
didn’t have to go through the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to do 
what was necessary. 
 Another example was the Seabees at Gulfport, MS. When they went to these 
meetings with all of these muckety-mucks, all of these different agency heads, to hear the 
problems and do nothing about it, the Seabees would make lists of things they could do 
and they went out and did it. They went out and stopped the leaky water main. They went 
and removed the debris so you could get into a neighborhood. They went to the school 
and they took action to tear down or repair or fix a wall so it would at least be safe for 
their children. You know what. They just did it. 
 By the way, they could have gotten in trouble because if FEMA hadn’t agreed to 
reimbursement, they would have had to eat the cost of what they did, and some captain in 
the Seabees could have been in real jeopardy. But, thank goodness, they worked through 
it. They got reimbursed and did well. 
 So I think that is part of the problem. I asked the Seabees: Why were you able to 
do that? 
 They said: Well, the chain of command was so long and laborious, we decided we 
would find the things we could do and we would just go out and do it. 
 FEMA, I think, meanwhile, had been sort of pushed back into the back 40 part of 
Homeland Security. They had been underfunded, undermanned, and had not been really 
getting the involvement and the attention they needed. Plus, I was shocked one time when 
I heard the Secretary of Homeland Security complaining that the head of FEMA was 
going around him directly to the President. Yes, he should have. You shouldn’t have the 
emergency management and recovery people having to check with the Assistant 
Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, the Secretary, the Chief of Staff, the OMB, to get to the 
President. This is an emergency. It is a disaster, for heaven’s sake. So I don’t think it 
worked well. 
 224
 I don’t blame a lot of the good men and women at FEMA; I blame us. We did it. 
We created a system that didn’t work. 
 So I introduced legislation to move FEMA, like its predecessors, back into a role 
as an independent agency with specific authorities for natural disasters, reporting only to 
the President. I was joined in sponsoring that legislation by the Senator from New York, 
Mrs. Clinton, who knows something about how the predecessor to FEMA worked under 
its Administrator at the time, James Lee Witt, who also had a little experience with 
disasters, although the ones he dealt with on 9/11, as the Senator from New York knows, 
were manmade. Others joined in cosponsoring that legislation. 
 I still believe that is the best way to go. I think it should be independent. 
 In the House, you have two separate approaches. You have the independent 
approach and you have the approach that would keep it locked in Homeland Security. But 
it seemed to me that there was a third way. There is always a third way, if you will just 
look for it. I think that is one of the things we have lost in this institution. We get locked 
into the Republican position, the Democratic position, or some other division, and then 
we won’t talk to each other. 
 So Senator Collins, to her credit, on her own initiative, said: Can I come talk to 
you about the proposal that Senator Lieberman and I have, which was to keep it in the 
Department of Homeland Security, with some changes, and some recommendations I 
thought would have been positive but still was not the solution I thought we needed. But 
she came and took the time to explain it to me. It had some attractive features to it. She 
gave it more authority. 
 But then I thought about it for a while and I went back to her and I said: Let’s find 
this third way. I think maybe the thing to do is to carve FEMA out into a position like the 
Coast Guard but within the Department of Homeland Security but with an independent 
authority, the ability to report directly to the President of the United States. Yes, they 
could be involved in coordinating and in the preparation for disasters of all kinds, but set 
them up basically independent within the Department of Homeland Security. 
 I think it will work. An example is the Coast Guard. So much of the language that 
we have in this amendment came from the Coast Guard language. I know Senator Collins 
has taken the time to explain the details of what is proposed here, and I am painting a 
broader picture of what is involved. But we were able to come to an agreement. Her staff 
was cooperative. My staff, which has had a lot of experience with this sort of thing, 
worked with them, and we came to an agreement. By the way, I then went to Senator 
Clinton and said: I think we can get something done if we do this, rather than just having 
a big fight. Do you want a big fight or do you want a result? The new hurricane season is 
upon us. 
 Now, the media made it sound like on June 8, or whatever the date was that 
hurricane season begins, we would get hit immediately. Well, those of us who are 
hurricane pros know that hurricanes generally don’t hit in June and July, but they will 
come in August and September, and this time it may not be Mississippi or Florida; it may 
be Maine. But it will come somewhere. I don’t want to be sitting around here 
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complaining about what it was like because FEMA did not have the authority they 
needed, didn’t have the money, didn’t have the power they needed 6 months or a year 
from now. So we needed to get something done. 
 Senator Clinton understood what I was trying to do. It is part of the way I think 
we need to do things around here. It is part of being honorable with each other. She had 
been a cosponsor. I thought I should explain what I was working on doing. So we came 
to the agreement that has been produced with this amendment. I think it makes good 
sense. I think the House will find some wisdom in it, and the most important thing is we 
will get something done. 
 It is so difficult to move something through the Senate anymore. Do you think we 
could really move a whole new, freestanding bill through the Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs Committee, get it to the floor of the Senate, all kinds of 
amendments-and let me tell you, I would be one of the ones waiting here with lots of 
amendments. I have lots of other things stuck in my craw about the hurricanes that I am 
worried about for the future-or could we go with an amendment, which seems appropriate 
to me, to the Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill, get it to the House, 
get their input, and get a result. Even then, it won’t be perfect, but I believe it will be 
better. This is something we should do. 
 I will be coming back, until the last day I serve in this institution-whenever that 
may be-to talk to my colleagues about lessons we learned and things we can do that will 
hopefully help our people be more secure; that will help people who will be hit with other 
kinds of disasters such as tornadoes, earthquakes, crickets, or whatever, but we will do it 
better because of what we learned from Hurricane Katrina. 
 So I am delighted to be here to support this amendment. In a perfect world I might 
do it differently, or I might still insist that it can be a separate entity. The amendment 
even proposes that it be renamed the Emergency Management Administration, I believe-
EMA. It is something we can say, and it is not a four-letter word. I think while that is not 
going to cure a single problem, it is part of creating a new atmosphere and a different 
mindset, hopefully. 
 I think the Administrator of FEMA that we have in place now, Mr. Paulson, is a 
good man. I think he is going to move toward trying to get professional disaster-
experienced people in FEMA throughout this country, and I certainly hope he will. 
 So I urge my colleagues to support this amendment and then support this 
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